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
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VICTOR MOREAU.

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ILLUSTRATED WITH
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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE first Edition of the History of the Campaign of 1796, in Germany, and in Italy, published three years ago, having been exhausted for a long time back, and its author having proposed, also to, publish the History of the War carried on in 1797, 1798, and 1799, in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, he has been induced to make a second Edition of his first work. He has added to it, and has caused to be expressly engraved for the purpose, Maps of the countries which were the theatre of the campaign of 1796. Several additions and corrections have also been made. The Author, however, has made no other changes than what the truth of the facts rendered ne-

VOL. I.

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cessary: he has left all the reasonings, opinions, and conjectures, such as they were in the first Edition, thinking that the reader of the present day will not be displeased to find what were the impressions, which the events and the result of the campaign had made on the public mind, at the commencement of the year 1797, the time at which this work was first published.

It is scarcely necessary to say, that the high price to which paper has lately risen, and the still greater increase of expense, incurred by the addition of the maps, do not permit the price of this volume to be left the same as that of the first Edition.

PREFACE.

NO person can be ignorant, how totally the war, which has desolated Europe for five years, has differed from all preceding ones, in its nature, in the means that have been employed for the prosecution of it, and in the consequences that have resulted from it. Its history, inseparable from that of the French Revolution, will, doubtless, be the most remarkable feature of the annals of this age. The campaigns of 1794 and 1796 will particularly attract the attention of posterity. In the first of these, political errors, still more than force of arms, enabled the French to become masters of the Netherlands, of Holland, and of all the countries on this side of the Rhine. The union of Belgium to France,

and the application of the French system to Holland, left no doubt of the project formed by the French, to enlarge their territory, and to compel Europe to submit, either to their arms or their principles. The spirit of moderation, which the successors of Robespierre were obliged to affect for some time, as well as other political reasons, prevented the French from pursuing their ambitious designs, during the year 1795. They resumed the execution of them in 1796, employed more considerable means, and combined them with greater ability. They knew how to take advantage of the disunion and the errors of their enemies; diminished their numbers, partly by terror, partly by seduction; invaded Germany as well as Italy; and were on the point of accomplishing their plan of general disorganization in its fullest extent. One young hero saved Germany: but a young man, also, on the other side, was almost constantly victorious in Italy.

The disastrous consequences which these events might have brought with them on Europe, the effects which they have already produced, and those which may result from them hereafter, attach a considerable degree of importance and of interest to the campaign of 1796. Possibly there may be some persons who would wish to have before them, in one view, all the various facts which compose it, combined, arranged, and connected. This is what the Author now presumes to offer to the public. He has neglected no inquiries, nor pains, to give to this historical account, exactness and perspicuity, the only merits of which a work of this sort will admit. It seems to him, that he who writes, not on theories, but on facts, is absolutely bound to be impartial, both with respect to things, and to persons, whatever may be his own interests and opinions. He has endeavoured to prove himself such to his readers.

The materials from which this work is

composed, have been partly collected from the accounts officially published at London, Vienna, and Paris; and partly procured through the means of a correspondence constantly kept up with some distinguished military characters on the Continent. Some of these have been, and still are, actually engaged in this war; and the others have watched its progress with the most attentive and intelligent observation. No pains have been spared to put together and to compare these various materials. This work is, in fact, an abstract and a combination of all these accounts.—The author has endeavoured to draw, from the whole, a result, if not absolutely correct, at least, as nearly so, as it was in his power to make it.

The knowledge which he himself has personally had of the greater part of the theatre of the war, of some of the armies which are engaged in it, and of several of the Generals who command them, joined to some degree of experience on the sub-

ject, cannot have failed to be of considerable use to him.

He hopes it will not be expected, that there should be found in this historical detail, a constant and minute criticism on the operations of the Commanders, and on the causes of their success or their failures. On this point he has thought it right to impose on himself a good deal of reserve. —For if the art of war presents so many difficulties to those who are carrying it on; if its chances are attended with so many vicissitudes; if accident so often deceives the foresight of the most able commander, or gives him unexpected success; would it not be ridiculous in any man to presume, in his closet, to form a correct judgment of military operations, the object, as well as the probable advantages and inconveniences of which, are often unknown, even to those who are employed to execute them?

Anxious as the author is to avoid this reproach, he has, nevertheless, endeavour-

ed to explain the motives for the different movements of the armies, and has not refrained from presuming to censure or to applaud, where there was evidently room either for the one or the other. If, notwithstanding the choice of his correspondents, and his earnest endeavour to relate the exact truth, he has (as there is too much reason to fear) fallen into some errors, he hopes to be pardoned from the reflection that will occur to candid minds, on the difficulty of stating facts quite correctly, when one is at once so distant from the countries, and so near to the period, in which the events to be recorded took place.

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C A M P A I G N

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CHAPTER I.

Relative situation of the Imperial and Republican Armies before the opening of the campaign—Estimate of their respective force—Interest of the French to carry on an offensive war—Interest of the Imperialists to adopt a defensive one—Rupture of the Armistice—Movements of the French on both banks of the Lower Rhine—Battles of Uckerath and of Altenkirchen—Evacuation of the Hundsruck, by the Archduke Charles—March of that Prince to the Lahn—Engagements at Westlaer—Second battle of Uckerath—Retreat of the French beyond the Rhine and the Sieg.

IT is necessary, before entering on a narrative of the events of this campaign, to explain the strength and position of the adverse armies, at

the moment of its commencement, and to introduce some details on the interests of the Belligerent powers, on the objects to which their views were apparently directed, and on the means which they respectively possessed to attain them.

At the period of opening the campaign, the Imperial and French Armies were situated in the following manner.—The Rhine separated them, from the frontiers of Switzerland to the environs of the town of Spires, where it ceased to be their common barrier. Beyond that city, the cantonments which they respectively occupied, at the distance of some leagues from each other, extended across the Upper Palatinate, the Duchy of Deux Ponts, and the Hundsruok. The line occupied by the Imperial army, passed through the towns of Spires, Neustadt, Kayserlautern, Kussell; and from thence, crossing the Nahe, terminated at the Rhine, in the neighbourhood of Baccharach. At this point, that river again became the common separation of both armies, and continued so to beyond Cologne, between the river Sieg, and the town of Dusseldorff. The Austrians and French divided between them the space between the river and the last-mentioned fortress, before which the army of the latter had an

entrenched camp. The Imperialists possessed on the Rhine the strong fortresses of Philipsburgh, Mannheim, Mentz, and Ehrenbreitstein. The French, on their part, possessed on the Upper Rhine, those of Alsace, and on the Lower Rhine, that of Dusseldorf.

With respect to the strength of the opposed armies, it is obvious, no one could be able to appreciate them with absolute precision and certainty, unless he were either the commander in chief, or at least an officer of the staff of both armies. The inquiries, however, on this point, have been numerous and extensive, and addressed for the purpose to those persons, whom their local position, and their military situation equally placed within reach of very good information on the subject. From the result of communications so obtained, a near estimate may be formed of the numbers of the French and Imperial armies, at the opening of this campaign. They authorize a statement, that at this time, the two French armies, commanded by Generals Jourdan and Moreau, amounted to more than 160,000 men; and that the Imperial forces, commanded by his Royal Highness the Archduke Charles, including the

Saxons and other contingents of the Empire, were nearly 150,000 men.

Every motive which determined the French Government to continue the war, made it likewise their interest, or rather indeed imposed upon them the necessity to carry it beyond the Rhine, and into the heart of Germany. They had at their command a great number of soldiers, but were in want of money to pay them, of clothes to cover them, and means to subsist them. The Netherlands, Holland, and the countries situated between the Meuse and the Rhine, had borne, during two years, the whole burden of maintaining the French armies. These countries, but a short time before so rich and so abundant, were exhausted; their whole specie was absorbed by contributions, their manufactures were suspended, and their produce consumed. An immense quantity of paper money, without any real value, had operated to paralyze their commerce and their industry. The productions and commodities of the country were scarcely equal to the consumption of the armies and of the inhabitants. Two years had been sufficient to place the countries conquered by France on a level with herself, and to reduce them to one common equality of death and misery. It was

become therefore absolutely necessary, at whatsoever price it was to be accomplished, that the French should march forward into other countries, in search of subsistence, of horses, of clothes, and above all, of money. These views were most unequivocally expressed by the Directory, in the order given to their Generals, that *they should maintain their troops by victory.*

To this urgent call of necessity were added some motives of ambition, and reasonings of political interest. The Directory flattered itself—that by an invasion of Germany, it would accomplish the disunion of the Germanic body—that the inferior Princes, struck with terror, would hasten, by turns, to purchase a separate peace—that the Emperor, reduced to his own forces, stripped of one part of his dominions, and fearing to lose what remained, would in the end subscribe to such conditions of peace, as it should please his conquerors to impose—that at the conclusion of the war, its final result would place all the countries on their side the Rhine, in the possession of the French, and the fate of Germany in their disposal; and would leave them enriched with its spoils, and dictating laws to Europe.—Such was the brilliant perspective which presented

itself to the chiefs of the French Republic, and at once directed their views, and animated their expectations.

If from what has been here suggested, it should appear that their plan would of course be offensive, every thing on the other hand seemed to prescribe to the court of Vienna a line of conduct almost entirely the reverse. A concurrence of military and political considerations ought to have engaged it to persist in the defensive system, which it had adopted, and pursued with advantage, the preceding year. The situation of the French and Imperial armies offered to the latter but few means to ensure, and but little reason to expect success in an offensive war. Several campaigns (amongst others, those of 1674* and 1793)

* The Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke de Bournonville, penetrated into Upper Alsace, in 1674, and established themselves there in winter quarters. M. de Turenne, who they imagined was at a great distance from them, secretly passed the *Vosges*, and came unawares upon the quarters of the Imperial army. After having taken some of them, he marched rapidly to Colmar, where the Elector and the Duke were stationed. He attacked them on the 5th of January, defeated them, and obliged them to return in disorder to Strasburgh, where they repassed the Rhine. Thus, in a few days, M. de Turenne, whose forces did not

had sufficiently shewn them how extremely difficult it was to penetrate into Alsace, and above all, to maintain themselves there. France was scarcely more vulnerable by the rout of the Sarre and the Moselle, which were defended by a great number of strong places. They could still less think of retaking the Netherlands, and of advancing between the Moselle and the Meuse, the French being masters of Dusseldorf, of all the fortified towns of the Meuse, and of those of Holland. At any rate, the Imperial army, being of inferior force, would have been unable to penetrate to the frontiers of France, or even to the Meuse, without fighting many battles. The advantages of the French, both in number and position, would have necessarily occasioned the

amount to 30,000 men, drove from Alsace 60,000, who had imagined themselves to be secure. These events were without doubt to be attributed as much to the position which the Imperialists occupied, and which lay between the mountains of the *Vosges* and the Rhine, as to the superior talents of M. de Turenne. This position would be at this time more dangerous, Strassburgh belonging at present to France. It is in the memory of every one, that at the end of 1793, Marshal de Wurmser was not more fortunate in Lower Alsace, and that after having resisted forty-two successive attacks, he was obliged to yield to the French, and was under the necessity of repassing the Rhine.

loss of much time and many men ; and could it even have been supposed that the Austrians would have been always victorious, the most successful campaign could at best have probably ended only in putting them in possession of one or two strong places, and in effecting their arrival on the banks of the Meuse.

The strength and situation of the Republican armies, did not however permit the Court of Vienna to hope for these successes. It was evident that, whether in Alsace or on the Sarre, the Moselle or the Meuse, all the chances, and all the advantages were on the side of the French. The Austrians, therefore, ought to have adopted a plan for the campaign, of which the basis should have been essentially defensive, but the operations of which might be partially offensive, according to circumstances, and the nature of the countries.

If, in a military point of view, the interest of the Emperor prescribed to him a defensive war, it was still better adapted to his circumstances in a political aspect. The loss of the Netherlands and Holland, and the defection of Prussia and Spain, deprived the rest of the coalition of every possibility of making conquests upon France. Under

the necessity of continuing the war, the combined plan of England and of Austria was less directed against the armies of the Republic, than against her finances and military resources. To follow up this system with advantage, it became the object of the campaign to observe, to exhaust, and to gain time, rather than to win battles. The great point was to reduce the French to their own resources alone, for the payment and maintenance of their numerous armies, to confine them on their frontiers, and on those of the conquered countries; in a word, to hinder them from penetrating into, and spreading in Germany.

The most natural and most easy method to accomplish this object was, without doubt, to take the course of the Rhine as the line of defence, and to give to the different corps of the Imperial army, the same disposition which Marshal Clairfait had established in 1795, a disposition of which that General's success had proved the advantage. It appeared advisable, after his example, to abandon to the French, the Hundsruock and the Duchy of Deux Ponts, countries of little importance in themselves, already exhausted by the war, and which belong always of course, except in the case of a great superiority of force, to the pos-

sector of Landau, Bitche, Sarrelouis, Treves, Traerbach, and Coblenz. By abandoning these countries, and carrying the greater part of their forces to the right bank of the Rhine, the Austrians would have been in a situation to strengthen it with a sufficient number of men, to defend the passage of that River from Basle to Manheim, and to place between the latter fortress, and that of Mentz, a large body of troops, which could readily advance to the succour of either of those places, and support their garrisons. By adopting this disposition, the Imperialists would have been enabled to place on the Lahn and the Sieg, more than a third of their army; to reinforce their right wing, the point where they were weakest and most menaced; to oppose a powerful resistance to any enterprize of the French on the Lower Rhine; to confine them in their camp before Dusseldorf, and even to profit of any favourable opportunity to attack them there with advantage.

The dispositions and first movements of the Austrian Generals seemed to indicate the adoption of a different plan. The army of the Upper Rhine, under the command of Marshal Wurmser, was strongly reinforced, which gave reason to suppose that it was intended he should cross the

Rhine, to penetrate into Upper Alsace. At the same time, the greater part of the army of the Lower Rhine, under the immediate orders of the Archduke Charles, took post in Hundsruock and the Duchy of Deux Ponts, and seemed to menace at once Lower Alsace and the fortresses on the Sarre and the Moselle. The misfortunes which rapidly followed these indications, soon obliged the Austrians to renounce their first dispositions, and to adopt in part those which have been already mentioned.

The armistice, agreed upon at the end of the year 1795, between the French and Austrian Generals, was put an end to by the latter, on the 21st of May. One of the conditions of this suspension of arms being, that there should be an interval of ten days between its rupture and the renewal of hostilities, the respective armies became at liberty to recommence them on the 31st of May.

On that very day, the French army of the Sambre and the Meuse, commanded by* General

* This General had served in the French army, first as a private, and afterwards as a Serjeant, before the Revolution. When that took place, he followed the business of a Fencing Master, and his wife that of a milliner.

Jourdan, made a movement forwards on the two banks of the Lower Rhine. On the same and the following day, some trifling affairs of advanced posts took place in the Hundsruck. It was on the right bank of the Rhine that the French employed the greater part of their force, and it was precisely there that the Imperialists had the least to oppose to them. There were not more than 20,000 men to defend the Sieg, to cover the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, and to line the right bank of the Rhine, between the Sieg and the Lahn. This corps was commanded by the Prince of Wurtemberg, who had taken a position in front of the Sieg. He was attacked there, on

He was then appointed an officer of the National Guard, went to the frontiers when the war broke out, and was advanced gradually to the command of an army. It was he who commanded the French at the battle of Maubeuge, in 1793, and at that of Fleurus, in 1794. It is known that in the former, Prince Cobourg and General Jourdan both believed that they had been defeated, and both retreated at the same time. We may also recollect that Jourdan, quickly informed of the retreat of his enemies, returned to his former position, and retook 40 pieces of cannon, which he had left in a wood. Although he repaired his mistake, Rober-spieire did not forgive him. It cost him, for some time, the loss of his command. Few of the Republican Generals have been so often defeated as he has been.

the 1st of June, by the greater part of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, under the order of General Kleber. After an engagement of several hours, the Austrians, being forced at all points, abandoned the Sieg, and retiring behind that river, took the strong position of Uckerath. They lost in this engagement, 2400 men, of whom, if we are to give credit to the reports of General Kleber, 1000 were made prisoners.

That General did not allow the Prince of Wurtemberg time to establish himself in his post, and to receive reinforcements. The French being unable, without a great sacrifice of men, to attack the formidable position of Uckerath in front, availed themselves, the next morning, of the superiority of their number, to outflank and turn it. The Prince of Wurtemberg seeing himself on the point of being surrounded, quitted the position of Uckerath, and fell back on that of Altenkirchen, which was equally advantageous. He was attacked there, the 4th of June, in the morning. After a pretty vigorous resistance, the superiority of numbers again carried the point, and the Austrians were completely routed. They lost, according to the French accounts, 12 pieces of cannon, part of their baggage, and 3000 men made pri-

soners. The fruit of this victory to the French was the capture of some magazines, without which they would have been unable to subsist in a country exhausted by the consumption of the armies. It forced the Austrians to retire behind the Lahn, leaving uncovered, by that means, the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, which the French invested.

The success of the Republicans on the Lower Rhine, and the apprehensions that, after forcing the passage of the Lahn, they would direct their march towards the Mein, and entirely turn his right, warned the Archduke of the pressing necessity which there was to reinforce the Prince of Wurtemberg, and to check the progress of the army opposed to him. Renouncing, therefore, his diversion in the Palatinate and the Hundsruock, he began, on the 6th of June, to retire from those two countries, and directed his march rapidly towards Mentz, with the greater part of his army. He there passed the Rhine on the 9th, and proceeded, by forced marches, to encounter the French, who occupied the Lahn, to the number of 50,000 men.

The Archduke, not doubting that General Jourdan would hasten to pass the Rhine likewise, with his division of the army, to join General

Kleber, felt how important it was to get the start of him, and to engage the French before their junction. Having secured the defence of the Lower Lahn by three corps, placed at Limburg, Weilburg, and Nassau, he marched in person towards the Upper Lahn, against the left wing of the French army, commanded by General Lefebvre.

On the 15th, the Archduke made the right wing of his army pass the Lahn and the Dille, at Westlaer.* General Werneck, who commanded it, attacked the French, but was repulsed, and could not succeed in dislodging them from the advantageous position which they occupied. A brisk cannonade continued on both sides for the rest of the day: but towards seven o'clock in the evening, a reinforcement of Saxon calvary being arrived, the Archduke immediately attacked the enemy. The Austrian Cuirassiers of Karackzay and Nassau, in spite of the obstacles arising from the nature of the ground, and a tremendous fire of grape-shot, made their way up the heights, which were defended by the French infantry, charged them several times with the greatest intrepidity, and at length entirely broke them, and

* It is in this Imperial City, that the Sovereign Chamber of the Empire is held.

took from them several pieces of cannon. At the same moment, a body of Austrian grenadiers attacked the enemy's centre, and dislodged them from the woods which they occupied.

The French, driven from their position, took up another, in their retreat, equally good with the former. They were very soon attacked again. Four squadrons of Austrians and Saxons gained the steep heights, on which some battalions of the enemy were posted, charged them with impetuosity, forced them, and completed the victory. It cost the Imperialists about 500 men; the loss of the French was more considerable. Four of their battalions were cut to pieces by the Saxon and Austrian cavalry, which took also 12 pieces of cannon, and made a great many prisoners.

The French corps, which defended the Lower Lahn, not having met with better success, were obliged to quit the banks of that river, to fall back on the Sieg. The Archduke pursued them, without allowing them any respite, took some more prisoners, and got possession of a large quantity of provisions, of cannon, of artillery, waggons, and baggage, which the difficulty of the country, the animosity of its inhabitants against the

French, and the disorder of their retreat, made it impossible for them to save.

His Royal Highness did not give them time to recover, or to collect together again. He manœuvred in such a manner, as to oblige General Jourdan, who had passed the Rhine at Neuwied, on the 12th of June, to repass it on the 18th, with the right wing of the French army. At the same time, he sent forward his advanced guard, about 11,000 men strong, under the orders of General Kray, in pursuit of General Kleber, who was retiring towards the Sieg with 25,000 men

On the 20th of June, General Kray came up with Kleber, who finding himself superior in numbers, attacked the Austrians with all his forces, and carried almost every point of their position. This first success promised the French a complete victory; but they were deprived of it by the bravery of three Austrian battalions, who, unshaken by the numerous artillery of the French, suffered nine battalions to advance to within a hundred yards, and, charging them with fixed bayonets, put them completely to the rout. This advantage gave time to the Saxon and Austrian cavalry to rally, to return victoriously to the charge, and

finally to stop the progress of the enemy. The Imperialists lost in this affair, 500 or 600 men; they killed and wounded of the enemy 1500, and took 700 prisoners. In this action the Austrians performed prodigies of valour; the event was the more honourable for them, as the French more than doubled them in number.

General Kleber, defeated in this very position, which eighteen days before he had taken from the Austrians, was obliged to continue his retreat precipitately quite to the lines of Dusseldorf.

Thus, in fifteen days, the Archduke marched from the banks of the Upper Nahe to those of the Upper Lahn, gained two battles, and drove the French from the walls of Wetslaer to those of Dusseldorf. One cannot sufficiently admire the bravery of this young Prince, the rapidity of his movements, and the ability of his manœuvres. In this short space of time, he gave sufficient proofs of what his army and Germany might expect from him.

CHAPTER II.

*Opening the Campaign on the Upper Rhine—
Evacuation of the Palatinate by Marshal
Wurmser—Departure of that General with
30,000 men to Italy—Passage of the Rhine
and capture of Fort Kehl by the French—
Their progress in the country of Baden—
Battle of Renchen—Battle of Rastadt—
Passage of the Sieg and the Rhine by Gene-
rals Kleber and Jourdan—Battle of Monta-
bauer—Battle of Friedberg—Capture of the
Fort of Kœnigstein by the French—Their
entrance into Frankfort—Battle of Etlingen,
and retreat of the Imperialists.*

WHILE these events took place on the Lower Rhine, the Imperial army, commanded by Field Marshal Wurmser, and the French, under the orders of General Moreau*, had also opened the

* This General was, in 1789, the first of the clerks of the Parliament at Rennes, in which his father exer-

campaign on the Upper Rhine. When the Archduke quitted the Hundsruok, to march to the right bank of the Rhine, Marshal Wurmser at the same time withdrew his troops from the lines of Spirebach, and made them take an excellent position before the fort of the Rhine, opposite to Mannheim. His right extended to the town of Frankenthal, and was covered, as well as his front, by inundation and canals, that joined to the little river of Rhebach, which bounded and defended his left.

General Moreau made two attacks on this position, on the 14th and 20th of June, which produced no effect but the loss of some hundreds of men on both sides, and to confine the Imperialists within their entrenched camp before the Fort of the Rhine. Moreau made these two

cised the functions of an advocate. Moreau was named, in the beginning of the Revolution, Chief of the National Guard of Rennes. The war being declared, he was sent with the national volunteers of Britany to the army of *La Fayette*; he there distinguished himself on many occasions, and obtained, very soon, the rank of a General Officer. In 1794, he took the Fortress of l'Ecluse, on the same day that his father was guillotined in France. This circumstance concurred with his character, naturally honest, to inspire him with horror for the Jacobins, whose principles he never adopted.

feints merely to fix the attention of Marshal Wurmser to this point, and to deceive him with respect to his real designs. After leaving a small corps before the Austrian camp, to observe it, he turned suddenly back on the 21st, and marched rapidly with the greatest part of his army towards Strashburgh, where preparations were making for a more important enterprize.

The loss of the Milanese, and the desire of reconquering it, having determined the Court of Vienna to send Marshal Wurmser into Italy, with 30,000 men of the army which he commanded in Germany, these troops began their march early in June. Their departure diminished the Imperial army on the Upper Rhine, nearly one half, and of course increased proportionally the superiority of the French, and may, in fact, be said to have opened to them the gates of Germany. They were informed of this movement in good time*, indeed before it had actually taken place; and determined to take advantage of the

* A few days before they resumed hostilities, an Austrian officer having been sent to have a parley with Moreau, this General did not conceal from him that he was informed that 30,000 men would be sent immediately from the army in Germany to that in Italy. The officer carried this intelligence to the Austrian head

opening, which the departure of so large a force left in the line of defence on the Upper Rhine, an opening which Prince Charles's expedition on the Lower Rhine, would not admit of his filling up for a considerable time. The French could not have chosen a more favourable moment to attempt the passage of the Rhine, and to invade Suabia, of which they had already formed the project. They hastened to carry it into execution; made their preparations with no less promptitude than secrecy; and disguised them under the pretext and appearance of some other expedition.

quarters, where the order for the departure of these 30,000 men did not arrive till two days after. This fact, transmitted by one whose veracity can be relied on, is a proof that the French are as well served by their spies who are near the cabinets, as by those near the armies of their enemies. In general, they have had much better intelligence than the allies during this war, because they have better paid for it. This circumstance had contributed not a little to their success. It is well known that these means have never been neglected by the greatest Generals, and that they engaged good spies, whatever the price of them might be. The Marshal de Luxembourg gained over the Secretary of the Prince of Orange, and Prince Eugene succeeded in bribing the master of the post-office at Versailles, whom he rendered very useful to him.

On the 24th of June, before the break of day, General Moreau embarked in boats 3000 men, who landed on several small islands that lie between Strasburgh and the fort of Kehl. They easily drove from thence the Imperial piquets, who in their retreat, either had not time or address to break down the bridges which communicate with the right bank of the Rhine. The French therefore were enabled to pass over them, and suddenly attacked the redoubts of the fort of Kehl, which were occupied by some troops of the circle of Suabia. These troops, surprized, and besides as ill-disciplined as they were badly commanded, although attacked only by infantry, without any cannon, either would not, or did not know how to make use of the means of defence, with which this important post furnished them. They suffered it to be taken by the French, who found in it 500 men, and 15 pieces of cannon, and who, when they had become masters of it, lost no time in putting themselves in condition to keep it. They immediately reinforced it with a considerable number of men ; and worked hard in the course of the day to establish a bridge of boats between Kehl and Strasburgh.

The Imperial army on the Upper Rhine having been considerably weakened by detaching 30,000 men from it to Italy, and General Latour, who commanded in the room of Marshal Wurmer, not having at all suspected that the French would attempt the passage of the river opposite to Kehl, the Austrians had but a small number of light troops near that place. The nearest corps to it, was that composed of some thousands of Suabians, who were encamped at Marle and Wildstedt, about two or three leagues from Kehl. If these troops had been more vigilant, or better commanded, and had, on the first discharge of cannon, marched instantly towards the fort, they certainly might have prevented the French from getting possession of it, or even have re-taken it, before the latter could have been enabled to transport cannon and cavalry over the river.

These troops, however, of the Empire, made no movement whatever, but suffered the French to establish themselves firmly on the right bank of the Rhine. The inexcusable inaction, and unmilitary behaviour of the Suabian corps, during the remainder of the campaign, exposed

their Generals to the suspicion of holding correspondence with the enemy.*

The French took advantage of this remissness and alarm of the Imperial troops, to complete their bridge of boats, and to pass over with their cavalry and artillery. They spread themselves over the plain, to prevent the approach of any force that might be sent against them, either from Offenburgh, or from Rastadt. On the 26th, they attacked the camp at Wildstedt, and easily drove the Suabian troops from thence. The only resistance they experienced was from the Austrian regiment of Anspach Cuirassiers, who arriving

* General Stein, commander in chief of the troops of the circle of Suabia, was openly accused of having delivered up to the French, for a considerable sum of money, the fort of Kehl, as well as the posts of Kniebis and Freydenstadt. He confirmed these suspicions, by refusing, under different pretexts, to join the Prince de Condé, to attack the Republicans before they were well established at Kehl. He behaved still worse to the Prince of Condé, for he represented his army every where as a band of robbers, and inserted in the newspapers, the most unjust calumnies of it. However, it was more easy for him to disavow, than to confirm them, and the Count de Viosmenil, a general officer of superior merit, obliged him to contradict all the first reports against the army of Condé; this disavowal was also inserted in the public papers of Germany.

at that instant, furiously charged a corps of French infantry, broke through them, and cut to pieces a considerable number.

As soon as Mr. de Latour was informed of the French having passed the Rhine, and of their having invaded the territory of Baden, he gave instant orders to the regiments which were nearest, to march; and put himself in motion with the greatest part of his forces to meet the enemy, and to endeavour to stop his progress. The Prince of Condé was amongst the first to set out with the corps which he commanded, and moved rapidly towards Offenburgh, hoping to arrive there before the Republicans had made themselves masters of it. He accomplished this object, and joined, on the 27th, at Biehl, before Offenburgh, some Austrian detachments, as well as troops of the circles, which had been driven from the camp at Wildstedt. On the 28th, however, this corps of Imperialists was obliged to abandon its position, as well as the town of Offenburgh, the French having brought against them several strong columns. The latter made this movement to prevent the junction of the Prince of Condé with several small Austrian corps which were marching to his assistance, and thus

to divide the Imperial army of the Upper Rhine. This last object was of the utmost importance to them, and on its accomplishment, the success of the invasion in a great measure depended. General Moreau was perfectly aware of this, and towards this point directed all his movements, and employed all his means. He divided his army, 80,000 men strong, into three columns; that on the right, under the orders of General Ferino,* was directed to drive back into the Brisgaw, the corps of the Prince of Condé, and of General Frolich. It met with some success against them, and got possession of the town of Bibrach, in the valley of Kintzig.

The centre, commanded by General St. Cyr, forced the passes which lead along the valleys of Renchen and Kintzig, to the mountains of Saubia. Continuing to advance, he made himself master

* This General had been an officer in the Emperor's service, in the regiment of Bender, which he quitted some years ago, and then went into France, in hopes of obtaining some employment during the Revolution; he was then made an officer, and soon after a General. As the regiment of Bender was usually in garrison at Freyburgh, and other towns of the Brisgaw, Ferino was well acquainted with the latter country, and that was probably the reason of his being employed in that quarter.

(on the 4th of July) of the mountain of Kniebis, and of the town of Freydenstadt, posts of the utmost importance, which the Suabians defended most shamefully, or rather, which they delivered up to the French.*

The left column, which was the strongest of the three, was under the orders of General Desaix. It was opposed to General Latour; and was intended to act against the Austrian force, which was marching in great haste from the Lower Rhine. General Desaix pressed forward to attack Mr. de Latour before its arrival. On the 29th of June, he gained a pretty considerable

* The Suabians, descendants from the ancient Suevi, of whom Tacitus speaks, appear to have much degenerated from the valour of their ancestors. It is almost considered as giving abusive language to any one in Germany, to call him Suabian. It is nearly equivalent to call him coward. The troops from this circle, justified, at Kehl and Freydenstadt, the ironical acceptance given to the word Suabian, in Germany. It is, no doubt, contradicted by many exceptions, and the regiment of Bender is a very remarkable one. It is composed of Suabians, and there certainly exists not in the Austrian army, a regiment of greater bravery, or one in every respect more military.

The mountain of Kniebis, the highest in Suabia, forms a defile, which is one of the principal passes of that country. Freydenstadt is situated on a rock, two leagues from Kniebis.

advantage over him at Renchen,* where the Austrians lost 500 men and 10 pieces of cannon. He gained ground again on the following days; and on the 4th of July, pushed forward to the river Murg, and the city of Rastadt.

General Latour, who had taken a very good position in front of this river, was attacked on the 5th along his whole line, by General Moreau, who was just arrived with a reinforcement to General Desaix. The action lasted the whole day, and was very bloody on both sides. It terminated to the disadvantage of the Imperialists, who were under the necessity of retreating, the next day, to Etlingen.

The Archduke Charles having succeeded in driving the army of the Sambre and Meuse across the Rhine and the Sieg, immediately returned, suspecting the project of the French on the Upper Rhine, and sensible how much its defence was weakened by the large reinforcements that

* It was near this town that Mr. de Turenne was killed, in 1675. Although inferior in force, he had found means to stop the progress of Mr. de Montecuculli for two months, on the banks of the Renchen and the Kintzig: it was there that these two great Generals exhausted, against one another, all the resources and combinations of the art of war.

had been sent into Italy. He was then informed of the passage of the Rhine, and the capture of the Fort of Kehl.—Leaving 30,000 men under the orders of Lieutenant-General Wartensleben, to cover the Lower Rhine, and having reinforced the garrisons of Ehrenbreitstein and Mentz, he set out with the rest of the army, and directed his course towards the Upper Rhine by forced marches. He arrived on the banks of the Murg, at the moment when General Latour was giving way to the efforts and the numbers of the French. His Royal Highness then took the command of that army, which formed a junction with his own at Etlingen.

The possession of the pass and town of Freydenstadt by the enemy, opened to them an entrance into the Duchy of Wurtemberg, cut off the communication between the armies of the Prince of Condé and General Frolich, and that of the Archduke, and at the same time threatened the left of his Royal Highness's position. This latter circumstance obliged him to send a considerable corps into the mountains, to secure his left flank, and to endeavour to re-establish his communication with the corps above-mentioned. Notwithstanding the disadvantage of his position

in general, and the inferiority of his forces, his Royal Highness determined to risque a battle. It afforded him the only chance by which he could hope to drive the French out of Suabia, and to maintain himself on the banks of the Rhine. It became the more necessary to lose no time in hazarding this last resource, as the new advances which the French had made on the Lower Rhine encreased the Archduke's embarrassments, and made his situation every day more and more critical.

As soon as the French Generals, who commanded the different corps of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, were informed of the passage of the Rhine, and the departure of the Archduke, they instantly resumed their offensive operations; and on the 28th and 29th of June, they marched from Dusseldorf and Cologne towards the river Sieg, from whence they easily drove the few light troops, which defended it. On the 2d of July, the commander in chief, General Jourdan, also passed the Rhine, opposite to Neuwied, where the Austrian General Funck suffered himself to be surprized, and did nothing to oppose the passing of the French. The divisions of the Generals Jourdan, Grenier, Kleber, and Le-

fevre, then effected a junction, and advanced, with more than 65,000 men, against Mr. de Wartensleben, who had scarcely 30,000 to oppose to them. This great inferiority made it impossible for the latter to face the French in all points. He gained, however, an advantage over them on the 3d of July, near Montebauer, where General Werneck took several hundred men, and some pieces of cannon. But having received a check the day following on his right, and finding that he was in danger of being surrounded by different corps of the enemy, General Wartensleben retired behind the Lahn, which the whole French army passed on the 9th of July, in three columns.

The advanced guard of the left column was attacked on the same day by the Austrians, who routed it; but the main body coming to its support, a warm action ensued, the success of which was various, but in which the Austrians had finally the advantage. On the 10th, the latter were attacked on all the points which they occupied between the Mein and the Lahn; and after an obstinate engagement, which they maintained near Friedberg,* in which they suf-

* It was near this imperial city, that the French, in 1762, gained a victory over the Allies.

ferred some loss, General Wartensleben was again obliged to retreat, in order to secure the position of Bergen, before Frankfort. On the 11th, the French invested the Fort of Koenigstein, which capitulated a few days afterwards from the want of water; the garrison were made prisoners of war. On the 12th, they arrived before the city of Frankfort, to which the Austrians had retired. The day following, they summoned the Magistrates of this Imperial city to open its gates; but the Austrians, who were still in possession of it, would not permit them, and even shewed a disposition to defend the city, the fortifications of which will not admit of its making a long resistance. That which the Austrians maintained had no other object but to gain time to remove their provisions and their magazines, of which Frankfort was the dépôt. On the night of the 13th, the French erected a battery of mortars, and bombarded the town, which they set fire to. The magistrates and inhabitants then renewed their entreaties to General Wartensleben to evacuate the city, to which he assented, having accomplished his end; and on the 14th, he agreed on the terms of capitulation with General Jourdan,

who in consequence entered Frankfort the day following.

After the evacuation of this city, the necessity of General Wartensleben's giving way to the prodigious superiority of numbers daily increased. He continued his retreat up the river Mein, directing his course towards Aschaffenburg and Wurtzburg, in order that he might approach the Archduke's army, and establish some communication with it.

Whilst General Wartensleben experienced this ill success on the Lower Rhine, his Royal Highness the Archduke Charles had not been more fortunate on the Upper. After the retreat to Etlingen, on the 6th of July, before-mentioned, the Prince received the intelligence that General Jourdan had again crossed the Rhine, and forced General Wartensleben to renounce every attempt to defend the approaches to the Lahn. It was easy for him then to foresee, that the latter, with so very inferior a force, would even be obliged to abandon Frankfort; and that he should find himself between the victorious armies of Jourdan and Moreau. Placed in a situation so critical, the Prince saw that he could not escape from the dangers which threatened him, but by a decisive

victory; and that he had no other means of preventing the invasion of the greater part of Germany. Resolved to try the chance of a battle, and circumstances not admitting of delay, he nevertheless found himself under the necessity of deferring it till the 10th, all the troops which he expected from the Lower Rhine not being yet arrived. He employed the 7th and 8th in making the necessary preparations, and in fortifying his position.

His right extended to the Rhine, near to the village of Dertmersheim. His centre was in front of Etlingen;* and his left rested against the town and mountain of Frauenalb.

The French were posted in front of, and along the river Murg: their left at Rastadt, and their right in front of Guertsbach.

General Moreau, being informed that the Archduke had not received all the reinforcements which he expected, and not doubting but that an attack would be made upon him the moment they arrived, resolved to prevent it. He rein-

* Near this village passed the famous lines of Etlingen, which were forced, in 1734, by Marshal de Berwick and the Count de Saxe.

forced himself on the 8th, with almost the whole of the centre column, commanded by General St. Cyr. In the morning of the 9th, while the Archduke was completing his dispositions, and placing the different corps which were to be engaged the following day, he found himself attacked in every point of his position, by the whole French army. They directed their principal efforts against the left of the Imperialists, and endeavoured to turn it, by getting round the mountains. Though all the troops which were to form the left of the Austrian line were not yet arrived, General Keim, who was at the head of it, made a very firm resistance. He repulsed four successive attacks; but the French having made a fifth with fresh troops, and the Saxons who were ordered to support General Keim not being yet come up, he was obliged to abandon his position, which the French had out-flanked, and to fall back to Pfortzheim, where he was joined by the Saxons.

The Archduke had been more fortunate on his right and in front, where he had completely repulsed all the attacks of the French. But the retrograde movement of General Keim having entirely uncovered the left of the army, and

enabled the enemy to take possession of the mountains which commanded it, the Prince found himself under the necessity of quitting the field of battle, and of retreating towards Pfortzheim, where he arrived on the following day.

The Imperialists lost in this action, 2000 men, of whom 1000 were made prisoners. It cost the French full as dear, but the event of it gave them the important advantage of detaching the Austrians entirely from the banks of the Rhine, and from the fortified towns of Philipsburgh and Mannheim. The Archduke had had the precaution to throw into both sufficient garrisons, as General Wartensleben had done into Ehrenbreitstein and Mentz, before they were invested by the French.

By leaving near 25,000 men in these four fortified places, Prince Charles judged that the enemy would also be obliged to leave behind a part of their army to blockade them; and that the garrisons of Philipsburgh and Mannheim might a good deal interrupt the communication between the armies of Moreau and Jourdan, by threatening and harassing their rear, and by falling suddenly on their convoys and small detachments. This judicious disposition produced the full

effect, which the Archduke expected from it. The garrisons of Mannheim and Philippsburgh made many useful excursions; disturbed the formation of the enemy's magazines; pushed their parties as far as Heilbron; and even fell in with, and took some French couriers and detachments, in the very heart of Franconia.

CHAPTER III.

Engagements at Canstadt and Eslingen—Contributions imposed by the French—Armistice concluded by them, with the Duke of Wurtemberg, the Margrave of Baden, and the circle of Suabia—Second engagement at Eslingen—Continuation of the retreat of the Imperial Army—Action of Mettingen—Retreat of General Wartensleben to Amberg, and of the Archduke to Donauwert—Projects of that Prince.

AFTER the battle of Etlingen, the Archduke, as has been before observed, retreated to Pfortzheim, where he remained the 11th, 12th, and 13th. On the 14th, he learnt that the centre of the enemy's army, meeting with little opposition from the troops of the Duke of Wurtemberg, and those of the circle of Suabia, had penetrated farther, and were directing their march towards the town of Stuttgard. That he might not lose the communication with the Prince of Condé, the Archduke broke up his camp at Pfortzheim

on the 14th, and encamped again near Vahingen, on the river Entz, where he passed the 15th and 16th. The enemy continuing to advance into the Duchy of Wurtemberg, the Archduke marched again on the 17th; arrived on the 18th at Ludwisburg, (a country house of the Duke of Wurtemberg's, near the Necker) and sent two small corps, the very same day, to post themselves at Canstadt and Eslingen. It was of consequence to the Archduke to make himself master of these places, on account of their situation on the Necker, and of the magazines which they contained. The French having entered Stutgard in the course of the same day, and knowing the importance of the post of Canstadt, wished to dislodge the small body of Austrians which defended it, under the command of General Baillet, attacking at the same time the corps at Eslingen, which was under the orders of Prince John of Lichtenstein. These two Generals defended themselves with great bravery. Notwithstanding three successive attacks, the French were unable to dislodge General Baillet from Canstadt. They were, however, rather more successful against Prince Lichtenstein, and found means, after repeated efforts, to make themselves

masters of the heights which commanded his flank and rear. In this emergency, the Prince, hearing that a body of troops was ordered to his assistance, resolved to stand at his post, and continue the combat. He was already on the point of being surrounded, when General Devay at last made his appearance with the expected succours. The French now found themselves attacked in their turn, both in flank and rear, and at the same instant Prince Lichtenstein pressing hard upon their front, they were put to the rout, with the loss of about 1500 men. This advantage cost the Austrians 900 men.

On the 19th, the Archduke, after having passed with his army over the Necker, pitched his camp at Feldbach, that he might cover the communication with the town of Ulm, and save the principal magazines on the Upper Danube. While the French were thus forcing him to retire from the Rhine to the Necker, they likewise, after several slight engagements, compelled the Prince of Condé, and General Frolich, to yield up the Brisgau, as well as the country of the Black Forest. These two commanders effected a junction at Villingen; but being opposed to very superior numbers, they found it necessary to fall

back to Sigmaringen, on the Danube. In the mean time, General Wartensleben continuing to give way before the numerous army of Jourdan, was retiring across Franconia; and found himself, when he arrived at Wurzburg, on a line with the front of the Archduke; and from this time (July 20th) the march of the respective armies became more regular and better combined.

From this period also the Imperial army commenced a methodical retreat, and a war of manœuvres. It was divided into three principal corps, amounting to nearly 80,000 men, having been reduced to that number by detaching 30,000 men to Italy, by leaving 25,000 to garrison the different fortresses, and by the losses sustained in the different actions.

The first of these three corps, about 25,000 strong, occupied both banks of the river Mein, under General Wartensleben, and was opposed to the army of Jourdan, which amounted to about 55,000 men. The Archduke, with 40,000 men, was posted upon the Necker, which he defended against General Moreau, who commanded more than 50,000.

The third body, consisting of about 15,000 men, was divided between the Prince of Condé

and General Frolich, and defended the Upper Danube against General Ferino, who having been reinforced by General Laborde, was at the head of 20,000 men.

The losses sustained in different engagements, and the necessity of leaving bodies of troops to blockade the fortified places, had weakened the armies of Jourdan and Moreau; the superiority, however, of their numbers over the Imperialists, was still greater than at the opening of the campaign.*

From the middle of the month of July, the French began to reap in part those advantages which they expected from the invasion of Germany. They found the country which they occupied, abundant in resources of every kind; and they imposed on the inhabitants heavy

* The author repeats that he pretends not to estimate with strict exactness, the force of the respective armies, still less that of their different divisions. Whoever has been engaged in war, knows how much the daily losses, reinforcements, and detachments, occasion a continual variation in the comparative proportion of two opposed armies. He has given only an approximating estimate, to put the reader in possession of some reasonable datum, and to enable him to form a more adequate judgment of the course of the military operations.

contributions. The weight of them was chiefly felt by the people of the Brisgau, who had taken up arms against the Republicans. The town of Frankfort was compelled, for the second time since the commencement of the war, to share its riches with the French, being taxed by General Jourdan, to the amount of six millions of French livres in specie, and two millions in provisions. The Margrave of Baden, the Duke of Wurtemberg, the circle of Suabia, and all the petty Princes whose estates are comprehended in it, seeing themselves on the point of becoming a prey to the French, who already occupied their territory, solicited a suspension of arms, which they obtained separately, but for which they paid dearly. Their joint contributions amounted to twenty-five millions of French livres, 12,000 horses, an equal number of oxen, 500,000 quintals of wheat, rye, and oats; 200,000 pair of shoes, with an immense quantity of other necessities.

We have seen above, that the Archduke Charles had arrived, on the 19th of July, on the banks of the Necker, while at the same time the corps of Condé, and of Frolich were on the Danube, and that of Mr. de Wartensleben was

posted upon the Mein. The extreme inferiority of his force preventing the Prince from acting offensively, his sole object was to protract his defence, and to retire as slowly as possible, in order to give the Court of Vienna time to send him those reinforcements which it was then collecting.

The Archduke having received information that the enemy meant to attack the important post of Eslingen, which commands the high road from Stutgard to Ulm, sent reinforcements thither on the 20th. The next day it was attacked by a numerous body of troops, as had been expected. General Hotze, and the forces under his command, defended the position with equal success and bravery. The French were constantly repulsed, and lost about 2000 men. It did not cost the Austrians more than half that number. They owed this success entirely to the obstinacy with which they fought. The most striking proofs of it were given by one battalion of the Hungarian regiment of Spleny, which defended its post during the whole day, without being either relieved or reinforced, and maintained its ground until night, though they had lost in the course of the engagement 300 or 400 men.

On the 22d, the enemy having made a movement, which indicated an intention to turn the right wing of the Archduke, by posting themselves on the road from Stutgard to Donauwert, he abandoned Eslingen and the banks of the Neckar, on the night of the 22d, turned to the right to frustrate the intention of the French, and fixed his head quarters at Geinund. From thence, he marched on the 26th, still continuing to give ground. The progress made by the enemy on the Mein and Danube, again obliged the Prince to retreat. He moved, on the 1st of August, to Heydenheim, on the 2d to Nörersheim, and on the 3d to Nordlingen.* Several skirmishes took place during that interval, in which

* This Imperial city has been rendered famous by the different battles which have taken place in its neighbourhood. The Imperialists beat the Swedes here in 1694. The great Condé, at that time Duke D'Enghien, gained a battle, in which the Commander in Chief of the Imperialists, Merci, was killed, and General Glen, who commanded under him, was wounded and taken prisoner. The Marshal de Grammont, the second in command of the French army, was likewise wounded and taken prisoner by the Imperialists.—The city of Nordlingen was formerly the bulwark of Franconia, against Bavaria.

the Imperialists, although retreating, frequently had the advantage.

The Archduke was obliged to yield so much ground, on account of the advances made on his right and left by the enemy in the latter days of July. Jourdan's army had entered Wurzburg on the 26th, and General Wartensleben had been compelled to fall back towards Bamberg, Nuremberg, and Anspach. The three corps of the Prince of Condé, Generals Frolich and Wolf, had been forced to retire on the right bank of the Danube, thus abandoning Upper Suabia to the French.

The conquest of Suabia and Franconia spread great alarm throughout Germany. The French were on the frontiers of Bohemia and Bavaria, and their great superiority of numbers seemed to exclude every hope of being able to put a stop to their progress. But neither the misfortunes which he had just experienced, nor those he had to apprehend, were capable of discouraging the Archduke. He opposed the unshaken constancy of his soldiers to the number of their enemies. He compensated by his talents for the deficiency of his means; and did every thing which could be expected from the most

consummate General. Thinking it unnecessary to cover Bohemia, where numerous obstacles opposed themselves to an invading enemy,* the Prince wisely took the resolution of drawing towards himself the greater part of Wartensleben's army. By these means, he had it in his power to meet with a greater mass of force either of the French armies which might choose to attack him; and by keeping along the Danube, he reserved to himself the power of moving with ease to either side of that river, according to the positions and motions of the enemy. This plan, as well executed as it was conceived, concentrated his defence, gave him the means of prolonging it, and more effectually protected the hereditary dominions.

On the 3d and 5th of August, the French attacked the advanced posts of the Archduke. On the first of these days, they were victorious; but on the other, were defeated.

* Bohemia is surrounded by a circle of very high mountains, which form a natural rampart round it. These mountains are least elevated on the side of Moravia, and Bohemia is much more accessible in this point than at any other. This is a great advantage for the House of Austria, since it is likewise in possession of Moravia.

Several engagements at the same time also took place between the armies of Wartensleben, and of Jourdan. One corps of the latter was repulsed with loss on the 4th of August, by General Kray. They were again engaged on the 6th and 8th, on both which days the Austrian cavalry much distinguished itself. The French General Doré was killed, and General Richepanse wounded.

In spite of their bravery and partial success, the Austrians could not prevent the French from gaining ground every day. The forces of General Wartensleben were not sufficiently numerous to oppose the different columns of Jourdan's army, which incessantly harassed his flanks, and threatened entirely to cut off his communication with the Archduke. The necessity there was for keeping up this communication, and the order which this commander had received to draw nearer to the Prince, determined him to leave Bamberg and the Mein, on the 7th, and to march first to Forchheim, on the Rednitz, and then to Lauf, on the Pegnitz.

On the 8th, the French attacked and dislodged one of the advanced corps of the Archduke,

taking 200 or 300 prisoners. This advantage, and above all, the retreat of Mr. de Wartensleben, induced Prince Charles to abandon his position at Nordlingen, to take another between that town and Donauwert, which he wished to cover. He established his head quarters at Mettingen, upon the little river Egar, his left extending towards Hohenalheim, and his right towards Allersheim. The Prince of Condé had retreated to Mindelheim, and General Wolf had retired into the defiles near the town of Bregentz, of which the French took possession.

On the 10th, at night, the Republicans attacked the body of Austrians under the command of General Hotze with great impetuosity, and forced a part of his position, taking 300 prisoners. This slight check was no obstacle to the project which the Archduke had resolved to carry into execution that very day. Being well informed of the situation of General Moreau, he had judged that he might attack him with advantage, and had determined to do so on the night of the 11th. The Prince made his preparations for a general action, which was to take place in several columns. His principal object was, to turn the right of Moreau, and to fall suddenly on his

rear, while the whole length of his front should be attacked at the same time. As the French were very much superior in number, the sole hope of success which the Archduke could possibly indulge, was rested in the goodness of his dispositions, and the effect of a surprise. He concerted his movements in such a manner, that before break of day, five of his principal columns might engage the enemy. A violent storm, which came on in the night, and lasted several hours, damaged the roads to such a degree, that the different corps could not reach the places of their destination so soon as was expected. This delay enabled the enemy to discover the measures taken against them, and gave them time to prepare their defence. The battle began about seven o'clock in the morning, and continued the whole day, with various success. The three columns, which formed the centre of the Austrian army, and were commanded by the Prince of Furstemberg, and Generals Hotze and Latour, succeeded in dislodging a part of the enemy's centre. The column on the right, under the orders of Prince Lichtenstein, was not so fortunate; General Moreau having marched all his

corps de reserve to the left, in the very beginning of the action, was enabled to repulse Prince Lichtenstein, and obliged him to yield a good deal of ground. This movement having laid open the right and centre of the Imperialists, the French attacked them with advantage, and succeeded in driving them back also. The Archduke was occupied in reinforcing his right, for the purpose of recovering the ground it had lost, when he received a report from General Wartensleben, intimating that he had been compelled to abandon his post on the Pegnitz, and to retire to Amberg; that the right of Jourdan's army was arrived at Nuremberg on the 9th, and was approaching nearer to the army of Moreau. As this last movement put the right of the Archduke, which the French were endeavouring to turn and separate from Mr. de Wartensleben, into imminent danger, that Prince judged that, whether he was conqueror or conquered, he should be obliged, in either case, to fall back to the banks of the Danube, and the town of Donauwert. He determined therefore to put an end to a battle, which now became useless. It was however with regret that the Prince formed this resolution, having just learned that his left

wing, conducted by General Riese, had turned the right of the enemy, had advanced four leagues upon their rear, and made a great number of prisoners. The Archduke had sufficient command over himself, to make a sacrifice of this brilliant success, of which the consequences might have been of the utmost importance; and to encamp, with his whole army, on the very spot he had occupied before the action. This engagement cost the Austrians 1500 men, and the French 3000, of whom 1200 were taken prisoners; the latter likewise lost several provision waggons, and many pieces of cannon.

This day might have been decidedly advantageous to the Imperialists, had they not committed a material fault. General Frolich was at Guntzburgh with a corps, of from 6000 to 7000 men, as well infantry as cavalry, and was in a situation to support the attack made by the Archduke. Instead of so doing, that General left it on the 11th, to rejoin the Prince of Condé, then seriously threatened at Kamlach by forces infinitely superior; but after having marched more than 20 miles in the day, he received, in the night, orders to return to Guntzburgh, where he arrived on the 12th at noon. Thus by this

double march, this corps was rendered useless to the Archduke ; and the Prince de Condé was deprived of a reinforcement which was very necessary to him.

The Prince having rested his army on the 12th, retired on the 13th to Donauwert, where he established his head quarters. The battle of the 11th disconcerted the projects of Moreau for some time. His reserve of artillery and military stores, on the point of falling into the hands of General Riese, had been obliged to fly a considerable way to effect their escape. This circumstance, as Moreau himself expressed in a letter to the Directory, prevented him from attacking the Archduke during his march. The Prince profiting by this, on the same day (the 13th) crossed the Danube by the bridge of Donauwert, with the greatest part of his forces. He however left two bodies of troops on the left side of that river, which occupied the roads from Nordingen and Hochstedt* to Donauwert. It

* It is this same village of Hochstedt which has been rendered so famous by the two great battles which were fought there at the beginning of the century, in the first of which the French were victorious, and in the second defeated.

was at this period that Prince Charles conceived the bold project, which was afterwards productive of such brilliant success. Till that time nothing had been able to check the victorious march of the French. They were masters of Suabia and Franconia. General Jourdan was directing his march towards the Danube, and threatened at the same time Bohemia and Upper Austria. The army of Moreau was on the frontiers of Bavaria; his right wing had seized the important posts of Bregentz, and was advancing into the Tyrol. The victories of Bonaparte in Italy, gave that General hopes that he likewise should be able to penetrate into the Tyrol, and to form a junction with General Moreau. The French believed themselves on the point of realizing the vast plan which they had framed; a plan, the object of which was to unite three large and victorious armies in the heart of Germany, and to pour their combined force against the hereditary states of the House of Austria.

Any other General but the Archduke, and any other army but his, might have been alarmed at such a situation of affairs. But this young Prince, entrusted with the defence of his brother's

dominions, and the safety of Germany, wished to prove himself worthy of the confidence reposed in him, and to shew that he was capable of sustaining so great a load of responsibility. He saw that some daring and sudden enterprize, was the only possible method of extricating himself from the surrounding dangers. Assured of the attachment of his Generals, and of the constancy of his troops, and conscious of the example which he should himself set them, he expected every thing from their courage, and something from fortune.—The forces and military means of the Prince increased daily, the nearer he approached to his brother's dominions. Considerable reinforcements had been sent him, which in some degree lessened the great disparity of numbers between him and the French, who were besides much weakened by the different engagements, and by the detachments they were under the necessity of leaving in their rear.

The Archduke, however, finding himself too weak to attack both the French armies at a time, resolved to unite almost his whole force against one of them, and to risk every thing to defeat and disperse it. As the army of Jourdan more immediately threatened the States of the Empe-

ror, and was in all respects much less advantageously posted than that of Moreau, the Prince resolved to direct his operations against the former. He judged, that by leaving a part of his forces to keep General Moreau in check, he might gain some marches over him, and fall unexpectedly with the rest of his army on Général Jourdan. The Archduke was perfectly aware of the great dangers to which this plan exposed him. He saw plainly that he left Moreau with little opposition or impediment; but he flattered himself that this General would hear of his march too late to be able to afford the least assistance to his colleague, and that even when he heard of it, and discovered the weakness of the corps opposed to him, he would be tempted to attack it, that he might make himself master of Munich, and create a diversion in favour of Jourdan. The event shewed the justness of the Archduke's conjectures, and fully answered his expectations.

CHAPTER IV.

March of the Archduke—Retreat of General Wartensleben behind the Naab—Actions of Teining and Neumarkt—Retreat of General Jourdan—Engagement at Amberg—Defeat of General Jourdan at Wurzburg—Surrender of the Citadel—Jourdan's retreat to the Lahn—Engagement at Aschaffenburg—Koenigstein retaken by the Imperialists—Bad condition and losses of the army of Jourdan—That General repasses the Lahn—Death of the Republican General Mareau—The French retire beyond the Rhine and the Sieg—Prince Charles marches towards the Upper Rhine.

ON the 14th of August, Prince Charles made at Donauwert every preparation necessary for the execution of the plan which he had formed. He left about half of his army with General Latour, with orders to defend Bavaria, and the river Lech. On the 15th, after having recalled

all the corps from the other side of the Danube, he ordered the bridge of Donauwert to be burnt, and left that town with 20,000 of his best troops. The next day he continued to march rapidly along the right bank of the Danube, and crossed that river on the 17th, at Neuburg and Ingolstadt, leaving a garrison in the latter place, which was capable of defence. He halted on the 17th and 18th before those two towns. His resolution had been to attack on the 19th that column of Jourdan's army, which had taken possession of Nuremberg, and threatened Ratisbon; but he was informed, in the night of the 18th, that General Wartensleben had been driven from the town of Amberg, and had retreated to Schwartzfeld, behind the river Naab.

In consequence of this change in the position of the armies of Jourdan and Wartensleben, the intended motion of the Archduke became extremely dangerous, as it would have rendered his communication with Mr. de Wartensleben very precarious, and thrown considerable difficulties in his way, in case he had been obliged to retire.

The Prince, on this account, altered the direction of his march, advanced more to the

right, and arrived on the 20th at Hemman. His vanguard, led by Major-General Nauendorf, proceeded the same day to take possession of the heights of Taswang; while a column, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Hotze, marched towards Bellugriess, to secure at the same time the left of the Archduke, and the road from Ratisbon to Nuremberg. The necessity of knowing precisely the situation of Mr. de Wartensleben, retarded, for one or two days, the Archduke's operations.

On the 22d, General Nauendorf attacked that column of the French which had advanced from Nuremberg and Neumarkt, as far as the village of Teining, within a few miles of Ratisbon. This body of the enemy, commanded by General Bernadotte, was dislodged, and driven back to Neumarkt. It was again attacked at that place the day after, by the united columns of the Archduke and General Hotze, was driven from it, and pursued as far as the neighbourhood of Altdorf, to which place it retired. Several squadrons of Austrian cavalry, and some light infantry, were sent by the Archduke, at the same time, to occupy the high road to Nuremberg.

These preparatory successes, having placed that Prince upon the right flank, and even in the rear of General Jourdan's army, who was still upon the Naab, he hastened to profit of his advantageous situation, and to accomplish his designs. He had concerted with General Wartensleben the plan of a general attack, for the execution of which the whole army set forward, on the 24th, divided into seven different columns. Of these, three marched against the front of the French army, while the others were to turn it upon the right and left.

As soon as Jourdan heard of Bernadotte's defeat, and of the movements which were making against himself, he abandoned with precipitation all the posts which he occupied, and retired to Amberg, in the night of the 23d, not daring to risk a battle, which, from the situation of the Archduke, and the difficulties of the country through which he would have been obliged to retreat, might, in case of a defeat, have ended in the total destruction of his army. The Austrians, without giving him time for recollection, attacked and defeated him at Amberg, on the 24th. He was compelled to fall back to Sultzbach, leaving 900 men in the hands

of the Austrians, who cut in pieces two battalions of his rear guard.* Jourdan continued to retreat, on the next and following days, by forced marches, passing successively through Velden, Betzenstein, Forchheim, Ebermanstadt, and Bamberg, where he arrived on the 29th. His army crossed the Mein at Eltmann and Hallstadt on the 30th, and halted at length near Läringen and Schweinfurt. During these eight days of continued retreat, Jourdan was pursued and incessantly harassed by the Imperial light troops, who frequently intercepted his couriers,

* It was in this affair that the English Colonel Craufurd, attached to the Austrian army, with the charge of sending to the British Cabinet reports of the military operations, was severely wounded in the head, and made prisoner. The military qualities of this officer, his talents, and the judicious perspicuity of his reports, occasioned a general regret for his misfortune. It was not less felt in the Austrian army than in his own country. Prince Charles immediately made the most pressing instances for his being set at liberty, and succeeded in obtaining it from General Jourdan. The Colonel's wound having unfortunately prevented him for a long time from exercising his functions with the Austrian army, they were ably discharged, in his absence, by Mr. Robert Craufurd, his brother, and for a short time, by Captain Anstruther. Their reports imitated the exactness and precision of those of the Colonel.

and got possession of a part of his baggage. The celerity of his retreat prevented the Archduke from coming up with the main body of his army, and forcing him to engage. That Prince, however, directed the march of the different columns with so much ability, that one of them reached Nuremberg before the French, and prevented them from passing through that town, and along the great road of Franconia. This skilful manœuvre obliged the right wing of Jourdan's army to retire by a worse and a longer route, compelled that General to repass the Mein with his whole army, and deprived him of every hope of being able to join Moreau, or of receiving any assistance from him.

To prevent the latter General from profiting too much by the weakness of General Latour's corps, and from causing any powerful diversion in favour of Jourdan, the Archduke had sent back General Nauendorf on the 25th of August, with 10,000 men to support him. The Prince having thus freed his mind from all anxiety about what might happen in Bavaria, thought only of taking advantage of his late successes over Jourdan, and forcing him to a complete

retreat, either by a victory, or by the effect of his manœuvres. His Royal Highness having arrived on the 31st at Bamberg, and having informed himself of the posts which the enemy occupied, was confirmed in his hopes of being able to drive him entirely out of Franconia, by compelling him to retire to the Upper Lahn, across the country of Fuld. To attain this end, it was necessary to make himself master of the town of Wurtzburg; and that Prince neglected nothing which could give him speedy possession of it. The vanguard of one of his columns, commanded by General Hotze, arrived before that town on the 1st of September, and forced its way into it, in spite of the resistance of the French garrison, which was driven out, and obliged to retire into the Citadel.

This vanguard was followed by the whole of the Austrian army, divided into three different corps; that on the right commanded by the Archduke in person, that in the centre by General Kray, and that on the left by General Sztarray.

Jourdan, conscious that the preservation of Wurtzburg was of the utmost consequence, had made every exertion to arrive there before the

Austrians. This, however, he found himself unable to effect, and did not appear before that town until several hours after it had been in the hands of his enemies. He then resolved to dislodge them, by attacking the corps which occupied the place, before it could be supported by the rest of the Imperial army.

On the 2d of September, he fell with great impetuosity upon General Sztarray, who had joined his vanguard under General Hotze, and succeeded in forcing a part of his position. But finding every effort to dislodge him from the principal points fruitless, he retired at night to Kornach, nearly three leagues distant from Wurtzburg. Well aware that the Archduke would soon attack him, if he remained in that position, he resolved to make a stand, thinking it both his duty and his interest, before he abandoned the countries he had conquered, to risk a battle, which, if he was successful, might restore to him Wurtzburg and Franconia.

He waited for the Archduke in a very advantageous position; his right wing being placed on a height, at the foot of which ran the Mein and another small river, with very steep banks; his

centre was also posted upon a chain of hills, the slope of which was bordered with woods, above which he placed a great number of cannon. These eminences were terminated by a plain, on which Jourdan drew out his left wing, composed almost entirely of cavalry. It was disposed so as to protect the infantry which occupied the heights, and to be capable itself of receiving support from the fire of the artillery and musquetry. Jourdan had, besides, left General Lefebvre with one division of his army, to cover the road from Schweinfurt to Puld; and communicated with that General through the means of a small intermediate corps.

The Archduke was no less desirous to engage, knowing that the solidity of his successes depended upon the celerity with which they were obtained; and that it was necessary to hasten the complete defeat of Jourdan, that he might have time and means to drive Moreau out of Germany.

On the 2d, his Royal Highness caused two bridges to be thrown across the Mein at Detelbach and Geroltshoffen, with the intention of attacking the French the next day. He had for this purpose divided his army into three columns, that on the left being commanded by General

Sztarray, that in the centre by General Wartensleben, and that on the right by General Kray.

General Sztarray was the first who was engaged, and met with some success in the beginning of the action ; but the passage of the Mein having retarded the march of the other two columns, he very soon had to support alone the weight of the whole French army. He not only lost the ground which he had gained, but even saw his own position in danger of being forced.

At this critical moment, which might have ended in the loss of the battle, the Archduke sent orders to General Wartensleben to ford the Mein immediately with all his cavalry, and to charge the left wing of the enemy without delay.

This manoeuvre, which was well executed, had the desired effect. Jourdan was forced by it to march back his troops to the left, and General Sztarray was in consequence relieved. The Austrian cavalry then charged that of the French in the plain, and compelled it to give way and seek for shelter under the fire of the infantry and artillery, which were posted on the heights and in the woods which bordered them. The

Imperial horse was so much annoyed by the fire from the batteries, that they were obliged to fall back, after having charged twice successively.

As the French could not be driven from their position without the assistance of infantry, the Archduke was under the necessity of waiting the arrival of the column under the orders of General Kray, and of the remaining part of that commanded by Mr. de Wartensleben. As soon as they appeared, the Prince ordered a general attack to be made on the whole of the enemy's line. Eight battalions of grenadiers penetrated the wood, in spite of the heavy fire kept up from the batteries, and the swarm of *Tirailleurs* who were posted in it. They advanced with fixed bayonets to the top of the hills which the French infantry occupied, and dislodged them from thence in a few minutes.

From that instant Jourdan gave up all thoughts of defending his ground, and began to retire. His retreat was conducted for some time with order, under the brave and steady protection of his cavalry and flying artillery; but the former, being attacked by the Austrian horse, was put to the rout, and the retreat was from that time conducted with the greatest confusion.

Night, and the excessive fatigue of the Imperialists, saved the French army from total destruction. It lost on that day 2000 men, killed and wounded, more than 3000 taken prisoners, 10 pieces of cannon, and a vast number of baggage and provision waggons. This victory cost the Austrians no more than 800 men. They were indebted for it to the example set them by the Archduke, to his coolness, his quickness of perception, and to the ability of his manœuvres.

The defeat of Jourdan drew after it the surrender of the Citadel of Wurtzburg, the garrison of which, consisting of 700 men, with their commander, General Belmont, chief of the French artillery, were made prisoners of war. The Austrians found 150 pieces of cannon, with a large quantity of ammunition and provisions, in this place and in Schweinfurt, which was evacuated by General Lefebvre. These stores were the produce of the contributions, levied by the French in the surrounding country. The raising of these contributions, joined to the vexations and outrages exercised upon them by the Republicans, had irritated the inhabitants of Franconia to such a degree, that they armed on all sides, during the retreat of the French, stopped se-

veral of their convoys, plundered their military chests, and either massacred or took prisoners all the stragglers.

Jourdan, after his defeat at Wurtzburg, retired to Hamelbourg, and continued his retreat towards the Upper Lahn, across the country of Fuld and Weteravia. He was closely pursued by the Archduke, who, in order to compel him to abandon the banks of the Mein entirely, detached General Meerfeld, on the 5th, with ten squadrons of light cavalry, destined to form a junction with the garrisons of Mannheim and Mentz, and by these means, to bring 15,000 men upon the rear of the enemy. The Prince in the mean time sent a strong vanguard, under the orders of General Kray, to take possession of all the avenues of the forest of Spessart.*

* This forest, one of the most considerable in Germany, extends from the town of Aschaffemburg, to the angle formed by the Mein, between that town and that of Wurtzburg. It was formerly infested by Brigands, and the passing through it, was as dangerous as difficult. The last Bishop of Wurtzburgh, some years ago, constructed in the middle of this forest a superb causeway, which is become the great road from Frankfort to Vienna. It was during their retreat across this forest, that the French had the most to suffer from the arming and the vengeance of the peasants. They stopped the

That General, finding them occupied by a body of 2000 French, attacked them vigorously, and drove them, after a brisk cannonade, from their advantageous position, killed 400 men, and took 600 prisoners. The rest were pursued by the Austrian cavalry as far as the town of Aschaffenburg, and dispersed on the other side of the Mein. The town of Aschaffenburg, which General Kray took possession of, was of importance to the Austrians, its bridge over the Mein being the only one between Frankfort and Wurtzburg.

The Archduke deserves the highest praise for the ability he displayed in getting the start of Jourdan, so as to arrive before him at Nuremberg, Wurtzburg, and Aschaffenburg. This able manoeuvre completely separated Jourdan from Moreau, detached him by force from the Mein, and put it out of his power to maintain his ground between that river and the Lahn.

The Archduke arrived on the 7th, and passed the 8th at Aschaffenburg. Having learned that the French had evacuated Frankfort the pre-

grand staff of the army, pillaged its chests, and forced General Ernouf, the Chief of it, to seek for safety in the swiftness of his horse.

ceding night, in consequence of the movement which has been just mentioned, he pushed forward his vanguard to the Nidda. On the 9th, he marched to Dettingen, and on the 10th to Windecken, his advanced guard occupying the important post of Friedberg. He was joined here by 10,000 men of the garrison of Mentz, who had taken possession of the fort of Koenigstein, which had on the 8th been abandoned by the French.

General Jourdan, it has been already observed, had retired through Fuld, directing his march towards the Hessian town of Hanau. His design was to take possession of the strong post of Bergen, where, he flattered himself, he might be able to make a stand against the Austrians, when joined by the troops, which had been blocking up Mannheim and Mentz. With this intention, he marched to Aschaffenburg, but finding that place already in the hands of the Austrians, he was obliged to change the direction of his march. He then turned to the right, and advanced to the Upper Lahn and Westlaer, where he arrived on the 9th, and employed himself in re-assembling the broken remains of his army. Ever since his defeat at Wurtzburg, it had been in the most

undisciplined and completely disorganized state. His retreat had been made with a confusion and disorder not to be described. The different corps of the French army having no regular supply of provisions, nor any settled points of retreat, had no longer waited for the orders of their Generals. They had fled in different parties, plundering and laying waste the countries through which they passed. A great part of the infantry had thrown away their arms, and were without shoes. Constantly harassed by the Austrians and the peasants who had risen upon them, Jourdan's army was struck with terror and despondency; it presented less the appearance of a retreat than of a tumultuous flight. The want of subsistence, excessive fatigue, and desertion, diminished it as much as the sword of the enemy, and the loss which it experienced in its retreat from the Naab to the Lahn, was generally estimated at upwards of 20,000 men.

The Archduke went and encamped at Friedberg on the 12th, having left a large body of reserve at Windecken. The same day he sent his right wing, under General Kray, against Westlaer, which the French abandoned at his ap-

proach, and took a position on the heights, which commanded that town.

In the mean time, the left wing of the Prince's army advanced, under the orders of General Hotze, towards Weilburg, but were unable to dislodge the enemy from thence. On the 14th, his Royal Highness began his march, and prepared to attack the centre of the French at Limburg and Dietz; while General Kray came upon the rear of their left, through Westlaer, and Major-General Mylius kept in check their right wing, which extended to Nassau.

Prince Charles having been reinforced by the corps of reserve left at Windecken, on the 16th attacked the front of the enemy, which a part of the garrison of Mentz, under the orders of General Neu, succeeded in turning, near Kinchberg. The French, threatened at all points, did not attempt to defend them, and retired behind the Lahn, abandoning the towns of Dietz and Limburg to the Imperialists. Their chasseurs, however, maintained their ground in the suburbs of the latter place; and night coming on, prevented their being driven from them.

The Archduke assembled his whole army, on the 17th, between Limburg and Dietz, intending

to make a vigorous and general attack. But General Jourdan, although reinforced by a part of the *army of the North*, and by the division of General Marceau, which had blocked up Mentz, did not dare to hazard a battle; the great disorder and depression which still reigned in his army leaving him but little hopes of success. Giving up all idea of defending his position on the Lahn, notwithstanding its advantages, he profited by a thick fog, which lasted the whole morning, to conceal his retreat from the Austrians, and to steal a few hours march upon them.

All the different corps of his army left the banks of the Lahn on the same day. The left and centre directing their march towards the Sieg, while the right joined the division which was then blocking up Ehrenbreitstein, and together with that, threw itself into the works which the French had thrown up before the bridge of boats, at Neuwied.

This last body was pursued by General Neu, who arrived near Neuwied on the 19th, while the French corps, which retired towards the Sieg, were harassed by the Archduke, who directed his march towards Altenkirchen; and by General Kray, who proceeded to Dillenburg, and Siegen.

The vanguard of the Archduke, conducted by General Hotz, came up, on the 20th, near Hochsteinbach, with the rear guard of the French, commanded by Marceau, General of a division; defeated it, and took a great number of prisoners: amongst them was General Marceau himself, who, being mortally wounded by a carbine shot, died the next day at Altenkirchen. This General, scarcely twenty-seven years of age, was one of the most enterprising and skilful of the Republican officers. His death was much regretted by the whole French army. His Adjutant-General was killed in the same action, and two of his Aides-de-Camp were taken prisoners.

It might have been expected that the French, who had now drawn nearer to Dusseldorf and Cologne, and were certain of an easy retreat, would have endeavoured to defend the famous post of Ukerath, so often taken and retaken during this campaign. But the same reasons which had deterred them from attempting to maintain the still better position on the Lahn, banished all thoughts of making a stand in that of Ukerath: they did not even remain there one single day. Two divisions of their army passed the Rhine at Cologne; and the main body sought

for safety in the entrenched camp, before Dusseldorf, leaving only a few light troops on the bank, of the Sieg.

Thus ended the retreat of General Jourdan, a retreat of more than three hundred miles, in which he lost near one half of his army, and was driven in twenty-five days, from the frontiers of Bohemia, to the walls of Dusseldorf.

This retreat formed a strong contrast with that of General Wartensleben, who disputed every foot of ground with scarcely 25,000, against 50,000 men; who never suffered any considerable part of his army to be either cut off or endangered; and who employed near two months in retiring from the Sieg to the Naab.

A comparison drawn between these two retreats, seems to confirm the opinion, that if the French are endowed with the qualities which lead to victory, they are not, in the same degree, possessed of those which are requisite to support a defeat; and that the latter qualifications are eminently possessed by the Austrians. This campaign of Jourdan's proved, that if the valour of the soldiers, and the boldness of their Generals, are sufficient to render an army victorious, the only hope of safety, in case of a defeat, must be

placed in the passive obedience of the troops, in the regular subordination of the Officers, in the ability of the Generals, and in the solid organization of all its parts. It was to the want of all these circumstances, that Jourdan owed the rapid abandonment of his conquests, and the destruction of his army. Two great defeats would not have occasioned a loss equal to that which he sustained by the want of discipline among his soldiers, by the spirit of independence among his Generals, and of disobedience among his subaltern officers. The great irregularity in the distribution of provisions, and the extreme disorder which reigned in the interior government of his army, were more fatal to him than the sword of the Austrians. They produced disobedience and discouragement among the soldiery, caused a considerable desertion, and obliged the different corps to follow their own discretion, in directing their retreat to whatever places could provide them the subsistence which they were so much in want of. A total disunion in the motions and positions of the whole army was the consequence, which rendered it impossible to oppose a victorious, active, and well regulated force.

The excessive contributions, extortions, and outrages, exercised upon the inhabitants of the conquered countries, excited in them the most violent animosity, which shewed itself evidently, from the very beginning of the French disasters. The disorder of their retreat, the plunder and violence with which it was marked, gave the Franconian peasants, at the same time, new causes of resentment, and a favourable opportunity of revenging themselves. The bad military and political conduct of the French, occasioned the loss, not only of their conquests, but likewise of the partizans they had in Germany. When conquerors, they were detested; when conquered, they were despised.

His Royal Highness judging that Bournonville, who had just succeeded Jourdan in the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, could not recommence offensive measures for a long time, with an army totally disorganized, and which, if it may be so expressed, had lost all its powers of action; thought he had done nothing, as long as there remained any thing to be done. He had delivered the North of Germany from its enemies, but the South was still in their hands; and the Prince determined not

to lose a moment in wresting it from them. He left 40,000 men for the defence of the Lower Rhine, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Werneck, who pushed forward his advanced posts on the Sieg, and fixed his head quarters at Ukerath.

His Royal Highness again began his march towards the Mein, the 22d of September, passed that river on the 25th, and having made all the arrangements necessary for the safety of Ehrenbreitstein and Mentz, he bent his course towards the Upper Rhine, with about 15,000 men, to second the operations of Mr. de Latour, and to oblige Moreau likewise to repass the Rhine.

CHAPTER V.

Position of the armies of Generals Latour and Moreau, on the 15th of August—Engagement at Ober Kamlach—Passage of the Danube and Lech by the French—Defeat of Mr. de Latour at Fridberg—Actions of St. Gast, Ingolstadt, and Munich—Armistice concluded between the French Republic and the Elector Palatine—Moreau quits his position on the Iser—His rear guard and that of General Desaix are routed—Moreau determines to retreat.

WE left General Moreau's army on the confines of Suabia and Bavaria.—No account has yet been given of the events which took place in these two countries since the 15th of August, when the Archduke separated himself from Mr. de Latour, at Donauwert. As the Prince and the General ceased from that time to have any immediate connection with one another, an un-

interrupted relation of the operations of the Archduke appeared to be more distinct, as well as more interesting. The attention is now to be turned to Suabia and Bavaria, where events took place, not less important, and, in the final result, no less fortunate, than those which have been just described.

It may be remembered, that before he left Donauwert, the Archduke had ordered the bridge of that town, over the Danube, to be burnt down, after having passed, with all his troops, to the right bank of the river. Prince Charles having set out from Donauwert on the 15th, to commence his operations against Jourdan, had, as is above mentioned, left the command of the Austrian troops which remained in Bavaria, to General Latour. In order to prevent the French from penetrating into it, this General had taken a defensive situation behind the river Lech. His army occupied three principal points, Rain, Fridberg and Landsberg. His advanced posts were beyond the Lech, covering the town of Augsburg. Two other small detached corps, under the orders of Generals Frolich and Wolf, were at Wangen and Kempten, protecting the left of

the army, and keeping up his communication with the Tyrol. The French army was, at the same period, partly on the left, and partly on the right bank of the Danube, between the rivers Iller and Lech.

Such was the position of the armies of Latour and Moreau, on the 15th of August. No action of any importance had taken place between the two armies since the affair of the 11th, except that which took place on the 14th, at Ober Kamlach. Prince Condé was there attacked by the whole division of Ferino, which he could only resist by great efforts of talents and bravery: 2200 Noble infantry attacked and drove from their position 5000 Republicans; but this success was purchased by the loss of 500 of that corps. It will be recollected, that on the 11th, General Frolich began his march to go to reinforce this little army, but that he received counter orders, and was obliged to return to Guntzburg. If this had not happened, he would have joined Prince Condé on the 12th, and there is reason to believe, that, in this case, the division of Ferino would have been entirely defeated in the affair of the 14th. This junction was, from circum-

stances, the more requisite, as, if the army of Prince Condé had been composed of common troops, it would have been destroyed by Ferino, who would then have passed the Lech without obstacle, and would have turned the left of the Archduke.

General Moreau learning that Prince Charles had concentrated his forces at Donauwert, resolved to march likewise with the rest of his army along the right bank of the Danube, and passed that river, on the 17th, at Dettingen, Höchstet, and Laningen. By this movement, Moreau realized the plan which had been formed by the Archduke to drive him with his whole force to the right bank of the Danube. Although he had left a small corps at Donauwert, to keep up his correspondence with Jourdan, Moreau was so ill-informed of the motions of the Archduke, that on the 21st of August (six days after the departure of the latter) he believed him still at Rain, as appeared by his letter to the Directory.

When he at last was informed of the Archduke's movement, he determined, as that Prince had expected, to take advantage of the weakness of Mr. de Latour, persuaded that he could pur-

sue no plan so likely to disengage his colleague, as to enter Bavaria, and to make himself master of Munich. He lost no time in carrying this diversion into effect, flattering himself that it would oblige the Archduke to renounce his projects against Jourdan, and to return immediately.

On the 22d, Moreau pushed forward his advanced posts as far as the Lech, and drove those of the enemy to the right bank of the river. He reconnoitered the different fords on the 23d, and repaired the bridges which the Austrians had destroyed in their retreat. These preparatory dispositions being made, he undertook the passage of the Lech on the 24th, at three different places. The right wing crossed it the first, under the orders of General Ferino, opposite to Haustetten, at a ford which the Austrians had neglected to guard: the French, of course, found there no resistance. The only obstacle they had to surmount was the rapidity of the current, by which their first platoons, that threw themselves into the river, were carried away: a great many men were drowned, among whom was the Adjutant-General Houel. This column having, nevertheless, succeeded in effecting the passage of the river, out of sight of the enemy, advanced

against Kussing, and the heights of Othmaringen, from whence it threatened the left wing of the Austrians, and by this feint favoured the passage of the centre column.

This last, commanded by General St. Cyr, forded the Lech, on the right and left of Lechhausen, under the protection of artillery and musquetry. It forced this village, and as soon as the cannon were brought over the river, it attacked in front the position of Friedberg, while General Ferino took it in flank, and got possession, behind it, of the great road to Munich. The Imperial corps, which defended Friedberg, being attacked on many points at the same time, was not able to defend them: it was soon obliged to retreat, leaving in the hands of the French (according to General Moreau's report) 1500 men, and 16 pieces of cannon.

The left wing of the French was also successful in forcing the passage of the river, opposite to Langenwied, and the Austrians, entirely driven from their position, took up another, between the Lech and the Iser. This expedition could not fail to have cost the French a considerable number of men, either killed or drowned.

The passage of the Lech opened to the Republicans, the entrance into Bavaria. They found themselves in an abundant country; and got possession of considerable magazines, which the Austrians had not time to save. They flattered themselves that this success would determine the Archduke to desist from his enterprize against Jourdan. Moreau had no doubt of this, and, indeed, expressed these expectations to the Executive Directory, by a letter on the 25th. In this, however, he was mistaken: as it has been before observed, the Archduke contented himself with sending, on the 25th, General Nauendorf, with 10,000 men, to cover Ratisbon, and to support Mr. de Latour. This reinforcement put the latter General in condition to prevent the enemy from penetrating beyond the Iser; and thus rendered of no effect, the diversion which Moreau endeavoured to make in favour of Jourdan.

After the passage of the Lech, the French gained ground for four days successively on the Austrians, who took a fresh position between the Iser and the Amper. General Latour posted himself behind the first of these rivers, opposite to Munich. The advanced guard of

Moreau advanced under the walls of this city on the 30th, but neither the French nor the Austrians took possession of it. They were separated only by a barricade through the most advanced bridge of the city, which had a garrison of 8000 Bavarians. He stationed another corps at Freysingen; while General Mercantin went to occupy Landshut, where he communicated with some light troops, which covered Ratisbon. The approach to this city was besides defended by the troops which the Archduke had left at Ingolstadt, a fortified town, where there is a bridge over the Danube.

While Mr. de Latour took this position, before which Moreau found the termination of his progress, the latter posted his right at Dachau, his centre at Pfaffenhoffen, and his left at Bombach. This position was no less singular than dangerous; his left was liable to be attacked, with advantage, by the Austrian corps, which was in possession of Ingolstadt; and his centre could not advance against Regensburg (Ratisbon) without being exposed to be taken in flank, by the corps which was at Landshut. To improve his situation, by securing his left, Moreau

resolved to dislodge the Austrians from the *tête de pont* at Ingolstadt.

But while he was endeavouring to quit the dangerous situation in which he had placed himself, Generals Nauendorf and Mercantin determined to take advantage of it. On the 1st of September, at break of day, one part of the left wing of the French having advanced against Ingolstadt, the other part of it was attacked with great vigour by the Austrians, entirely routed, and pursued by them as far as Langenbrucke, and the Chapel of St. Gast. This attack forced the French to renounce that which they meditated against Ingolstadt, and to return to make head against General Nauendorf. He had completely defeated the corps which had been opposed to him, and had advanced several leagues; but the main body, and corps de reserve of the French coming up, stopped the progress of the Austrians, whose cavalry being entangled in a morass, suffered considerably. After some fruitless attempts to dislodge the enemy from their principal position, the Austrians returned to that which they held before the action. During this engagement, the French had made an unsuccessful attack on General

Latour, opposite to Munich.—These affairs cost both sides some hundred men; both claimed the advantage, which was, in fact, nearly balanced. It belonged, however, rather to the Imperialists, since they disconcerted the plans of the enemy against the *tête de pont* of Ingolstadt, the garrison of which defeated the small French corps that was left before it. In Moreau's report to the Directory, of the transactions of this day, he again observed, *that the army of the Sambre and the Meuse would soon resume offensive operations.*

Moreau, having failed in his project against Ingolstadt, determined to dislodge the Austrians from Freysingen, and to drive them on that point beyond the Iser. In this attempt he was more fortunate. General St. Cyr, on the 3d of September, got possession of Freysingen, as well as of the bridge of that city.

From this day to the 10th, the armies of Moreau and Latour preserved nearly the same position. Between these two periods, there were several affairs of advanced posts, some of which were pretty warm, and in one of which the Republican General Lambert was killed. It is not here necessary to give the detail of those actions,

as they produced no material alteration in the situation of the armies.

The same silence must not be observed respecting a transaction which took place in the interval. The Elector Palatine had quitted Munich a few days before the French arrived before that town. That Prince had, before his departure, appointed a commission authorized to treat with the conquerors, and to negotiate with them a suspension of arms. As soon as Moreau entered Bavaria, these Commissioners sent deputies to prevail on him not to treat their country as that of an enemy, offering to provide, by contributions, whatever might be necessary for the maintenance of the French army.

After many days of negotiation, they obtained from General Moreau, and from Haussman, the Commissioner of the Republic, a suspension of arms, of which the principal conditions were: that the Elector Palatine should withdraw all the troops which he had with the Imperial army, into Bavaria; that he should give the French Republic ten millions of French livres, payable at different periods, of which the most distant should be four months from that time; that

he should deliver to the French 3300 saddle and draft horses; 200,000 quintals of grain; 100,000 sacks of oats; 160,000 pair of shoes; 10,000 pair of boots; 30,000 ells of cloth; and 20 pictures, which the French should be at liberty to select from the galleries of Dusseldorf and Munich. It was at this price that Haussman and Moreau *condescended* to grant to the Elector Palatine the neutrality of his dominions in Bavaria, Franconia, and Westphalia. They also demanded, that this Prince should send Deputies to Paris, with power to conclude a separate peace with the Republic. The events, which shortly followed, prevented this last condition from being carried into execution, and the others were only partially fulfilled. The effect of this treaty, however, deprived the Austrian army of the co-operation of some thousands of Bavarian soldiers,* while it produced to that

* The French had likewise succeeded, a month before, in detaching from the Coalition the Elector of Saxony. They had concluded with him, under the mediation of the King of Prussia, a treaty of neutrality, in consequence of which the contingent of that Elector, amounting to 9000 men, separated, at

of the Republic, money, subsistence, and a very considerable addition of military stores and resources. These advantages were, no doubt, great, but the acquisition of them cost the French dear; it brought along with it the disasters which they experienced during the remainder of the campaign; and the loss of all their conquests in Germany, was the sequel and effect of the momentary subjugation of Bavaria. By advancing into that country, Moreau separated, and as it were insulated himself from Jourdan, lost the means of acting in concert with him, as likewise the possibility of affording him any ready assistance. By transporting all his force to the right bank of the Danube, Moreau enabled the Archduke to conceal his movements from him, and gave that Prince time to come up with Jourdan, and to drive him beyond the Mein. As soon as he was apprized of the measures taken by the Archduke, yielding to the temptation of an easy conquest, he too readily persuaded himself that the invasion of Bavaria would recall to it the 20,000 men who had

the end of July, from the Austrian army, and sensibly weakened it.

advanced against Jourdan. Being, during the space of fifteen days, as ill informed of the movements of the Austrians, as of the situation of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, Moreau never knew, with certainty, the number of men that Prince Charles had taken with him, nor of those which he had sent back. He continued, nevertheless, to advance in Bavaria, still confident that it was the only means by which he could save his colleague. Hence it resulted, that the Archduke was enabled to push Jourdan to the utmost, and to drive him beyond the Rhine; and that Moreau, finding himself soon reduced to his own force alone, had no part left but that of a retreat, which was become perilous in proportion as it had been delayed.

The light troops dispatched by the Archduke, after the battle of Wurtzburg, on the left flank and rear of Moreau's army, were so vigilant and so well distributed, that they cut off that General from all communication with Jourdan. Several couriers, sent both by these Generals and by the Directory, were intercepted, and Moreau was, during three weeks, very imperfectly informed of the state of affairs in Franconia. Whether that General, as he wrote to the Directory, wish-

ed to have some account of the Archduke, or whether he was at last sensible of the necessity of advancing against that Prince, in order to succour Jourdan effectually, on the 10th of September, he caused a large corps of cavalry, drawn from his left wing, to cross the Danube. Moreau, willing to put himself in a situation to support or follow this column, quitted, on the 11th, his position on the Iser, but while executing this manœuvre, he was attacked near Munich, by Prince Furstenberg and General Frolich, who defeated his rear guard, of which they killed, or took prisoners, more than 2000 men.

The division which had passed the Danube, under the orders of General Desaix, pushed forwards to the town of Aichstedt, on which it levied a contribution of 300,000 florins (£30,000 sterling.) The march of this column again threw Franconia into alarms, from which she was but just recovering. It was supposed that Moreau's whole army was going to pass the Danube; that this General intended to occupy the road from Ratisbon to Frankfort, and that after having got possession of Nuremberg and Wurtzburgh, he would march with all his forces against the Archduke's rear, to seize

his magazines, his convoys, and his posts of communication; and that that Prince would soon find himself enclosed between the armies of Jourdan and Moreau.

To put himself in condition to prevent these designs, or to render them abortive, Mr. de Latour began instantly to pursue Moreau, who directed his course towards Neuburg. At the same instant, General Nauendorf passed the Danube below that town, in order to meet the French corps which had crossed that river at Donauwert. The march of General Nauendorf, together with the accounts that were received from France, and from Jourdan, determined Moreau immediately to recall General Desaix to the right bank of the Danube; but before the latter could execute the order, he was overtaken, on the 14th, by General Nauendorf, who completely defeated his rear guard, killed a great many of his men, and took 1000 prisoners.

From this moment, Moreau thought of nothing but retreating towards the Rhine, through Suabia. Whether from an ignorance of the state of affairs in Franconia, whether pursuant to his first plan, or in consequence of orders from the Directory, he had continued for a fortnight in

the same position. By remaining so long in Bavaria, where he had kept in check a part of the Austrian forces, he had hoped to give Jourdan time to rally his army, and flattered himself that his colleague, when he had received reinforcements, might be able to stop the Archduke, and resume the offensive. The contrary, however, had happened.—The successive defeats of Jourdan, and the dispersion of his army, no longer allowed Moreau to expect any great efforts from that quarter.—The army of Latour was besides, in this interval, a good deal augmented.—It had received all the reinforcements that had been sent from Bohemia and Austria.—The extraordinary levies which had been made in these two countries, and the military enthusiasm which had been displayed at Vienna, as well as in all the hereditary dominions, might in a very short time double the Austrian force in Bavaria. Moreau was likewise aware that detachments from the Archduke's army were then marching to Suabia, and might get possession of the passes, by which he communicated with that country and with France. Under those circumstances he perceived, that, without

exposing his army to inevitable destruction, he could no longer defer his retreat, which already presented many dangers and difficulties. He therefore determined on it, and had then no other object, but to effect it with as much steadiness and method, as there had been disorder and precipitation in that of Jourdan.

CHAPTER VI.

Moreau repasses the Lech—Engagement at Jsny—The Fort of Kehl is taken by the Austrians, and retaken by the French—Moreau continues to retreat—General Nauendorf prevents his entrance into the Duchy of Wurtemberg—The Peasants of Suabia arm against the French—Affair of advanced guards at Schussenried—Moreau sends a part of his baggage and troops through Switzerland—Defeat of the Austrians at Biberach—The French force the pass of the valley of Hell, and arrive at Freyburg.

AFTER the affair of the 14th, Moreau drew together the different corps of his army, contracted his line, and retired behind the river Lech; but finding himself too much pressed by Generals Latour and Nauendorf, who followed him very close, on the 17th he made a movement forward, repulsed the advanced posts of the Austrians, and again extended his line to Lansberg, Fridberg, and Rain.

On the same day, General Frolich made himself master of Immenstadt and Kempten. On the 19th, he dislodged the Republicans from Jsny, after an engagement, in which they were defeated with the loss of 500 men. By the capture of this last place, General Frolich outflanked the right wing of Moreau, whose left was at the same time turned by General Nauendorf, who had advanced in force to Nordlingen. The latter, on the 20th, obtained possession of Donauwert, and likewise of the position of Shellenberg.* From thence he pushed on parties towards Ulm, Dillengen, and Gemund, which formed a junction at Canstadt on the Necker, with some detachments of a corps commanded by Major-General Petrarch.

This corps had been formed by part of the garrisons of Philipsburgh and Manheim, and by the ten squadrons of light cavalry, which the Archduke had detached under General Meerfeld after the battle of Wurtzburgh. Soon after this junction, General Petrarch had marched into

* This mountain of Shellenbergh, famous in all the wars of Bavaria, was fortified by the Swedes in the thirty years' war. It was to this mountain, that John of Wert retired after the battle of Nordlingen.

the Margraviate of Baden, had successively beaten and driven from Bruchsal, Durlach, Carlsruhe, and Radstadt, several small bodies of the enemy, who occupied the valley of the Rhine. These detachments, after their defeat, having thrown themselves into the fort of Kehl, General Petrarch was ordered to follow them, and to attempt a *coup de main* on that important post, the capture of which would have cut off Moreau's principal communication with France, and have multiplied the difficulties of his retreat. The French had covered that fort by considerable entrenchments, but which were, at that time, neither in a finished state, nor sufficiently provided with artillery.

General Petrarch, on the 17th of September, caused an attack to be made on the fort of Kehl, by two battalions, who carried it by storm, killed 1200 men, took 800 prisoners, and forced the remainder to retreat beyond the Rhine. But one of the two staff officers who conducted the attack, having been killed in the action, and the other taken prisoner, the inferior officers, deprived of their leaders, supplied their place with but little intelligence and activity. With a degree of negligence scarcely credible, they

omitted the obvious precaution of immediately breaking down the bridge of Kehl; and suffered the soldiers to ramble in disorder about the town and fort. Meanwhile, a reinforcement of 3000 men, who at the beginning of the action, had marched from Strasburgh, passed over the bridge, attacked and easily routed the Austrians, who, supposing the engagement at an end, were entirely off their guard. They were in a very short time driven from the fort of Kehl, and from all the entrenchments, with the loss of 400 men. Thus did a few moments of improvidence and disorder rob them of the whole fruit of their victory, and deprive them of an invaluable post, which afterwards cost so much blood and expense. Few examples can be produced, which have more strikingly proved the absolute necessity of unremitting attention and vigilance in war, or more clearly shewn the fatal consequences which may result from one moment of mistake, or of forgetfulness. The fault committed at Kehl, by the officer on whom the command devolved by the loss of his superiors, cost the Emperor, in the sequel, many thousands of his best soldiers, and occasioned the expense of many millions.

General Petrarch having rallied the two defeated battalions, and supported them by some fresh troops, made a new, but unsuccessful, attempt on the fort of Kehl. Leaving then some troops to blockade it, he retired to Bichoffsheim, a small town about fifteen miles distant from it. From thence he sent a detachment to take possession of the valley of Kintzig, as well as of the defile of Kniebis; and marched with the remainder of his troops towards Stutgard and Canstadt, where his advanced guard arrived on the 24th. By this disposition, and by these movements, General Petrarch made himself master of one of the five principal passes of Suabia, placed himself in the rear of Moreau, deprived him of all direct communication with Strasburgh, carried off the magazines formed by the French, in the Duchy of Wurtemberg, and intercepted their convoys and couriers. Having opened an immediate communication with General Nauendorf; he straitened the front of Moreau's retreat, and obliged him to make it through the southern part of Suabia.

Pressed on his rear by General Petrarch, and turned on both flanks, by Generals Nauendorf and Frolich, Moreau was obliged to re-com-

mence his retreat. On the 20th, he repassed the Lech, at Augsburg and Rain, marched up the Danube in close columns, and arrived on the 22d, at Weissenhausen. His plan was to retire across the Duchy of Wurtemberg, and the country of Baden, through Ulm, Stutgard, Canstadt, and Kehl. To this end, he had sent forward the Commissaries of provisions, the army bakers, and a part of the baggage. The whole of this was fallen in with, and captured, on the 22d, on the road from Ulm to Stutgard, by an Austrian detachment from the latter town.

The march of the Commissaries' department towards Stutgard, and its orders to have in readiness in that town, as well as at Canstadt, bread and provisions necessary for four divisions of Moreau's army, proving, beyond a doubt, that General's intention to pass the Danube at Ulm, with a view to retire through the Duchy of Wurtemberg, General Nauendorf left Nordlingen in haste, to endeavour to be at Ulm before the French, and arrived in the neighbourhood of that town, on the 23d, in the morning. Some hours afterwards, a strong column of the French army came out of Ulm, but found the Austrians posted on the heights, which command the road

from that town to Stutgard. They did not attempt to force the passage, and the day passed without any engagement taking place. The next day, General Nauendorf attacked the French, and drove them back to the gates of the town. Seeing themselves thus prevented, and not doubting that the Austrians occupied, in force, all the passes of the Duchy of Wurtemberg, the French gave up their intention of taking that route. On the 26th, they left Ulm, leaving there a part of their pontoons, and considerable magazines. They continued to ascend the left bank of the Danube, as far as Erbach, where they passed that river on the same day, the 26th, and from thence directed their march towards Biberach and Schussenreid. With a view to anticipate, or stop them on the new route which they were going to take, General Petrarch marched from Orb to Villingen, leaving a small corps under Colonel d'Aspre, to occupy the mountain of Kniebis, as well as the valleys of the two rivers of the Renchen and the Murg, between which that mountain is situated.

In the mean time, a column, sent by Moreau to re-open the communication with Kehl, through

the valley of Kintzig, was repulsed, and forced to fall back on Freyburg.

This General having, as has been just mentioned, passed the Danube on the 26th, and marched towards Biberach and Schussenreid, was followed by Mr. de Latour, who advanced on the 27th, to the Iller, and on the 28th, to the Rottam. On the 29th, his advanced guard drove the French from Biberach, and pursued them as far as Groth, from which it was unable to dislodge them. The army of Mr. de Latour was, at that time, divided into four corps: that at the right, under the immediate orders of that General in person, occupied Biberach; the second, commanded by General Mercantin, was behind Schussenreid. General Klinglin (who, before the Revolution, had been a General in the French service) was with the third corps, at Wolsech. The fourth was with General Frolich, in the neighbourhood of Wangen. At the same time, the two corps of Nauendorf and Petrarch, which were both out of the line, moved, the first to Hechingen, and the second, towards Rothweil and Villingen. The object of these movements was to bring these two corps nearer each other, and to make them co-operate with more concert

and effect. General Meerfeld commanded the advanced guard of General Petrarch's corps.

It is obvious, from this view of the position of the different corps of the Austrian army, that the principal passes of Suabia were shut against Moreau, and that the only ones remaining open to him, were those of the principality of Furstenburg, and of the Forest Towns. He might not be free from uneasiness, even with respect to the latter opening, in consequence of General Frolich's march towards the Lake of Constance.

To all these difficulties which opposed Moreau's retreat, were added other embarrassments equally pressing. The excessive contributions raised by the French, and the depredations and outrages committed by them on the inhabitants of Suabia, had irritated the latter to the highest degree. They supported with impatience, the presence and the yoke of these greedy and tyrannical conquerors. They had scarcely experienced some reverses, and begun their retreat, when the hatred in which they were held, broke out openly. The peasants every where armed themselves, massacred, or took prisoners, the smaller detachments of the French, stopped their sick and wounded, pillaged their magazines, and

retook a part of those spoils of which they had themselves been plundered. The Austrian Generals, taking advantage of the disposition of the natives, pointed out to them the most eligible places for assembling, put at their head officers of experience, and posted their new auxiliaries on the mountains, in the woods, and in the defiles, through which the enemy were obliged to pass.

Menaced in every point, at the same time, by the Imperialists and the armed peasants, and having, in addition, to surmount those obstacles which arose from the nature of the country, Moreau found himself in the most critical situation. To escape from Suabia, called for more courage, and for greater efforts, than had been required to enable him to penetrate into it. It was incumbent on him to fight, in order to retire ; his safety could result only from a victory.

Surrounded by a multitude of small corps, scattered over a great number of points, he was sensible, that instead of facing them all at once, his situation demanded the adoption of a contrary disposition, and that he ought to march in a mass, and in very close order. He judged rightly, that by concentrating his army, he would

be enabled to attack with superior force, and to break through some point or other, of the circle which was forming round him.

It not being possible for him, without great danger, to retire in the face of the principal corps, under the orders of Mr. de Latour, which pressed very closely upon him, Moreau was under the necessity of removing that hostile corps to a greater distance, in order to gain somewhat more space, and greater facility of moving.

In the morning of the 30th, while the vanguards of Generals Latour and Mercantin were marching towards Schussenreid, they were vigorously attacked by three divisions of the French army. These vanguards fell back on the main body, which followed them, and which stopped the progress of the Republicans. They were repulsed with loss, and the Imperialists kept their position. This affair cost the latter 600 men, of whom a great number belonged to the Prince of Condé's army. His troops formed the vanguard of General Mercantin, and had to sustain the whole shock of the Republicans. They exhibited proofs of the greatest bravery, and the young Duke d'Enghein, who commanded

them, shewed himself, by his capacity and courage, the worthy descendant of the great Condé.

Moreau, having succeeded but imperfectly in his plans against Mr. de Latour, hastened to take advantage of the only route which remained entirely in his power. In order to get rid of his sick, his wounded, and of all that train of equipage, so embarrassing to a retreating army, and by the Romans so properly called *impedimenta*, he sent into Switzerland, by the way of Schaffhausen, a great part of his heavy baggage, accompanied by a considerable number of soldiers. On their entrance into the territory of Switzerland, they were disarmed by the troops, which the cantons had assembled on their frontiers, and sent into France, across the cantons of Zurich and Soleure. Moreau, by this means, disengaged himself from whatsoever could most incommode and incumber his retreat, and kept with him only those troops, which were the best calculated for action.

After the engagement of the 30th, Mr. de Latour advanced as far as Groth and Steinhäusen, presenting his front to Moreau, who was posted between Schussenreid, and a small lake, called the Feder See. The situation of

the latter General grew every day worse, and his retreat became more and more difficult. The corps of General Petrarch, posted between the sources of the Necker and the Danube, incessantly harassed his rear. He had no longer any communication with France, and could entertain no hopes of receiving from thence any succour. Reduced to his own forces, he could only look for safety to the courage of his troops, to some successful manœuvre, or to the fault of his enemies.

The corps of Mr. de Latour being the most numerous, the nearest, and consequently the most to be feared, Moreau resolved to make a new effort against it. He judged, that General Nauendorf, having separated himself from Mr. de Latour, the right of the latter would be unprotected, and might be attacked with advantage. He made his dispositions, in consequence, with great ability; and they were executed with secrecy, promptitude, and success.

In the night of the first of October, he made the left wing of his army cross the Danube, at Reidlingen. It recrossed that river at Munderkingen, and at day-break fell upon the right of the Austrian army, which was posted between

the Danube and the Feder See. Major-General Kospoth, who commanded this right wing, not having been properly vigilant on that point, was surprised, and completely beaten. Nearly two battalions were cut off; and the rest sought for safety in flight. As soon as Moreau was informed of the success of his left wing, he attacked the whole front of Mr. de Latour's line, but more feebly on the left, than at the other points.

The army of Mr. de Latour, without comprehending in it the three corps of Generals Nauendorf, Petrarch, and Frolich, which were detached, and totally separated; the two first from the right wing, and the last from the left, was divided into three principal corps. The right wing, as has been stated, was under the command of General Kospoth, the centre under that of Prince Furstenburgh, the left under that of Prince Condé and of General Mercantin, this latter General being on the left of the whole.

Moreau, informed of his success against the right of the Imperialists, made a faint and distant attack on the centre, where Mr. de Latour was himself, and which occupied an excellent position on the heights of Groth. The left was at the same time attacked, but so feebly,

that it could easily have advanced and flanked the enemy's corps, which was making the attack of Groth. Mr. de Latour, informed of the defeat of General Kospoth, urged by Prince Furstenberg, and distrusting the firmness of his infantry, among which there were a great number of recruits and new battalions, ordered at the same time the retreat of the centre and of the left, enjoining, that any one of the two columns which should arrive first at a place where there was only one road for both, should continue its march, and that the other should halt and cover the retreat.

The different regiments of Austrian infantry which composed the centre, were probably informed of this disposition, for they retired with a precipitation which approached nearly to flight. Hence the corps of Condé, which followed behind more slowly, found itself charged with covering the retreat, General Mercantin having, in obedience to the orders which he had received, fallen back towards Mulhausen. In the mean time, the fugitives of the right wing, and the baggage, sought for safety, by retreating from Biberach to Uhmedorf, where the infantry had to pass a

marshy and deep ford, which retarded it for some time. On the other side of the ford, the road of Ochsenhausen passes over a very high and long mountain, which was covered with more than 600 waggons laden with baggage and ammunition, and by all the artillery. Such was the position of the Austrian army, when the enemy came up with Prince Condé, who formed the rear guard.

In this situation, at once dangerous and honourable, this Prince displayed the talents of a most able General, and his army the most determined intrepidity. It shewed no hesitation in devoting itself for the glory of its commander, and the safety of the Imperial army. Having sustained all the weight of the French army, it arrested its progress, even attacked it with success, and made three charges of cavalry upon it, in which it took one cannon, and in which the Duke d'Enghien, anew distinguished himself by his bravery and the skill of his manœuvres.—After having thus given time to the column of the centre, and to the baggage and artillery, to extricate themselves from the embarrassment in which they were placed, and when the corps of Mr. de Latour was out of danger, Prince Condé performed his own retreat, and went to take a position upon the

heights, behind Uhmedorf to the left, and in front of that occupied by Mr. de Latour.

Without this combined firmness and skill, with which the army of Condé was conducted, the centre of the Austrian army (that is to say) more than eight battalions, its equipage, and all its artillery, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy. The latter could then have attacked, with an enormous superiority of numbers, the corps of Generals Mercantin and Frolich, could have obliged them either to fly or to lay down their arms, and Moreau would no longer have had an enemy between the Danube and the Lake of Constance. The great successes of the Archduke would then have proved detrimental, by placing him between the victorious army of Moreau, and that of Jourdan, reinforced by the succours which it had received at its return to the Rhine.

The loss of the Austrians, on this day, was about 4000 men and 12 pieces of cannon; that of the Republicans was considerably less. General Latour spoke in the highest terms of Prince Condé and of his troops, to which he confessed he owed the safety of his army. The

official accounts, published at Vienna and at London, made a no less favourable report of Prince Condé's conduct.

On the 3d, Mr. de Latour took a position at Monschroden, Erlenhausen, and Laupheim. The victory which Moreau had gained at Biberach having given him more liberty in his motions, he took advantage of it, on the 5th, to recommence his retreat, and to make sure of the means by which it might be successfully effected. Mr. de Latour being weakened by his defeat, and disabled for some days from an active pursuit of Moreau, the latter left only the centre of his army before that of the Austrian General. He ordered one division to open the entrance into the Forest Towns; and on the 6th passed the Danube with the rest of his army, between Sigmaringen and Riedlingen. The intent of the last movement was to cover the main body from Generals Nauendorf and Petrarch, and also to force the passage of the Black Forest.

By these dispositions, the centre of the French army, to which the artillery and all the baggage were entrusted, was covered on its right by the corps which was marching toward the Forest Towns; and on its left, by the two divisions which

had passed the Danube.* Thus did the French army retreat in three parts, in parallel lines, the right and the left opening the march, and protecting that of the centre, which on its side kept in check Mr. de Latour, and prevented him from reinforcing the Generals Nauendorf and Petrarch. It was in this regular and well arranged order of retreat, that Moreau directed his course towards the mountains of Suabia, and prepared to force their defiles.

On the 7th, he marched towards Stockach, where he arrived on the 8th. He had, the night before, ordered General Desaix to take possession of Engen, who on the next day attacked the advanced guard of General Petrarch, and dislodged it from Dutlingen. On the 1st, General Desaix, having formed a junction with the two divisions which had passed the Danube, made a fresh attack on General Petrarch, defeated him, and drove him from Schweyningen, as well as

* The reader will no doubt have remarked that from the time Moreau began his retreat, his right was of course become his left, and his left his right. The two first denominations, have nevertheless been continued, because in his encampments, and frequently even on his march, Moreau was obliged to face the different corps of Mr. de Latour's army, by which he was pursued.

from the towns of Rothweil and Villingen, two very important posts, without the possession of which, the French could not possibly penetrate the defiles of the Black Forest.

General Latour, after some days of inaction, occasioned by his defeat at Biberach, now resumed the pursuit of the enemy. He marched, on the 7th, to Buchau, on the 8th, to Ostrach, and on the 9th, to Mœskirchen, while General Moreau established his head quarters at Engen. On the 10th, General Nauendorf made an attempt to recover Rothweil. In the beginning of the action, he had the advantage; but it terminated in favour of the French, who vigorously repulsed him.

Whatever advantage the latter derived from possessing the post of Rothweil, it by no means decided the success of their retreat; and they had, as yet, only surmounted a part of the difficulties which attended it: the greatest impediments to it still remained. It was absolutely necessary that the French should force their way, either through the valley of Kintzig, to get to Kehl, or through the valley of Hell, to make good their retreat to Freyburg. Moreau had not a moment to lose to succeed in one or other of these at-

tempts. The entrances into these valleys were guarded by Austrian corps, and by armed peasants, whose number increased daily: there was every reason to apprehend that he would not succeed in forcing his way, if the Archduke Charles, who was rapidly advancing, and was already at Offenburgh, should have time to join the troops which occupied the defiles that we are now speaking of.*

* Prince Charles, it has been before mentioned, had marched from the Lower Rhine, on the 22d of September, with about 12,000 men, who were followed, at some distance, by 10,000 more. He passed the Mein on the 25th, and the Necker on the 30th, after having sent General Hotze to make a diversion in Alsace. This General's expedition will be mentioned hereafter. If it has not already been so, it is for the same reason that no account has been given of the march of the Archduke, and of the operations which took place on the Lower Rhine, after his departure. It has been the wish of the Author to describe, without interruption, Moreau's retreat, under the idea that the chain and connection of events, taken in one view, was preferable to a succession of dates. Such a chronological servitude would have caused great confusion in this historical summary, and would have deprived it of the small degree of interest it may otherwise possess. The Archduke having passed through Schweitzingen, Durlach, Carlsruhe, Radstadt, and Offemburgh, arrived on the 14th at Mohlberg, and two days after formed a junction with the corps of Nauendorf and Petrarch.

The centre of the French army, which its two wings had hitherto preceded, and which had marched in a parallel line behind them, in its turn, advanced to force the passage of the valley of Hell. Having formed a close column, it attacked, on the 10th, Colonel d'Apré, who defended the entrance of the valley. The inferiority of his forces did not admit of his maintaining himself. He was driven from post to post, and wounded in one of the actions that took place. The French, at length, succeeded in passing this terrible defile.* They arrived on the 13th at Freyburg, from whence they drove the Austrians; and advanced beyond this city, the possession of which secured and completed their retreat.†

* It is situated between the towns of Freyburg and Neustadt, is six miles long, and in many places not more than ten paces wide: a proverb of the country says, that in this pass one meets with *Paradise* and *Hell*. There is an Inn in it, called the *Kingdom of Heaven*.

† The town of Freyburg was formerly very strong, and the possession of it was necessary for every army that meant to have their winter quarters in the Brisgau. It was taken and retaken several times during the thirty years' war. It is particularly known in military annals by the two battles, fought in its neighbourhood,

While the centre of the Republican army was advancing to overpower, by its mass, the small corps which defended the valley of Hell, the two wings had formed a junction, that they might be in condition to check Generals Nauendorf and Petrarch. They passed, in their turn, the valley of Hell, on the 14th, 15th, and 16th; while the equipage and ammunition waggons which Moreau had with him, defiled by the Forest Towns, under the protection of the right wing.

Mr. de Latour had followed the enemy, on the 10th, to Engen and Stockach, flattering himself that he should be enabled to cut a part of them off, while they were endeavouring to force the entrance into the Black Forest; an attempt which, it is supposed, it would be extremely difficult to execute. But these narrow passes, too

in 1644, the Imperialists being commanded by Merci, and the French by the great Condé. These battles are celebrated for the obstinacy shewn, and the great number of men who lost their lives, on each side. The Marshals de Crequi and Villars both took it, the former in 1677, and the latter in 1713. The French, commanded by Louis XV. in person, besieged it in 1744, and took it, after thirty-seven days of open trenches. The siege cost the French a great number of men. They razed the works of the place, as well as the forts erected on a mountain, which commands it.

feebly guarded, having been penetrated and traversed by the French, with little loss, and great expedition, Mr. de Latour gave up a pursuit, from that time useless, which had now taken him up a month, and which had been conducted either in so unfortunate or so unskilful a manner. He marched to the right, towards the valley of Kintzig, to form a junction with the Archduke Charles, a junction which became necessary, from the union of the whole French army, near Freyburg. Generals Nauendorf and Petrarch had also marched, on the 14th, in order to join the Prince, the one to Eltzach, the other to Kintzig. On the 15th, the corps of Prince Condé and General Frolich were the only ones which continued the pursuit of the enemy into the defiles of the Black Forest.*

* The Black Forest stretches from South to North, from the four Forest Towns, as far as Neuenburg, in the Duchy of Wurtemberg. It was, anciently, still more extensive. Cæsar has given a description of it in his Commentaries. It constituted, according to the most general opinion, a part of that tract of country, called by the Romans, *Sylva Hyrcinia*. Its mountains separate the Duchy of Wurtemberg from the Margraviate of Baden.

General Frolich had successively taken possession of Bregentz, Lindau, and of Constance, which the French

The day after his arrival at Freyburg, Moreau caused Waldkirch to be occupied, and placed his advanced posts on the heights, which bound the right bank of the little river Eltz. A detachment of his army drove the light troops of the Archduke from Old Brisach, and threw a bridge of boats over the Rhine, between that town and New Brisach.

had evacuated, on the 8th. of October; but he had not been able to make himself master of the capital post of Stockach, in time to cut off from the French, the way of retreating through the Forest Towns.

CHAPTER VII.

Moreau endeavours to maintain himself in the Brisgau—March of the Archduke against Freyburg—Position of the opposed armies—Battles of the 17th, 18th, and 19th of October—Moreau retreats, and takes the formidable position of Schliengen—He is forced to abandon it, and to re-pass the Rhine, at Huningen.

MOREAU having luckily escaped all the dangers which attended his retreat, having, without any considerable loss, conducted his whole army over the mountains of Suabia; having, by the possession of the whole valley of the Rhine, as well as of the two bridges of Huningen and Brisach, a safe and perfect communication with France, might have thought (as it should seem) that he had done enough in saving his army, and have been inclined to retire with it beyond the Rhine. But, whether this General had received contrary orders from the Directory, or that he was elated by his successful retreat, instead of

retiring into Alsace, he proposed to maintain himself in the Brisgau, and to attack his enemy, instead of giving way to them. Accustomed, from the beginning of the campaign, to successes, which he owed very often to the errors of the Generals who were opposed to him, he trusted that fortune would continue faithful to him, and hoped to crown his retreat with a victory. He wished to defeat the Archduke, and to relieve the fort of Kehl from its blockade. With this intention, he ventured, on the 18th, into the valley of Kintzig, and marched to meet Prince Charles.

The latter had advanced from the Upper Rhine, in hopes of getting possession of Kehl, before Moreau had forced his way through Suabia. He had detached General Hotze into Alsace, merely to engage the attention of the troops which the French had in that province, and to prevent their sending any considerable force to succour Kehl. This diversion did not meet with the desired success. In vain did General Hotze overrun the Palatinate and Alsace, and levy contributions even at the gates of Strasburgh. The French, shut up in their strong places, and knowing that that General could undertake no-

thing against them, took care not to weaken Kehl, to enable themselves to oppose this momentary invasion.

The good state of defence in which this fort then was, as well as Moreau's successful retreat and subsequent movements, obliged the Archduke to renounce, for the present, his intended attack upon it, which he contented himself with blockading with a small corps. He marched towards Freyburg, and arrived, on the 16th, at Molberg, where he took the command of Mr. de Latour's army, which had been joined by the corps of Nauendorf and Petrarch.

Before the detail of the battles which took place between the 17th and 27th of October, and which decided the issue of this campaign, is presented, it is material to state the positions respectively occupied by the two armies, at the first of those periods. They had at that time ceased to be divided into several corps, at a distance from, and independent of one another. On both sides they occupied a line, almost all the points of which were connected with each other, and thus enabled to receive mutual support.

The line formed by the Austrian army, had its right against the Rhine; extended itself along the

front of the river Eltz; crossed the mountains of Simonswald, and terminated on the left at the entrance of the valleys of St. Peter and St. Meger's, where Prince Condé and General Frolich were posted. These two corps had not an immediate communication with the rest of the army.

The right of the French occupied the mouth of the valleys just mentioned. From thence their line passed by Simonswald, Waldkirch, Emenzingen, in front of the Eltz, and of Kintzingen, near the Rhine, to which their left extended.

It was in this position that the Imperial and Republican armies disputed the possession of the Brisgau. On the 17th, and particularly on the 18th, there were very smart actions between the advanced guards, which were favourable to the Austrians. On the latter day, the Duke d'Enghein, who commanded Prince Condé's advanced guard, defeated the right of the French, from whom he took the formidable posts of Hohlgraben, St. Meger's, and St. Peter. On the same day, General Frolich also made himself master of some important points in the valley of Hell.

These actions were only the preludes to a general engagement, for which the Archduke had made the following dispositions. The right of

his army, commanded by Mr. de Latour, was to attack the small town of Kintzingen : General Wartensleben, with the centre, was ordered to carry the heights behind the village of Malmertingen : General Petrarch, at the head of the left wing, was directed to advance on the road from Keimbach to Emendingen ; while General Meerfeld, with one brigade, was to penetrate the woods which were on the left, and Prince Frederic of Orange was to endeavour, with another brigade, to gain the commanding parts of the mountains, in order to turn the right of the French. These last were to be attacked, at the same time, at Waldkirch, by General Nauendorf ; and in the valleys of St. Peter's, and of Hell, by General Frolich, and Prince Condé.

On the 19th, in the morning, all these columns put themselves in motion towards the points of their destination : but the badness of the roads, as well as other difficulties, occasioned by the nature of the ground, very much retarded their march. They could not commence the attack till mid-day. General Latour experienced the greatest resistance in that on Kintzingen. He was even several times repulsed with loss : but

Prince Charles having put himself at the head of the grenadiers, they attacked the French with an irresistible fury, and drove them from the village. The left and centre having also met with great opposition, it was not without considerable difficulty, that General Meerfeld made himself master of the woods above Keimbach. The enemy, profiting from the advantage of their position, defended themselves, step by step, and were not driven from it, till the Prince of Orange, after a most laborious march, through a country that seemed impenetrable, appeared on their right. This manœuvre, quickly followed by a vigorous attack, decided the victory. The French abandoned Emendingen, and crossed the Eltz at Deningen, where they destroyed the bridge.

General Nauendorf was not less successful. At the moment that he put himself in march, he was briskly attacked by a considerable corps of the enemy, commanded by General Moreau in person. General Nauendorf not only rendered fruitless all his efforts, but vigorously repulsed him, drove him from Waldkirch, and made himself master of the bridge at this

town over the Eltz. By a ready and able manœuvre, this General turned three of the enemy's battalions, one of which laid down their arms, and the other two were broken and dispersed in the woods.

Prince Condé, also, and General Frolich, gained ground on the corps which were opposed to them in the valleys of Hell and of St. Peter.

It appeared, from the account that Moreau sent of this action, in which he suffered a considerable loss, that he had wished to avoid an engagement in the position which he then occupied. He had sent orders to the advanced guards of his centre, and his left, to fall back behind the Eltz, in case they were attacked; but General Beaupuy, who had been charged to see this order executed, having been killed in the beginning of the action, the French waited for the enemy before the Eltz, and engaged in a position which was very unfavourable to them.

General Moreau took a new one behind the Eltz, in the night of the 19th. His right rested against the mountains, and his left on some morasses behind the village of Versletten. This

last disposition had for its object, to guard the mouth of the defile of Theningen.

In the morning of the 20th, the Archduke pushed his advanced guard across the Eltz, opposite to Emendingen, and gave orders to General Latour to pass this river at Deningen, while General Nauendorf should advance in the plain towards Freyburgh. Mr. de Latour having been under the necessity of repairing the bridge at Deningen, under the fire of the enemy's artillery, lost many men and a good deal of time. It was already night before he was in condition to pass the river. This delay prevented the Archduke from making a general attack on the enemy, as he had intended. Prince Furstenberg, however, dislodged them, in the course of the day, from the village of Rugel, the possession of which opened to the Austrians the road to Old Brisach.

The advanced guards of each army passed the night of the 20th, within half cannon-shot of each other. The Archduke prepared to execute, at break of day, the attack which he had been prevented from making the day before. But Moreau did not think proper

to wait for it, and retreated during the night, after having sent a considerable detachment across the Rhine at New Brisach, and destroyed the bridge there.

Such was the result of Moreau's efforts to maintain himself in the Brisgau. All he gained by them, was a delay of six days, during which he lost 2000 men taken prisoners, and a like number killed and wounded. The loss of the Austrians was not the fourth of it. To the great regret of the whole army, General Wartensleben had his arm broke, on the 19th, by a grape-shot.

The Archduke entered Freyburgh on the 21st, where he was joined by the corps of Prince Condé and of General Frolich, which assisted him in driving the rear guard of the enemy out of that town. The Austrians followed the French, whom they supposed to be in full retreat towards Upper Alsace; but, whether Moreau wished to gain time, that he might prevent the Imperialists from attempting any other enterprize before the end of the campaign, or whether he wished still to endeavour to maintain himself on the right bank of the Rhine, he halted at Schlien-

gen, (twelve miles from Huningen), in a very strong position.

His right wing was placed on the neighbouring heights of the villages of Kandern and Sutzenkirchen. Beginning at these two points, his line extended along that chain of hills which terminates the valley of the Rhine, fifteen miles from Basle, and passed by Ober and Nieder Eckenheim, Liel, Schliengen, and Steinstadt. His left was posted above the latter village, beneath which ran the Rhine. The centre occupied the high grounds of the villages of Liel and Schliengen. The whole front of the line was protected by a small river, which takes its course in the mountains near Kandern, and runs by Ober and Nieder Eckenheim, Liel, and Schliengen to Steinstadt, where it falls into the Rhine. The French had, besides, posted a large body of infantry in front of their centre, on a very lofty point between the villages of Schliengen and Feldberg. To this detail of the position taken by Moreau, it must be added, that the high grounds on the left bank of this river, completely command those of the right bank. This circumstance gave the French a great advantage in defending the approach of their line. It was

in this formidable position that Moreau hoped once more to check the Austrians, and in which the latter did not hesitate to attack him.

The enterprize was opposed by so many almost insurmountable obstacles, that it required the talents of the Archduke, and the enthusiasm with which his valour had inspired the troops, to be able to overcome them. The Prince did not think fit to endeavour to turn round the heights occupied by the right wing of the French. The season, and the bad condition of the roads, rendered this measure tedious, and doubtful in its event. An attack by open force, in spite of its dangers, was more suitable to circumstances, and above all, to the enterprising character of the Archduke. He resolved, whatever it might cost, to dislodge the enemy from the heights of Kandern, Fuerbach, Sutzenkirchen, Ober and Nieder Eckenheim. The attack was disposed in the following manner:—The army was divided into four principal columns. That on the right was formed by the corps of Prince Condé, its vanguard being under the orders of the Duke d'Enghein. The second, commanded by Prince Furstemberg, consisted of nine battalions and twenty-six squadrons; the third, of eleven

battalions and two regiments of cavalry, was conducted by General Latour; and the fourth column, composed of the whole vanguard of the army, was headed by General Nauendorf.

The two first columns were ordered not to attempt a serious attack, the ground being too much against them, but merely to keep in check the left wing of the enemy, so as to prevent them from sending reinforcements to their right. The real attack was to be made by the two columns on the left, which were to advance against the right of the enemy, and endeavour to turn it.

The corps of Prince Condé, having been drawn together at Neuburgh, pushed forward to Steinstadt, and although it had received no orders to drive the French from that village, the troops were so animated with a desire of signalizing themselves, that they made an attack with fixed bayonets, took possession of the place, and maintained themselves in it the whole day, though constantly under the fire of the enemy.

Prince Furstemberg formed his column at Mulheim, and posted himself on the heights opposite Schliengen, which he defended with success.

The corps of General Latour was divided into two columns. That on the right, attacked the French in the vineyards, which they occupied between Feldberg and Schliengen, while the left dislodged them from Eckenheim, and pushed forward the attack to the mountains beyond the hollow way. The enemy defended themselves with great obstinacy, but were driven at length from the vineyards, and from a part of the woods which lie between Nieder Eckenheim, and Feurbach.

General Nauendorf left the environs of Feldbergh, and reached the points he was to force, after a long and difficult march. He divided his corps into several small columns, which made separate attacks on the villages of Sutzenkirchen, Fuerbach, and Kandern. After a severe conflict, the French yielded in all these points, and Mr. de Nauendorf found the communication opened between himself and Mr. de Latour, through the means of an intermediate corps commanded by General Meerfeld. A violent storm, and afterwards night coming on, put an end to the action, and to the efforts of the Austrians.

As the posts which they had taken possession

of commanded the flanks of those still occupied by the French, the Archduke prepared to attack them, the day after, on the heights of Tannenkirchen, where the right wing of the enemy had retired, and had taken a position *en potence*,* no less formidable than that from which they had just been driven.

General Moreau, foreseeing that if he was compelled to abandon this last post, the Austrians might place themselves between him and the bridge of Huningen, or drive him back upon the Rhine, determined to recommence his retreat, and to continue it till he reached the other bank of the river. He began his march during the night, and encamped on the 25th at Atlingen. The day after, his army passed the Rhine at Huningen, almost in the presence of the Austrians, who did not endeavour to disturb the last moments of its retreat. The French army was protected by a strong rear guard under the orders of Generals Abbattuci and la Boissière.

It was thus that General Moreau, after hav-

* This French expression, signifies a position in which two parts of an army are placed at right angles with each other, representing the form of a gibbet.

ing remained four months in Germany, after having conquered Suabia and Bavaria, and threatened Austria, was obliged to pass the Rhine, in order to protect the frontiers of France. No one can deny that he made a most able retreat. His successes from the 24th of June, (the period at which he passed the Rhine at Kehl), till his entrance into Bavaria, resulting almost necessarily from the great superiority of his forces, were not decisive of his military talents. But his retreat has left no room to doubt of his abilities, and ranks him amongst distinguished Generals. Indeed, every one must acknowledge that he conducted his army with infinite skill in the midst of the Austrian corps which surrounded him, and that he chose well his opportunities to attack and defeat them, one after another. The movement which he made against Mr. de Latour was well combined, and it was to the success of this manœuvre, that he owed that of his retreat, which was judicious and methodical. He saved his sick, his wounded, his artillery, and his baggage.

However able the conduct of General Moreau may have been, professionally speaking, it presents, however, many errors, which have been

partly pointed out in the course of this work. Even his retreat is not altogether free from blame. By remaining stationary during eight days in a bad position, full of defiles occupied by the enemy, he ran the risk of being either completely routed, or finding himself in want of military stores. If it did not so turn out, Moreau had no merit in it: it must be attributed to the faults committed by the Austrian Generals, and particularly by Mr. de Latour. The French army owed its safety to the two following causes:

First, To the great distance there was between the corps of Frolich, Condé, Latour, Nauendorf, and Petrarch, which prevented them from having a quick and easy communication, and deprived the different Generals of the power of combining their motions or attacks with precision and security. By forming an immense circle round Moreau, they enabled him to bear with his whole force against any point of the circumference, which he found it necessary to break through: which that General did not fail to do, as often as circumstances required it.

Secondly, To the diversion made by General Hotze in Alsace, which proved of the utmost

utility to Moreau. This incursion had two objects: first, to induce the French to draw off a part of the troops stationed in Strasburgh and Kehl; and secondly, to hinder them from making any attempt on the Lower Rhine, by compelling them to detach a part of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, for the protection of Alsace and the Duchy of Deux Ponts. The first of these two objects was not attained, and the second was but imperfectly executed. If, instead of sending General Hotze with 9000 men into Alsace, he had been ordered to join Mr. de Petrarch without delay, it would have enabled that General to act more effectually against the French, instead of being obliged to confine himself to slight attacks, on account of the small number of his troops. Having every advantage, which the nature of the country could afford, and being moreover seconded by the inhabitants, Mr. de Petrarch might have checked Moreau in the defiles of Suabia, or even have prevented him from penetrating into that province. These 9000 men, posted in the valley of Hell, would have rendered it inattackable. What would have become of Moreau, had he

not been able to force this passage, and arrive at Freyburgh? All entrance into Switzerland was shut against him. Had he attempted to violate the neutrality of its territory, the Swiss troops, assembled by the different cantons in that of Schaffhausen, might have opposed his entrance into their country, and have placed him between themselves and the Austrians. In this case, his only resource would have been to pass through the Forest Towns; defiling through which, an army impeded by equipage, stores, and artillery, might have been destroyed, or at least have lost its rear guard: the end of this campaign might have been very different.

After Moreau's return into Alsace, the respective armies were again separated by the Rhine, almost the whole length of its course, from Basle to Cologne. Henceforward this campaign, which ought seemingly to have been put an end to by the season, no longer excited that lively degree of interest, which two numerous armies, opposed to each other, in a vast and open country, naturally inspire. Great battles, and those decisive movements, which produce the acquisition or the loss of a great

tract of country, were no longer to be expected. Military curiosity had no other object, than the sieges carried on against the heads of the bridges at Kehl and Huningen, as well as some unimportant events which took place on the Lower Rhine, which are now to be related.

CHAPTER VIII.

Disposition of the armies of the Archduke and Moreau, after the latter had re-entered France—Operations of General Werneck, on the Lower Rhine—Beurnonville succeeds Jourdan in the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse—Condition of that army—Operations of Generals Hotze and Neu, on the left bank of the Rhine—Passage of that river by the Austrians, on the 21st—Affair on the Sieg, the same day—Engagement at Kreutznach—General Hotze retires into the entrenched camp before Mannheim—He is attacked in it without success—Neutrality of Newwied agreed upon—Armistice concluded on the Lower Rhine.

PRINCE Charles, after having driven the army of the Rhine and Moselle into Alsace, thought of nothing but to wrest from them the two places still in the hands of the French, on the right bank of the Rhine, viz. the heads of the bridges of Kehl and Huningen. He ordered

them to be invested at the end of October, and made every necessary preparation for these enterprises. He entrusted the direction of the attack to be made on the head of the bridge of Huningen, as well as the command of the left wing of his army to the Prince of Wurtemberg, and marched himself, with the rest of his forces, to Offemburgh. He fixed his head quarters in this town, that he might personally be able to direct the operations of the siege of Kehl. The Prince ordered the right wing of his army, under General Sztaray, towards Radstadt and Mannheim, in order to unite it to the troops which occupied the latter place, and to secure a powerful support to its entrenched camp, in case of an attack.

On the other side, General Moreau disposed his army nearly in a manner similar. He left his right wing under the orders of General Ferino, in the environs of Huningen, to defend the head of the bridge, marched the centre of his army towards Strasburgh, and established his headquarters near that town, in the village of Illkirch. He gave the command of his left to General Desaix, who marched towards Landau, in order to oppose General Hotze, and compel him to

retire into the fort of the Rhine, before the town of Manheim.

The positions taken by the armies of Prince Charles and General Moreau, for the remainder of the campaign, as well as for their winter quarters, having been now stated, the Lower Rhine must now, for the last time, be returned to.

It may be remembered, that the Archduke, having forced Jourdan's army to cross the Rhine and the Sieg, left General Werneck, on the 22d of September, with about 40,000 men, to keep the French in check on the Lower Rhine. This General, well worthy, by his military talents, of the confidence reposed in him by the Archduke, placed his advanced posts on the Sieg, and his head quarters at Uckerath. His operations could only be defensive, and his sole aim was to prevent the French from taking the field again. To attain this, he had two objects to fulfil; first, to confine the enemy between Dusseldorf and the Sieg, and secondly, to block up the head of the bridge at Neuwied as closely as possible.

The campaigns of 1795 and 1796, having furnished many examples of the facility with which an army, superior in number, could force the

passage of the Sieg and the Lahn, General Werneck endeavoured to find, in the nature of the country, and the works of art, the means of obviating the defects of several points of his position. In order to improve and concentrate the defence of the Lahn, he contrived to unite, by combined entrenchments, the towns of Montebaur and Limburg, to the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein. Foreseeing, besides, a possibility that the enemy might force these entrenchments and the passage of the Lahn, Mr. de Werneck caused the town of Friedberg to be fortified, that he might add a second line of defence to that of Frankfort.

It may be remembered, that, at the end of his retreat, Jourdan was deprived of the command of the army, the remains of which he was bringing back. The complaints made by this General against the plan of the campaign, which he had been obliged to follow, against the want of means in which he had been left, and against the bad conduct of the civil Commissaries, attached to his army; all these, but still more the misfortunes which he had experienced, dissatisfied the Directory, of whom Jourdan had been till then the favourite. Instead of an increase

of authority, which he demanded, as necessary to restore order to his army, he was stripped of his command, which was bestowed on General Beurnonville, already known by his campaign of Treves, in 1792, and by his imprisonment in Moravia. Scarcely had the latter returned into France, than he was sent, in compensation for his long captivity, to take the command of the army of the North, in Holland. He brought a part of it to the assistance of Jourdan, in the end of September, and succeeded, a few days after, to the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse.

This change of Commanders did not accelerate the restoration of good order throughout the army. On the contrary, it appeared that Jourdan, in spite of his misfortunes, still retained many partizans in it, in all its different classes. Several Generals and subaltern officers wished to share his disgrace; and desertion, which was already very considerable, became more prevalent than before. These circumstances did not second the wishes of the Directory, and the efforts of Beurnonville, to restore to the army that consistence which it had lost.

The business, indeed, was less to reform, than to new model it altogether. The elements of it were either dissolved or relaxed; it no longer retained either union or spirit. The Generals were discontented, the officers disheartened, and the soldiers were without confidence and subordination. This army was in want of horses, artillery, clothes, arms, and provisions. It was deficient in those various military means, without which an army, whatever be the number of its soldiers, cannot undertake an active war, without experiencing embarrassments. This, however, was what the French Government expected from it, wishing the army to recommence offensive operations as soon as possible, that while there was yet time, a powerful diversion might be made in favour of Moreau. Notwithstanding the orders of the Directory, and his own exertions, General Beurnonville could not put the army of the Sambre and Meuse in a condition to act effectually. In vain did he cashier officers, break Commissaries, dismiss contractors, and shoot some soldiers: his army was not rendered, by this, more fit to be employed, and these internal arrangements consumed the time,

during which it was still possible to undertake some enterprize.

To the above-mentioned causes, which prevented Beurnonville from recommencing offensive operations, was added the necessity of defending his own position. General Hotze, as it has been before related, passed the Rhine at Mannheim, on the 2d of October, with about 9000 men, and sent a part of his forces into Alsace, to attract the attention of the enemy, to destroy their lines, and to levy contributions. Another division of the same corps marched to the right, and pushed parties into the Palatinate and the Nahegau, as far as Kaiserslautern and Baumholder.

This unexpected irruption alarmed the French corps which were in front of the Nahe, and in the Hunsrück; and they marched towards the Duchy of Deux Ponts, to protect it from the incursions of the enemy. General Neu, Governor of Mayence, taking advantage of the weakness of the French corps which blocked up that place, drove it back, after several brisk engagements, behind the Nahe; and took possession of the town of Bingen, as well as of some important points on that river.

As the motions of General Neu, combined with those of General Hotze, rendered it possible for them to attempt something more important, Beurnonville hastened to march a large party of his army towards the Hunderuck. He thus weakened himself greatly on the right bank of the Rhine, deprived himself of the power of undertaking any thing in that quarter, and gave General Werneck an opportunity of making some attempt.

This General, wishing to profit by the removal of a part of Beurnonville's army, as well as to favour, by a diversion, the operations of Generals Hotze and Neu, assembled some boats, and caused several small detachments to cross the Rhine, on the 21st of October, both above and below Coblentz. His aim was to spread alarm along the left bank of the Rhine, by making debarkations on several points, and more especially to break the bridge of boats at Neuwied, in order to cut off the troops which defended the head of that bridge.* General Kray, to whom this ex-

* It may have been remarked, that, in the course of the campaign, the French passed the Rhine several times at Neuwied. An island which is situated almost opposite that town, gave them, at the same time, the

pedition was entrusted, succeeded in the latter object, and effected the destruction of the bridge, which was already much damaged by the swell of the Rhine, and by trees and all sorts of lumber brought down with it. These different detachments had several smart actions, but as their numbers were too small to enable them to make any advance into the country, they repassed the Rhine, with the loss of about 300 men, after having been on the point of getting possession of the town of Coblenz.

power of easily throwing a bridge over the Rhine, and the means of defending it by batteries erected on the island. The advantages which this point offered for passing the Rhine, induced the French to establish there a permanent bridge, and to cover it by works, which they caused to be constructed during the summer. This *tête de pont* made them masters of a fixed passage over the Rhine, and gave them a point of support against the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, which is only twelve miles from Neuwied.

In 1672, Marshal Turenne, being encamped, with 20,000 men, between Bonn and Coblenz, threw also a bridge of boats over the Rhine, at Neuwied, and covered it in the same manner with entrenchments. The Elector of Brandenburg, who was with 30,000 men before Mentz, attacked, without success, this *tête de pont*, in which Mr. de Turenne had left 3000 men. The bridge was soon afterwards destroyed by the ice.

Beurnonville, anxious to signalize himself by the news of some brilliant exploit, sent an account of this affair, full of bombast and falsehood. After having exalted the talents of his Generals, and especially his own, he described the tremendous attack made by the Austrians; the *irresistible courage of his soldiers both on land and on water*; the *inconceivable fire kept up by his artillery*; and concluded, by stating, that *all the Austrians had been killed, drowned, or taken prisoners*. The number of the latter, amounting by his account, to 1000.*

On the same day, the 21st, a very severe en-

* It was to this same General Beurnonville, as great a braggart, though far less able and fortunate, than Bonaparte, that Dumourier confided at the end of 1792, 30,000 men, with a commission to attack the Prince of Hohenlohe, who defended the approaches to Treves, with 10,000 men. After several attacks, as unsuccessful as they were ill-planned, Beurnonville was obliged to lead back to Mentz and Thionville, his army reduced to 15,000 men, by the sword of the Austrians, and the Prussian dysentery. He then wrote to the Convention, that the nature of the season and the country, had not allowed him to fulfil, entirely, the commission with which he had been entrusted, but that he had made an enormous slaughter of the Austrians, and that he had lost, in this expedition, *only the little finger of a ranger*.

gement took place on the Sieg, between the advanced guards, opposed to each other, in which the French were worsted, and suffered much.

The two divisions of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, sent into the Hunsrück, and upon the Nahe, restored the superiority to the French, in that part of the seat of war. On the 26th, they attacked the Austrians, posted on the right bank of the Nahe, with their right at Bingen, and their left near Kreutznach. Notwithstanding the inequality of strength, the Imperialists defended themselves with success, and stood their ground. The French renewed the attack on the 27th, and the resistance made by the Austrians was no less vigorous than that of the preceding day; but their left, over which the enemy had the advantage of ground, having been turned, they were compelled to retire upon the Seltz, after having lost about 300 men. The loss of the Republicans was not inferior. They left, besides, 200 prisoners in the hands of the Austrians.

The Executive Directory construed this advantage into a great victory, in order to compensate for the news of Moreau's defeat, and of his retreat beyond the Rhine, which happened at the same period. This success was, however,

of very little importance, either with respect to the issue of the battle, or the extent of country which it put the French in possession of. The situation of the Hundsruok, and of that part of the Palatinate, which lies between the Moselle and the Rhine, is such, as to make it difficult to defend it against a superior force; these two countries belong almost necessarily to the most numerous, and especially, as it has been before observed, to the possessors of the places on the Sarre, Moselle, and in Alsace. Of this the present war has added its testimony to that of all the preceding ones.

These countries, as well as the Duchy of Deux Ponts, are indebted to their situation, for the misfortune of having been occupied and laid waste, one after the other, by the contending armies. They have experienced, more cruelly than any other country, the dreadful scourge of war. They are ruined for a great number of years.*

* These countries have been still worse treated in preceding wars. There are still to be found the traces of those horrid ravages which the French committed in 1688 and 1693. Mr. de Louvois, Minister of war under Louis XIV. sent an order to the French Generals to lay waste the whole Palatinate with fire and sword. These orders were but too cruelly executed; almost all

Three days after the advantage gained by the French, in the neighbourhood of Kreutznach, they retired again upon the Nabe ; their aim in dislodging the Austrians from the banks of that river, having been merely to cover the march of a division of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, which was directing itself towards Kaiserslautern, in order to drive from thence the light troops of General Hotze. After his retreat across the Rhine, Moreau likewise ordered a division to march towards Landau and the Palatinate. At the approach of these two divisions, General Hotze, too weak to oppose them, and having, besides, no great interest in doing so, retired into the entrenched camp before Mannheim. The French followed and attacked him without success, on the 7th of November. In spite of

the towns of the Palatinate were burnt. It will no doubt be recollected that the Elector Palatine, reduced to despair by the ruin of his country, which he beheld a prey to the flames from the fortress where he had taken refuge, wished to fight Marshal Turenne, and sent him a challenge, which the latter refused. All the world likewise is acquainted with the manner in which Mr. de Louvois wished to draw from Louis XIV. an order for completing the destruction of this beautiful country, and the horror with which that Prince rejected the proposal.

all their exertions, he remained master of the post he had taken possession of, the right of which was covered by Franckenthal, and the left by a little river called the Rhebach. In the beginning of this work, a description has been given of this entrenched camp, known by the name of the Fort of the Rhine. After this action, the position of the Austrian and French armies from Mannheim to Dusseldorf, presenting nothing to either, which was at once necessary and easy to acquire, both sides remained in a state of inaction, which the rigour of the season and want of repose almost forced upon them. Although General Beurnonville had drawn together, in the first days of November, two large bodies of troops near Andernach and Cologne, and had made apparently great preparations for an impending attack, yet he contented himself with mere appearances. General Werneck, on his side, was just as inactive, and made no serious attempt upon the head of the bridge at Neuwied. Nothing happened but a few skirmishes and cannonades, which had no other effect but to cost the lives of some men on both sides.

This reciprocal inaction, it was believed, was occasioned, or at least would soon be followed,

by a suspension of hostilities upon the Lower Rhine. This belief was confirmed by the Austrian and French Generals having at Neuwied several conferences; the first effect of which was an agreement that neither party should occupy that place, and that it should be considered as neutral.* These conferences being renewed in the months of November and December, terminated in a more important agreement. The Austrian General Kray, and the Republican

* The neutrality was so much the more advantageous to this town, as by the position of its *tête de pont*, it found itself, if I may so say, placed between the Austrian and French batteries, and consequently liable to be reduced to ruins, if either of them undertook to maintain themselves there. It had, besides, suffered but too much already from the war, having been in 1795 bombarded and half destroyed by the French.

This town belongs to the Prince of Neuwied, famous in Germany for his eccentric humour, and the suit which he carried on against his wife, in the Imperial Chamber of Westlaer. She succeeded in procuring the administration of his property, and his principality to be taken from him, on the ground of madness. He nevertheless, many years ago, had the wisdom to grant the town of Neuwied religious and commercial franchises, which attracted thither a great number of merchants and manufacturers, from every country, and of every religion. This town is commercial, and regularly built; it is inhabited by a great number of Hernhutes or Moravian Friars.

General Kleber, concluded, on the 6th of December, a suspension of hostilities between the two armies on the Lower Rhine. The conditions were, that the Austrians should retire behind the Sieg, and the French behind the Wupper; that the latter should evacuate the head of the bridge at Neuwied, carrying their cannon, and leave only a piquet guard of 85 men; that the Austrians were to have a similar guard in the town, and that no post should be occupied by a greater number of men; that upon the left bank of the Rhine, the river Nahe should be the line of separation between the two armies; that upon giving ten days previous warning, they should mutually be at liberty to recommence hostilities, and to re-occupy the posts which they had held before the suspension.

On the 10th, the French withdrew their troops and their artillery from the head of the bridge at Neuwied, and on both sides the armies went into winter quarters. It therefore occasioned much surprize, when a proclamation of the Austrian Commander at Frankfort declared, that he was ordered to contradict the report of a suspension of hostilities on the Lower Rhine; that such a measure was directly contrary to

the Emperor's sentiments and intentions; and that the latter movements of the troops on the Lower Rhine, had been owing to nothing but the nature of the war in that country at that season of the year. It was difficult to reconcile this disavowal of the armistice with its real execution. The contradiction can only be explained by supposing that the Generals Kray and Kleber had tacitly concluded a convention, subject to the condition of its being ratified at Vienna, and at Paris; and that it was to be carried into effect provisionally. This supposition becomes the more probable from the circumstance, that this suspension was not officially published by the two Generals who concluded it. By some, it was supposed that it had displeased the Archduke, but it is not to be believed that General Kray would have ventured upon such a measure, without being previously authorized to it by that Prince. Others imagined, and with more appearance of reason, that the Archduke caused the report of a suspension of arms to be denied, and prevented its being officially published, in order that his troops, which at that time were besieging Kehl, with no less constancy than hardship, might

not envy the repose enjoyed by the army on the Lower Rhine,

General Beurnonville, who was sent back to the army of the North about the end of December, it was said, at that time was deprived of the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, as a punishment for having allowed it to remain in a state of repose, and for having consented to the suspension of arms. It was very singular to see this suspension disavowed by the higher powers on both sides, and yet carried strictly into execution. The fact is, that it resulted less from the wish of the parties, than from the rigour of the season, and the nature of the country which the respective armies occupied. All the country upon the right bank of the Rhine, from Mentz to Dusseldorf, is exceedingly mountainous, much covered with forests, and intersected by a great number of little rivers, or rather torrents, which overflow the valleys during winter. There are very few roads, and those are almost unpassable during the bad season. When it arrives, an army has hardly the possibility of acting in such a country, and therefore it was very natural for the Generals, on both sides, to wish to

save their soldiers from unnecessary fatigues, and to agree upon a state of inaction, to which they were in truth compelled by irresistible circumstances.

Whether the suspension was really agreed to, or not, its conditions were nevertheless exactly observed. They gave equally repose to both parties, but were more advantageous to the French, since they secured to them the preservation of the head of the bridge at Neuwied, in the possession of which they were to be re-established on the recommencement of hostilities. Thus ended the campaign upon the Lower Rhine.—An account of the sieges of Kehl, and of the head of the bridge at Huningen, remains now to be given.

CHAPTER IX.

Description of the fort and entrenched camp of Kehl—Siege of that place—Its surrender by capitulation—Siege of the head of the bridge at Huningen—Reduction of that place, and end of the campaign.

AS the Siege of Kehl attracted the attention of Europe for above two months, and was remarkable for its length, and for the expense of blood and treasure on both sides, before a detail of its progress is given, a few words shall be said on its local and military situation.*

This celebrated fort, so often taken and retaken, in the different wars between France and the Empire, or the House of Austria, is situated upon the right bank of the Rhine,

* This fort belonged formerly to the town of Strassburgh, and became afterwards a fortress of the Empire. Marshal de Berwick took it in 1733, after ten days' open trenches, and caused the fortifications to be razed.

opposite to the town, or rather to the citadel of Strasburgh. Before the war, it communicated with it by a bridge, built upon piles, and divided into two parts by an island. This bridge formed the principal communication between France and Germany; it was broken down on both sides at the commencement of the war.

At this period, the fortifications of Kehl, once the bulwark of Germany, were almost entirely destroyed. Some time afterwards, in order to prevent the Imperialists from reinstating the works, the French bombarded the fort, and even the town of Kehl, at the extremity of which it is situated. This bombardment demolished almost all the buildings that were within the circumference of the fort, as well as a great part of the town. This, however, did not prevent the Austrians from throwing up some works of earth, to secure this point from a *coup de main*, and to be enabled to command with their fire, the islands which lay between the two banks. Such was the condition of this fort at the end of the year 1795.

The manner in which the French took this

fort, at the beginning of this campaign, may be recollected. From the time that they got possession of it, knowing its importance, they hastened to fortify it, and skilfully employed all the means of defence, which its situation affords. To render this fort more difficult of attack, and of approach, they covered it by an entrenched camp, the right of which was flanked by an elbow of the river, and by an island in it. Its left extended to the fort itself. The front, which was a good deal more advanced than the wings, was covered by a strong dyke, armed with redoubts, and provided with a good ditch. It concealed the entrenched camp, and thus secured it from the fire of the cannon. They increased the difficulties of approach, by cuts made in the Kintzig and the Schutter, small rivers which fall into the Rhine near Kehl.

The retrograde march of Moreau, as well as the capture of Kehl by General Petrarch, who (as already seen) lost it again on the same day, made the French redouble their labour and exertions to complete the state of defence of the fort, and of the entrenched camp. They supplied it with a numerous artillery, and, to render the communication with Strasburgh more ready and

more sure, they constructed two bridges, one of boats, and the other a flying one.

The fort of Kehl was in this formidable state of defence, when the Archduke determined to make himself master of it. This enterprize presented great difficulties, required long labours, and immense preparations. It is seen, from the detail which has been entered upon, that it was not an ordinary siege ; that the business was less to take a fort, than a formidable camp ; and that it was one army besieging another. The time that was necessary to bring together the troops, the workmen, the artillery, and the magazines, retarded the opening of the siege. More than half the month of November was employed in making lines of circumvallation, as well as other works, preparatory to opening the trenches. The Archduke, that he might be nearer to superintend, and to animate the labours of the siege, took up his head-quarters at Offenburgh, about ten miles from Kehl. Mr. de Latour, who commanded the besieging troops, took up his at Wildstedt, five miles distant from the place, which was uselessly summoned on the 11th of November.

In the night of the 21st of the same month, the trenches were opened on the right bank of the

Kintzig. It was not there, however, that the Austrians proposed to make their principal efforts. Their works, on this point, had no other object, but to establish a cross fire against the fort, and the entrenched camp, in order to favour the approach from the village of Kehl, and to cover the right flank of the real attack. In the same night (viz. the 21st) General Moreau caused the garrison to be reinforced with a strong corps of infantry, drawn from Strasburgh. On the 22d, at break of day, these troops, commanded by General Desaix, made a vigorous sortie, attacked with fixed bayonets the left of the line of contravallation, and got possession, in an instant, of the village of Sundheim, as well as of three redoubts, of which they spiked the cannons.

Encouraged by such rapid success, the French attacked the other redoubts of the first line; and advanced at the same time against the second. They were less fortunate in this last enterprize. Prince Frederick of Orange, who was posted with a body of troops behind a dyke, which joined the redoubts on the left of the first and second lines, resisted, in this position, all the efforts of the enemy. After an engagement, as bloody as it was obstinate, and in which this young Prince

gave the strongest proofs of bravery and talents, he prevented the French from penetrating any farther. They experienced no less resistance in their attack on the other redoubts of the first line. Although surrounded, and left to themselves, for some time, they were defended with a courage equal to the fury of the assailants. In vain did the French grenadiers, several times, leap into the ditch, and endeavour to scale the palisadoes, and mount the parapet. They were constantly repulsed, and filled the ditches with their dead.

The long defence made by these redoubts, and the firmness of the Prince of Orange, gave time to General Latour to collect the corps of reserve, and to bring them into action. He retook the village of Sundheim, and maintained himself there, notwithstanding a fresh attempt made upon it by the French. The latter were soon after attacked, at the same time, by the Prince of Orange, and the Generals Latour and Stader, who dislodged them from the redoubts which they had taken, and forced them at last to retire within their own lines.

This action, one of the best disputed during the campaign, as well as one of the most bloody, considering the numbers that were engaged, and

the space in which it was fought, cost the Austrians 1300 men, and the French more than 2000. Four Generals of the latter were wounded, among whom was the Commander in Chief. On both sides prodigies of valour were performed. The Austrian regiments of Stuart and Sztarray particularly distinguished themselves. The Prince of Orange gained very great credit; and the Archduke gave fresh proofs of talents, and of that cool courage, for which he is remarkable. A sortie so vigorously made at the first moment of opening the trenches, marked the importance which the French attached, or feigned to attach, to the fort of Kehl, and shewed what sacrifices they were disposed to make, to retain possession of it.

On the following days, the Austrians continued their labours, which the bad weather rendered slow and difficult. In order to interrupt them, the French made a fresh sortie in the night of the 27th, in which they were instantly repulsed with loss. In the night of the 28th, the besiegers began their approaches on the right bank of the Schutter, and joined them to one part of the parallel already formed between that river and the Kintzig. From the 28th, the batteries of

this first parallel, as well as those of the redoubts which flanked it on the right and left, began to play on the French entrenchments.

On the 5th of December, the Archduke himself, at the head of one battalion of grenadiers, took the most advanced *fleche* on the right of the enemy. Advantage was taken of this to extend to this point the parallel of the left, all the batteries of which began to play the same day, and the fire from which was increased, on the 11th, by some new batteries erected on the same point.

The Austrians were not so fortunate in an attack which they made, on the 11th, on the first line of the advanced works which covered the right flank of the entrenched camp. They attacked it with bravery, and carried it; but the French having returned to the charge with superior force, they drove back the Austrians into their own entrenchments. The latter renewed the attack the day following; had at first the same success, and in the end the same disadvantage. In the evening, they made two more attempts, the issue of which was precisely the same. They lost a great many men in these actions, in which both sides shewed the greatest obstinacy.

The unlucky issue of these attacks, which failed only because the besiegers could not maintain themselves in the works after they had carried them, on account of the terrible fire of grape-shot and musquetry to which they were exposed, determined the Archduke to renounce, for the present, all attempts to carry them by force, and to confine himself to the operations of art.—The approaches were therefore continued; and a second parallel was constructed, but with incredible labour, the thaw which happened at this time having filled the trenches with water, and rendered almost impracticable the removal of the heavy artillery from one parallel to the other. These obstacles produced new delays in the formation of the siege, which had been successively retarded by the cold, by snow, by rains, and by the overflowings of the rivers Kintzig and Schutter. The enemy, besides, defended every inch of ground. The besieged, and the troops which guarded the trenches, were frequently engaged in actions, sometimes very warm; which, joined to an almost incessant cannonade and bombardment, cost the lives of a great number of men. Still more perished from diseases, occasioned by the nature of the

soil, and from the season. From these the besiegers suffered still more than the besieged. The former, as well as the latter, were confined within their works, and without any protection from the severities of the weather. The Austrians had no local means of cannonading and bombarding the French, which the latter did not equally possess against their adversaries. The French had, besides, the immense advantage of being relieved and assisted at pleasure, by troops drawn from Strasburgh, where 30,000 men might be easily quartered.

But neither the fatigues nor the dangers attending these operations, shook the constancy of the Austrian troops, nor the determination of the Archduke. He never ceased, during the whole course of this memorable siege, to animate the men by his exhortations, to encourage them by his example, and to support them by the confidence with which he had inspired them. The soldiers endured patiently those sufferings which the Archduke shared with them; the Prince's last triumphs were to them a certain pledge of the success of this enterprize.

On the night of the 19th, the Austrians made a successful attack on one of the advanced works

of the fort. They carried an entrenchment, thrown up near the post-house of Kehl, made 200 prisoners, and took 4 pieces of cannon and 2 howitzers.

The fort, as well as the entrenched camp of Kehl, deriving their principal means of resistance from their communication with Strasburgh, the length of their defence necessarily depended on the preservation of the bridges. The French had neglected nothing to strengthen and secure these bridges, from the effects of bombs and of cannon. They had directed their construction, and the disposition of the entrenched camp accordingly. It was so situated, that the Austrians could not fire directly against the bridges, which were besides protected by batteries raised in many islands, which the French had occupied since their treaty with the Margrave of Baden.

The most certain means then of expediting the reduction of Kehl, being to destroy the bridges, the Archduke would not omit any means to effect it. He caused several strong fire-ships to be built in the river Kintzig, which being launched in the Rhine, and sent down the current, might break the bridges, either by their weight or their explosion.

On the 22d, at night, the Austrians launched one of these fire-ships. To draw off the attention of the enemy, they redoubled the fire from the cannon and mortars, and at the same time attacked the advanced piquets of the enemy. But the French, who had expected that the besiegers would make use of these fire-ships, were prepared to prevent their effects. They had constructed an *estacade* above the bridges, which stopped the machine. It was immediately seized by the French pontonniers, who had the good fortune to prevent the explosion, by removing the match. Other machines, of a similar nature, launched a few days afterwards, shared the same fate as the former. The Austrians succeeded no better against the enemy's entrenchments. They were repulsed several times, and lost a great many men; but far short of 1500, which was the number at which the French estimated their loss in this affair.

The obstinacy with which the French defended their works, rendered the acquisition of them more slow and bloody; but did not prevent the Austrians from completing the batteries of the second parallel, and from making the approaches of the third. These having at length been pushed

to within 200 paces of the outward works of the left, and of the right of the centre of the entrenched camp, the Archduke determined to make the assault on these two points. The Prince's aim, in wishing to make himself master of them, was to be enabled to draw a third parallel across the enemy's entrenchments from the Rhine to the Schutter.

The Archduke made, in consequence, the following disposition: four battalions, under the conduct of Prince Frederick of Orange, were to attack the right: Major-General Zopf, who had also four battalions under his command, was to assault the works on the left, and one in particular called the Suabian Redoubt.

This plan was carried into execution on the 1st of January in the evening. The Prince of Orange advanced with his usual intrepidity against the enemy's works, attacked them with fixed bayonets, and carried them. Not satisfied with this first success, he continued to push the French, took from them many other works, and pursued them even into their camp. The latter having rallied, and being reinforced by the corps de reserve, commanded by General Lecourbe, made head in force against the Prince of Orange.

This circumstance, joined to the extreme darkness of the night, as well as to the sort of confusion which it necessarily occasions, did not admit of the Prince's maintaining himself in the most advanced works which he had taken. He determined therefore to abandon them, after having spiked 15 pieces of cannon, which he could not bring away; and took post in the front of the first works which he had been ordered to attack. In this position he maintained himself, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy; and thus covered the workmen, who were forming behind him, the projected parallel.

While the Prince of Orange was thus getting possession of the works, which flanked the right of the centre of the entrenched camp, those which flanked its left, were attacked with the same success, by General Zopf. The principal one was, as has been before observed, the Slesbian redoubt. This work, situated on the left flank of the dyke which covered the entrenched camp, was of considerable extent, having a ditch, demi-bastions, strong palisades, and a double row of *trous de loup*.

General Zopf, attacked it gallantly; and, notwithstanding its formidable state of defence,

drove the French from it, killed a great number of them, and pursued them into their entrenched camp. He then returned to post himself before the redoubt he had taken; and began a brisk cannonade with the same pieces of artillery, which he had seized from the enemy. In the mean time, the workmen completed the communication of this redoubt with the head of the sap directed against it, and united it, by a parallel, with the village of Kehl. The successes of the Prince of Orange, and of General Zopf, against the right and left of the dyke, having forced the French to abandon it, the Austrians immediately raised a *banquette* on its scarp, to be enabled to lodge themselves under cover.

At break of day, the besiegers perceived that many points, in which they had got possession, were enfiladed by the batteries of the entrenched camp. It was, however, of so much importance to preserve them, that they maintained themselves there, in spite of the tremendous fire to which they were exposed. They joined these works, by a parallel, to those which had been taken by the Prince of Orange.

The actions, of which an account has just been given, were very bloody. The French estimated

the loss of the Austrians at 2000 men, and their own at scarcely the half of that number. There is reason to believe that it was precisely the reverse.

The capture of the Suabian redoubt, and of the dyke, deprived the French of a safe communication between the right and the left wings of the entrenched camp: but as this was very near (as has been already observed) to the fort of Kehl, it was very much protected by its fire. This circumstance forced the besiegers to suspend the attack on the two wings, till they had established some batteries, which might batter two considerable works, raised behind the right of the centre, break their palisades, and silence their artillery.

These batteries were finished, and ready to play, on the morning of the 6th of January. The Archduke had determined that an assault should be made on the above-mentioned works on the same day; but, fortunately, he was not obliged to have recourse to this destructive measure. The French, seeing, that if they were forced in this point, they should have no means of safety, but in crossing the Rhine on a flying bridge, did not think it prudent to remain any

longer in this perilous situation. They evacuated, therefore, all the works of the right wing in the night of the 5th.

This retreat having considerably diminished the enemy's front, the operations, from that time, became more direct and more concentrated. The besiegers found themselves so circumstanced, as to be able to play on the bridges; and they constructed batteries to destroy them. The Archduke, impatient to terminate a siege so tedious, so expensive, and so fatiguing for the troops, was unwilling to lose a moment in taking from the French the entrenchments which they were still in possession of. In the night of the 6th, he ordered the left wing of the entrenched camp to be stormed. The Austrians were completely successful, and drove the French from their camp into the fort. But this happened at the moment when the French were relieving their troops on service. The guards that were relieved and relieving united on the glacis of the fort, and returned to the charge against the Austrians: the combat was extremely obstinate. Notwithstanding the favourable circumstance which had doubled their forces, the French were not able to recover their entrenched camp, and

were forced to retreat into the covered way of the fort. The besiegers hastened to lodge themselves in the works which they had taken, and joined them by a parallel to the head of the town of Kehl.

The French having thus successively lost the numerous and formidable works which supported the fort of Kehl, could no longer hope to preserve it. They were on the point of losing their communication with Strasburgh, except by boats, as their bridges could not fail of being shortly destroyed by the batteries raised against them. They therefore came to a determination to capitulate. General Desaix had a conference with the Archduke on the 9th, and settled with him a capitulation; in consequence of which, the French abandoned the fort of Kehl the day following, and withdrew, entirely, beyond the river, taking with them their arms, their baggage, and artillery.

Thus, after the trenches had been open seven weeks, the Imperialists recovered possession of an important post, which had been taken from them in a few hours. History will certainly record this siege of Kehl, as one of the most

remarkable events of this war. The French made a very brilliant defence, which did great honour to their engineer officers, who, on this occasion, gave a fresh proof of their superiority, already known, over those of other nations. If one may be permitted to say, that the Austrians did not shew so great talents for attack, as the French did for defence, it is but just to recollect the obstacles, of every description, which they had to overcome, and the immense works which they were obliged to make, notwithstanding the frost, the snow, the rains, and the thaws. The constancy, and the determination, with which they supported the dangers, the fatigues, and the tediousness of the siege, are above all praise. The Archduke discovered, throughout, that firmness, that resolution, and military obstinacy, which almost always in the end, procure success; and which so often gave it to the great Frederick.

This siege cost, on both sides, immense sums, and, what is more to be regretted, the lives of a vast number of men. The loss of the Austrians has generally been estimated at 10,000 men; and this calculation, though

exaggerated, is not very far from the truth. This severe loss of men was the more felt by the Austrians, inasmuch as it fell principally on the flower of their infantry. The loss of the French was little less, and chiefly affected also their best troops. Whatever importance they attached to the possession of the fort of Kehl, the obstinacy, with which they defended it, proceeded less from the hope of preserving it, than from that of weakening, for the rest of the campaign, the victorious army of the Archduke, and of preventing that Prince from undertaking any other enterprize beyond the Rhine, or from going to seek new triumphs in Italy.

It was from the same motives, and also to prevent the Austrians from uniting all their forces against Kehl, that the French persisted in maintaining themselves in the *tête de pont*, at Huningen: They had constructed it while their armies were still in Germany. It was supported and flanked by a considerable horn-work, raised on an island of the Rhine, called Shuster Insel. It was, besides, as well as this horn-work, protected by the fire of the fortress of Huningen,

and by that of many batteries erected on the left bank of the Rhine.*

After Moreau had repassed the Rhine, at the end of October, the Archduke left a body of troops to blockade the *tête de pont* of Huningen. It was invested, early in November, by Prince Furstemberg, who commanded the left wing of the Imperial army. That Prince caused the necessary works to be raised to support the investment, and mounted some batteries on the points which commanded the head of the bridge. As it was neither so well fortified, nor so advantageously situated as that of Kehl, it was not supposed that it would make so long a resistance, and that the French would, for the sake of defending it, expose the town of Huningen to destruction. However, whether they determined to engage on this point the attention of a part of the Austrian force, or whether the latter, relying too much on the advantages they possessed against this place, had not employed

* In 1733, the French also caused the *tête de pont* of Huningen to be fortified, in spite of the remonstrances of the canton of Basle, and they kept possession of it during the winter of 1733-34, although their army had re-entered France.

sufficient means to reduce it, its defence was protracted to a much longer time than had been expected.

The Austrians, after having in vain summoned the French to evacuate the *tête de pont*, began to cannonade and bombard it, as well as the Shuster Insel and the town of Huningen. From the commanding situation of their batteries, and the judicious direction of their fire, they were enabled to break the bridge which joins the two banks. This success insulating the *tête de pont*, made it liable to fall very soon into the hands of the Austrians; but in spite of the continued fire of the latter, the French contrived to repair the bridge, and re-establish the communication between the island, the town, and the *tête de pont* of Huningen.

Prince Furstemberg, disappointed in the hope that the reduction of the place must follow the breaking of the bridge, determined to attempt to take it by force. On the 30th of November, he ordered an assault on the enemy's entrenchments. His troops got possession of the half moon of the horn-work; but the French having been reinforced, retook it, after a bloody engagement. It cost the Austrians 800

men, and not fewer to the French. They lost, among others, General Abbaticci, to whom they owed the success of this day.*

After this fruitless attempt, Prince Furstemberg judging, with reason, that the fate of the *tête de pont* at Huningen depended on the issue of the siege of Kehl, and that the reduction of the latter place must draw after it that of the former, contented himself with cannonading and bombarding it. His batteries several times set fire to the town of Huningen, some part of which was burnt, and which was abandoned by almost all its inhabitants. In order to destroy the works of the Austrians, and to interrupt their workmen, the French made many sorties, in which they had generally the disadvantage. Some of the actions occasioned by these sorties, took place on the territory of Basle, which almost touched (if one may say so) the *tête de pont*. From this vicinity, it was very difficult for the Imperialists or the French

* This General, only twenty-six years of age, was, like Bonaparte, a Corsican by birth, and brought up in the artillery at the beginning of the Revolution. He possessed, it is said, as much courage, and greater talents than Bonaparte. He has been less fortunate.

to refrain, during an action, from seizing those advantages on the territory of Basle, which it might present to them; and it was not easy for the Swiss to prevent it. The French, already dissatisfied by the arming of the Swiss in the canton of Schaffhausen during the retreat of Moreau, complained that they had suffered their territory to be violated by the Austrians. Barthelemy, the Envoy of the Republic, made some bitter representations on this subject, to the Deputies of the cantons assembled at Basle. The latter, frightened by his menaces, hastened to pay attention to his complaints; and broke two officers of Basle, who were accused of collusion with the Imperialists, or at least with not having taken care that the neutrality of the Swiss territory should be respected. This severity scarcely satisfied the French, and disposed the Imperialists to complain in their turn. The Archduke and Prince Furstemberg ordered lively remonstrances to be made to the cantons, and formally called upon them to secure the inviolability of their territory. These respective applications only produced the effect of throwing the cantons into great embarrassments, but did not prevent either of the parties from

entering the Swiss territory, whenever it was convenient to them, with a view either to attack or defence.

The month of December passed without being marked by any thing important; the Austrians contenting themselves with finishing their approaches regularly, without making any attack by force. Immediately after the reduction of Kehl, the Archduke sent to Prince Furstemberg the heavy artillery which he had made use of at the siege of that place. Its arrival enabled the Prince to attack, with sufficient vigour, the *tête de pont* and the works which defended it. The French, finding themselves a good deal straitened, and unable to make any long resistance, determined to abandon the right bank of the Rhine, on which it was no great object to them to remain, after the fall of Kehl. They capitulated on the 2d of February, and on the 5th, re-crossed the Rhine with their arms and baggage. On the same day, the Austrians took possession of the *tête de pont*, as well as of the Shuster Insel. It was specified in the capitulation, that the Imperialists should not fire on the town of Hunzigen, and that, on the other hand, the

French should not fire from the town on the Austrian posts, opposite to it. They agreed, in general, that things should be replaced, on the right bank of the Rhine, in the same condition as they had been before the passage of that river by the French.

The reduction of the *tête de pont* of Huningen, put an end to the campaign in Germany. It appears proper to close the recital of it with some reflections and general observations, which may enable to form a judgment on this campaign. This shall be the subject of the last chapter.

CHAPTER X.

The Conclusion.

THE plan adopted by the French, in the campaign which has been described in the preceding chapters, was in every respect similar to that, from which they had, two years before, reaped such important success. This plan, which was practicable only with a great superiority of force, consisted, during each of these campaigns, in making the greatest efforts against the right and left wings of the enemy, with a view to outflank their centre, and to reduce them to the necessity of abandoning, or of suffering it to be surrounded. As the French had, in the year 1794, employed the greater part of their forces upon the Sambre, and in West Flanders, to induce the Allies to quit the centre, in which point they were strong, and to draw them to their wings, where they were weak; so having formed, in 1796, the resolution to invade Germany, they made no attempt to attack in front, the towns of Manheim, and Mayence, but proceeded to effect a passage

over the Rhine, at a distance from those places; and, instead of consuming their time, and wasting their strength, in the siege of them, advanced rapidly into Suabia and Westphalia. They wished to become masters of Ehrenbreitstein, Mentz, Manheim, and Philipsburgh, by the same method by which they had recovered, in the year 1794, the towns of Valenciennes, Condé, Landrecies, and Quesnoy, and to gain, by a single manœuvre, that which would in former times have been the result of two or three successful campaigns.

Every person, who may have taken the pains to compare the present war with those which have taken place for a century past, must have remarked, that the French have by no means confined themselves to the ancient course of military operations, and that they have added a system of tactics, more vast in its object and its means. The revolution, which has changed every thing among the French, has influenced the composition and the spirit of their armies, as well as the conceptions of those persons, who have been charged with the direction of them. The result has been a new military system, formed on a calculation of the relative state

of Europe and of France: a system, engendered by the spirit of conquest, diverted solely to that end, and intended to make the superiority of numbers ultimately triumphant. It would require a separate treatise, to unfold completely this system; and to shew in what respects it departs from those principles, which have hitherto been looked upon as fundamentals in the theory of war.* The limits of the present work only admit of pointing out the most striking application, which the French have made of this system, by forbearing to undertake any siege, and by venturing to leave fortified places at a great distance behind them. They foresaw, that by carrying the war to a distance from those towns, they should, by force, detach their enemies from them, and judged, that if they could obtain, and keep possession of the countries situated beyond

* Some works, and, among others, that of Mr. de Guibert, on tactics, had already pointed out the modification which it was requisite to make in the modern military system; and the changes that would result from the actual formation of the armies. The French have realized these in the present war, and have, besides, employed secondary means, before unknown, such, for instance, as telegraphs and balloons. They have employed the latter with some effect, on various occasions, among others, at Maubeuge and at Fleurus.

these fortresses, they would, in the end, fall into their hands perfectly undamaged, and without having cost them either blood or money. They proposed to acquire the fortified places, by making themselves masters of the surrounding countries; as, formerly, these countries were secured by getting possession of the fortified places. These had, hitherto, been the means of conquest; they now meant to make them its result. This method, by which the French acquired so great a number of fortified towns, in 1794, met not with the same success in 1796; but their failure did not arise from the strong places which they left behind them; and as these had not impeded the progress of Jourdan, neither were they the causes of his first disasters. If that General had been victorious at Amberg, or at Wurtzburg, the fortresses of Ehrenbreitstein, Mentz, Mannheim, and Philipsburgh, would, no doubt, have ultimately fallen, as Luxemburg did, in 1795.

The elements of the Austrian army having undergone no alterations, and its distinctive qualities being the stability of forms, and the uniformity of organization, the regulators of it have made no change in their theory, nor its Generals in their practice. By persisting, in these two

respects, in their ancient military system, while their enemies adopted one more advantageous, they, no doubt, contributed much to the success of the French. One might be inclined even to look upon this as the principal cause of it, if that were not sufficiently discovered in the loose texture of the coalition, in the treachery of some of its members, in the weakness of the Germanic confederation,* in the Emperor's pecuniary embarrassments, and in the obstacles and disadvantages of every kind, against which he has been constantly obliged to struggle. These considerations lead us rather to praise than to depreciate the Austrian army; and when we reflect that it was the first, and that it is now the last to bear the weight of this war, when we recall to our recollection all that it has lost in men, and in ter-

* The simple contingent of the Empire was fixed, in 1681, at 40,000 men. Conformably to the decrees given by the diet of Ratisbon, during this war, all the members of the Germanic confederation ought to have furnished a quintuple contingent, which would have raised the army of the Empire to 200,000 men. It has, however, never amounted to 60,000; the majority of the Princes and States having preferred paying their quota in money. The treaties of neutrality, concluded by the most powerful members of the Empire, have reduced its army to a small force. It is not at this moment 12,000 men strong.

ritory, we are induced to admire its perseverance, and to be satisfied that without its solid composition and unshaken constancy, the whole continent of Europe, perhaps, might by this time have been compelled to submit to the arms, or the principles of the French. It must be at least admitted, that the Austrian army is the strongest barrier which has been opposed to the torrent of the Republican troops, and that it has alone rescued Germany, during the year 1796.

No person has contributed more to the salvation of that vast country; no person has stronger claims to the gratitude of its inhabitants, and to the admiration of posterity, than the Archduke Charles. Obligated, for a long time, to struggle with an inferior force against an enemy, bravely conducted, and emboldened with victory, he has been deficient in no one of those qualities, which the exigence of his situation and circumstances peculiarly demanded. He has shewn himself courageous, skilful, patient: he has frustrated the hopes of France, and surpassed those of Germany.

This Prince found himself, at the opening of the campaign, at the head of a formidable army,

though one less numerous than that of his enemies. He might then flatter himself that he should make amends for this inequality of means, by a superiority of talents and activity. He had then, no doubt, formed some projects for the advancement of his brother's interest, and the promotion of his own glory. At the moment when he was on the point of putting them into execution, 30,000 of his best troops were taken from him, and sent into Italy.

The Archduke made no complaint of the great reduction, which his army, by this means, experienced; and still less did he think of endeavouring to prevent the measure by his credit, and his natural influence with the Emperor. Finding himself incapable of undertaking any offensive enterprize, and reduced to the necessity even of a defensive system, extremely difficult to maintain, this young Prince shewed neither disgust nor despondency. He exerted himself to compensate the loss of those troops which had been taken from him, by making the best use of those which remained with him. He went to seek for victory on the banks of the Lahn and the Sieg; and when an invasion, the

success of which the French had hoped for, only by effecting it at a distance from that Prince, opened to them Germany, and allowed them to display in that country their numerous battalions, the Archduke ceased not for an instant to oppose to them a firm and methodical resistance. He always could discern when it was proper to engage or avoid an action, and distinguish those posts of which it was expedient to dispute every inch with obstinacy, from those whose importance would not have repaid the value of his soldiers' blood. He effected his retreat, losing as little ground, and gaining as much time, as possible.

As soon as his approach to the hereditary dominions had sufficiently increased his force, and in the same proportion diminished that of the French, he then began to entertain the confident hope of delivering Germany; he then executed, with resolution, plans formed with wisdom. He displayed against Jourdan the courage and enterprizing spirit of his character, which had been long fettered by a defensive system. He defeated that General, pursued him without respite, outstripped him by his

celerity, circumvented him by his manœuvres, and compelled him to fly beyond the Rhine.

Having accomplished the defeat of one of the Republican armies, he hastened to direct against the other his fortune and his talents. He fixed the former, and gave new splendour to the latter. He baffled, by superior ability, the General opposed to him, rendered useless the courage of his soldiers, and relieved Germany from their presence. In two months, the Archduke passed from the frontiers of Bohemia, to the walls of Dusseldorf, from that town to Basle, and from Basle to Offenburg, always fighting and always victorious. Not satisfied with being so by halves, he resolved that the end of the campaign should afford a complete reparation for the disasters of its commencement, and allowed no respite to his enemies, till he had wrested from them the only remains of their first triumphs. Scarce had he accomplished this, when, instead of indulging a well merited repose, he listened only to the interests of his country; and not hesitating to change the command of a victorious army, for that of another, which knew nothing of war but defeats, he flew to meet new dangers in Italy.

The Archduke, no doubt, as well as every other Prince, who at his time of life has had the command of large armies, has of course listened to the counsels of experience. It is well known that he has profited by those of Lieutenant-General Bellegarde,* and of the Colonel of the staff Schmidt. To the talents of these two officers, we most readily pay due homage. They are, no doubt, worthy of that confidence, which the Emperor and the Archduke have reposed in them. They deserve praise for having made so good an use of that confidence, and are entitled to the grateful acknowledgements of Germany. They have probably contributed much to the Archduke's success, and by their experience have supplied his deficiency in that respect. But the qualities which that Prince may most justly claim as personally his own, are, his great courage, equalled only by his modesty; his coolness, and quickness of perception in the heat of

* This General, a Savoyard by birth, and, the author believes, the youngest Lieutenant-General in the Austrian army, has never ceased to distinguish himself during the whole course of this war. He has constantly enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor, and will one day probably be at the head of his army.

battle; that energy which makes him forget the weakness of his constitution, and support the greatest fatigues; and, finally, that impartial justice, with which he rewards with one hand, and punishes with the other. He has found the means to give to his Generals, and to the officers of his army, an activity before unknown to them, and to which may be attributed the latter successes of the Austrian army. He has reanimated discipline, not by increasing its severity, but by inspiring every one with the love of their duty, the desire of praise, and the fear of reprehension.* He has found the means of compelling the Generals of his army to

* A single trait will enable the reader to form a judgment of the manner in which the Archduke commands, and is obeyed. At the affair of the 24th of October, that Prince gave orders to the Major of the light horse of Modena, to attack a redoubt situated amongst some vines. That officer charged the French who defended it, but the ground being extremely disadvantageous for cavalry, he was repulsed and obliged to fall back. The Archduke came up in the interim, and seeing what passed, said to the Major, "Sir, you have misunderstood me; I gave you orders to *take* the redoubt." The officer felt the full weight of these words, and returned to the charge with all the force given by despair. He was killed, but the redoubt was taken.

show more zeal and more obedience in executing Mr. de Bellegarde's plans, than the Emperor was able to obtain from them, in 1794, in favour of the celebrated General Mack. He knew how to raise his authority above the abuses, the pretensions, and the intrigues, which besiege the head quarters of an army, no less than a court, and to force every particular interest to act in unison with the interest of the whole. These are the qualities and the facts which characterize the Archduke Charles, and of which history will not be unmindful. The conduct of this Prince, at once prudent and splendid, has, beyond contradiction, had a greater influence than any other circumstance on the issue of this campaign.

That issue replaced the opposed armies in nearly the same position, which they occupied before the rupture of the armistice. The slight changes which resulted finally from the campaign, were in favour of the French. They acquired a *tête de pont* at Neuwied, as well as a part of the Palatinate, and of the Hunsruck. In the course of this work, it has been pointed out how little military importance these

latter countries possess. The acquisition of the *tête de pont* at Neuwied was a more substantial advantage, but considerably diminished by the vicinity of the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein.*

It is evident, that few campaigns have produced a more insignificant result than that of 1796; at least as far as respects the gain or loss of territory; while perhaps there have been none, which in the beginning seemed likely to produce a more important one. However, though it has not been remarkable for great battles, and has produced no decisive alteration in the situation of the Belligerent Powers, it will not the less occupy the page of history. The interest which it will inspire, will arise less from the consequences by which it was actually followed, than from those which there was at one time

* This fortress is built on a perpendicular rock, at the foot of which runs the Rhine, and opposite to which the Moselle falls into that river. It commands entirely the town and environs of Coblenz. It unites to all the advantages of its situation, the impossibility of being attacked, except on a very narrow front, and the capability of being defended by a small garrison. This fortress, one of the best existing, belongs to the Elector of Treves.

reason to apprehend. The Archduke will be praised less for what he did, than for what he hindered the French from doing; and not so much for what he gained, as for what he preserved. The movements of the adverse armies during this campaign will furnish useful lessons to the soldier, and a copious fund of reflection to the statesman.

In reflecting on the trifling alteration produced in the relative situation of the French and Austrians, by four months' battles and military vicissitudes, it is impossible not to feel a lively regret that so many thousand men should have been sacrificed to the acquisition of some entrenchments, and of some square leagues of territory. It is easier to deplore the fate of these victims of war, than to determine their number with precision. The researches and calculations which have been made, nevertheless, permit a probable estimate on this point to be offered. There is good reason to believe, that the loss of the Austrians in this campaign in Germany, has been between 25,000 and 30,000 men, and that of the French about 40,000. The disasters experienced by Jourdan, have been

the principal cause why the loss of the latter has so far exceeded that of the former. It was, otherwise, during the rest of the campaign, on each side nearly balanced.

The French, as it has been observed in the beginning of this work, had a double object in the invasion of Germany. The first was to penetrate to the heart of the Emperor's dominions,* and the second to maintain their army at the expense of that Prince, and of the different states of the Empire. They failed in the first of these objects, but completely accomplished the second, during the four months, which they passed beyond the Rhine. They reaped great advantages from the dread, which their success, and their political designs had diffused through all the states and courts of the second order in Germany. The greatest part of these hastened with eagerness to purchase, at a high price, the permission of being no longer enemies of the French. The latter drew immense sums from the armistices which they granted, as well as from the contributions which they imposed on

* The armies of Jourdan and Moreau, had upon their colours, "Vienna or Death."

the hostile countries. Their rapid expulsion from Germany prevented them from being paid the whole of what was due, but a very great part they actually received; and during four months, the armies of Jourdan and Moreau cost nothing to the French Republic.

But, as much as the latter gained in money, and in military stores, in Germany, she lost in her influence and ascendant over the minds of the inhabitants. A great number of these, and principally in the Imperial towns, had been the dupes of those professions of political and moral faith, which the French had diffused through Europe. Seduced by these philosophical abstractions, strangers could not be brought to believe, that their practical result was not equally admirable. They were still under this infatuation, when the French themselves were no longer possessed with it. The former were imposed on by a brilliant theory; the latter had been undeceived by a cruel experience. The first viewed the revolution through a distant perspective, which occasioned its defects to vanish; the second had seen it close, in all its natural deformity. Like the fabulous lance,

which healed the wounds it had inflicted, the French were destined to cure those evils which themselves had caused. Their actions could not fail to destroy the effect of their writings; and it required only to know them, to be no longer tempted to an imitation of their system. The inhabitants of the Netherlands, and of Holland, had already owed their conversion to the presence of the French. It produced the same effect in Germany. Their military manifesto proclaimed *war to the castle, and peace to the cottage*;—it was only in the first point that they kept their word. They had promised the greatest respect for property;—and they sported with its rights. They had announced that happiness and liberty would follow their footsteps;—and wherever they were directed, they were marked by every excess of military despotism. This trial was not thrown away on the good sense of Germany; and the national habits soon prevailed over the French metaphysics. The philosophers, and literary men of Germany, began to compare more closely the principles with their consequences; and as to the people, they abandoned them-

selves at once to the sentiment naturally arising from their new situation. Their resentment broke out, and was exercised, as soon as they had opportunity and power. The vengeance, to which the inhabitants of Westphalia, Franconia, and Suabia, gave themselves up against the French, and the terrible reprisals of the latter, have made these to be more and more detested in the countries they have conquered. It may be reasonably believed, that were they again to attempt to penetrate them, they would find an enemy in every inhabitant.

All that the French have lost in Germany, upon the score of opinion, the Austrians have gained. If they had at first met with disasters, they speedily repaired them by brilliant success. If they traversed Germany by a retrograde march, they have since over-run it as conquerors; and it is always the last victory which reckons with the people: it is that which leaves the prevailing sentiment.

The Archduke Charles has personally acquired a great weight of opinion in Germany. He has been the deliverer of that country; he is become its idol. One half of its in-

habitants have been witness to his exploits: they have attached themselves to his person, from admiration; and to his cause, from the sacrifices which they have themselves made for it. These dispositions, and these sentiments will, one day, perhaps be useful to the house of Austria.

End of the Campaign of 1796 in Germany.


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
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
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CHAPTER I.

Force and position of the Allies and of the French in Italy—Opening of the campaign—Battles of Montenotte, Monteleone, Dego, and Vico—Retreat of the Allies—Armistice concluded between the King of Sardinia and the French Republic—Observations on these events.

FROM the beginning of the year 1796, it was well known to persons best informed on the subject, that the French had determined to make very great military efforts in Italy. It had been easy to foresee this from the end of the preceding year, since they were unwilling to extend to the armies of Italy, the truce which had been agreed upon, in Germany, at the close of that

year, between the Imperial and Republican armies.

Many political and military considerations concurred, to determine the French Government to push the war in Italy, with more vigour than it had been done the preceding years. The example of the Court of Spain, which had been hastily induced to make peace by the invasion of its territory and the loss of two or three strong places, gave the Directory reason to hope, that the same consequences might result from the adoption of the same plan, against the King of Sardinia. They flattered themselves, that by threatening the fortresses of Piedmont, and attacking, on all sides, at the same time, the territories of this prince, they would so far alarm him, that the apprehension of losing his crown, would determine him to detach himself from the coalition.

To these motives, were joined others, of no less importance;—to carry the war into the states of the Emperor himself—to destroy his preponderance in Italy—to shut up its ports against the English—and, above all, to find in a rich and fertile country, money, subsistence, and resources of every description.

To carry these designs into execution with the better chance of success, the French Government contrived to disguise them, and in so doing, had the good fortune to elude the vigilance of its enemies. Well assured, that snows and the nature of the country would prevent the Austrians and Piedmontese from attempting any offensive operations during the winter, it was in no hurry to reinforce the French army, in Italy, and to repair the losses which it had sustained in the campaign of 1795. It even went farther: the want of pay, and of subsistence, having caused considerable discontents among the national volunteers; the French Generals, finding that they could neither restore subordination amongst them, nor pay them, gave permission to all who wished it to depart, even winked at the absence of those who quitted their colours without leave, and thus suffered many thousands of their worst soldiers to return into France. The French government did not take any great pains, in the first instance, to restore order and discipline into the army of Italy. Its weakness, and state of disorganization, were known to the Allies: and they were, therefore, led to conclude,

that it would not be necessary to oppose against it any considerable force, in the ensuing campaign.

During the months, however, of January and February, the Directory, under pretence of appearing, or of preventing disturbances, in the South of France, caused about 40,000 of their best troops to assemble in the provinces of Languedoc, Roussillon, and Provence. The greater part of them, having made the campaigns in Spain, had become accustomed to a hot climate, and were therefore enabled to resist that of Italy. During the month of April, almost the whole of these troops arrived, by forced marches, in the territories of Genoa: and soon after the opening of the campaign, Bonaparte found himself at the head of an army of more than 60,000 men, of which 45,000 were under his immediate orders, in the position of Savona; the rest were posted on the Col de Tende, and in the different other passages, which lead from the *Riviera di Ponente* to Piedmont. It may be recollected, that at the end of 1795, the able Austrian General Vins, having been obliged, on account of bad health, to give up the command of the army to the unskilful General d'Argenteau, the

French, commanded by Scherer, possessed themselves of all the summits of the Maritime Alps, from the Col de Tende to the sources of the Bormida; they even occupied, and fortified the heads of several vallies, lying towards Piedmont, and, among others, the point of Montenotte, which was so much the more important, as it commanded the only passable road in that chain of mountains: Mr. de Vins had caused it to be constructed in 1795, in order to facilitate the communication between Acqui and Savona.

The cabinet of Vienna, desirous of repairing the checks experienced by its army of Italy, in the end of 1795, had augmented it, but not so much as was to have been wished, and even as it had itself engaged to do. It had promised to the King of Sardinia, who, on this condition, had refused, during the winter, very advantageous proposals of peace, if he would remain neutral, and the gift of the Milanese, if he would join himself to the French, to have in the spring of 1796, 60,000 men in Italy. The same promises had been made to General Beaulieu, who was sent to take the command of the army. He left Vienna with the hope of finding, or of receiving in a short time, all that had been held forth to

him; but what was his astonishment, and the discontent of the Court of Turin, when, in place of 60,000 men, he saw himself obliged to begin the campaign, with, at most, the half of that number, including even a corps of about 6000 Neapolitans, when he found that General d'Argenteau, who by his rank commanded the right of the army, was not, as had been engaged to him, recalled.

The King of Sardinia had about 60,000 men in arms, including his militia: 20,000, commanded by General Colli, defended the Col de Tenda, and the other approaches of Piedmont, on the side of the county of Nice, and of the state of Genoa: 10,000 guarded the different vallies, which separated Piedmont from France: 15,000, commanded by the Duke d'Aoust, were in Savoy, where they were opposed to the French army of the Alps, commanded by General Kellerman, and 25,000 men strong. The rest of the Sardinian troops were divided among the places of the interior.

On reviewing these different estimates, it appears, that the French began the campaign with 85,000 men, and the Allies with 75,000.

Hostilities began early in April. The French

at first threatened many points at the same time, that the Allies might be doubtful against which they really meant to direct their attack, and that, consequently, they might be obliged to divide their forces. They made many feints along the whole extent of the Col de Tende, which obliged the Piedmontese to extend their line of defence, that they might be enabled to secure all the passes that lead into Piedmont. The French spread a report that they meant to get possession of Genoa; and contrived to give a colour to it, by advancing to Voltri, a corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, commanded by General Laharpe, who pushed forward his advanced guard to St. Pierre d'Arena, a suburb of Genoa.

The moment that intelligence arrived of this movement, Mr. de Beaulieu set out from Alexandria, in the neighbourhood of which he had assembled his army, moved rapidly to Novi, took post in the front of the defile of Bochetta,* and caused a strong

* The Bochetta is a chain of mountains, over which, forming many windings, passes the great road from Lombardy to Genoa. On the top of the highest of these mountains, the road contracts itself so much, that

detachment to advance to the gates of Genoa, to cover that city, and to keep General Laharpe in awe.

The Chiefs of the Genoese government, finding their country pressed by two powerful armies, without means of making their neutrality respected, receiving messages from either party, sometimes with assurance of protection, sometimes with menaces, found themselves in a very embarrassing situation. They could not prevent the territory of the Republic from becoming the theatre of war, and from providing the opposing armies with means of subsistence. Perfectly aware, that, at all events, they must be at the mercy either of the French or the Austrians, they endeavoured to keep on good terms with both. They strove to preserve, as far as it was possible, the independence of the Republic. They did every thing that depended on themselves to maintain it;—collected their troops—ordered the militia within the walls—and supplied with

scarcely three persons can pass abreast. It is, properly speaking, this pass which is known under the name of Bochetta. It is the key to the territories of the Genoese Republic.

artillery, the fortifications of their city, which can only be defended, and, of course, be properly besieged, but by a very considerable force.* The magistrates, however, thought less of defending it against foreign armies, than of preventing an insurrection of its inhabitants, the lower class of which was as much attached to the French, as the higher order were to the Allies.

General Beaulieu, having in vain waited for the reinforcements and officers of the staff, which he had demanded; perceiving that the French army was daily becoming more formidable, and was threatening Genoa; and convinced that a feeble defensive would expose him to certain ruin; resolved, with his accustomed boldness, to attack the French vigorously himself, whose measures he did not think were

* The city of Genoa is ten miles in circumference. The regular troops of the Republic do not exceed 3000 men, but it can, if necessary, assemble 30,000 militia. It had as many as 18,000 on foot in the last war in which it was engaged. This town was bombarded, in 1746, by an English fleet, and taken by the Imperialists, who had forced the passage of Bochetta. It will, no doubt, be recollected in what manner it delivered itself from the latter.

yet fully arranged. In fact, the greater part of their artillery, which they were unable to transport by land to Savona, had been for some time blockaded in Nice, by a light English squadron; but, most unfortunately, this squadron, either forced by the winds, or having some supposed object of superior utility in view, left its station at this critical moment, and in two days after, the whole artillery and baggage of the French army arrived at Savona and at Vado.

The plan which General Beaulieu had formed, and which would have been completely successful, if he had had a greater force at his disposal, was as follows :

General Colli, who, at the head of the Piedmontese army, formed the right of the line held by the Allies, was to make a strong diversion, by the sources of the Tanaro, and the valley of Oneglia, and, in case he should find the French weak upon these points, to push them vigorously, and to cut in two their army. The Austrian General Provera, posted with 2000 men upon a rugged mountain, the base of which forms a peninsula, washed by the Bormida, flanked, at the same time, the left

of the Piedmontese and the right of the Austrians, and was, according to circumstances, to support or reinforce either the one or the other. General d'Argenteau, with about 15,000 men, reinforced by 4000 Piedmontese, picked men, was to attack the French by the valley of Bormida, and to endeavour to penetrate directly to Savona, by the road constructed by Mr. de Vins. General Beaulieu, with the rest of the troops, was to repair to Genoa, by the Bochetta, and to take the French in flank, in the Riviera di Ponente. Thus the latter were to be attacked upon the whole line of the Maritime Alps, from the Col de Tende to Genoa.—These dispositions were good in themselves, but the corps which were to carry them into effect, were too weak, and too far separated from each other.*

Note to the second Edition.

* It may be seen that this plan was, in its leading features, absolutely the same with that which General Melas executed with so much success, in the beginning of the Campaign of 1800. The attack which he made, and by which he cut in two the French army, was exactly the same with that which Mr. d'Argenteau was charged to make. Mr. de Beaulieu had, besides, the advantage of being master of Genoa, which was not

On the 10th of April, the day fixed for the commencement of the operations, Mr. de Beaulieu attacked General Cervoni, who was posted at St. Pierre d'Arena, and drove him from that place. On the next day, he again forced him to give ground, and repulsed him as far as Voltri.

It was less upon this attack, than upon that which was to be made by Mr. d'Argenteau, that the result of the combined operations depended. The entrenched position of the French, which he was charged with forcing, consisted of three great redoubts, raised at set distances one above the other, the last of which was at Montenotte, a place become so famous since that day which gave Italy to the French.

On the 11th, Mr. d'Argenteau attacked and carried the two first of these redoubts; but not till they had been defended so vigorously and so long, that this General did not arrive till very late before the third, which was the strongest of all. The enemy having been reinforced either by the case with Mr. de Melas. If the former did not succeed, it was because he had too few men, and because he had General d'Argenteau too much.

troops which had been driven from the two first, or by others which had arrived from Savona; and those of the Austrian General being extremely fatigued, he delayed till the following day the attack of this redoubt, and having taken a position a little farther back, he passed the night at a small distance from the French.

General Rampon, to whom the defence of the post of Montenotte was entrusted, having received new reinforcements during the night, dispersed some troops in the woods which border the only road by which it was possible to reach the redoubt. At break of day, Mr. d'Argenteau marched to the attack, and imprudently advanced without having caused the woods to be reconnoitred. Scarcely had his advanced guard arrived before the redoubt, when it was assailed on its flanks by a fire of musquetry, and in its front by so warm a fire of grape-shot, that it was speedily obliged to fall back. Being followed closely by the French, it was put to the rout, and soon communicated its terror and disorder to the rest of the corps of Mr. d'Argenteau, which precipitately retreated. Fearing that he would no longer be in a situation to make a stand against the French, he

sent to Colonel Wuckassowich, who was some leagues from him, with a corps of from 3000 to 4000 men, an order to join him, but he had the astonishing inadvertence to mistake the date, and to fix a day later than that which he intended.

In the mean time, Bonaparte, after having re-inforced his right, and ordered General Laharpe to advance between Generals Beaulieu and d'Argenteau, and to turn the left of the latter, had marched forward in two columns, the one by the valley of Tanaro, and the other by the heights of Savona, in order to turn the right of the same Austrian General; and in order to separate him also from General Colli. The latter, fearing to be cut off, and wishing to preserve his communication with the Imperialists, after a good defence, fell back. Bonaparte, having thus deprived Mr. d'Argenteau of the co-operation of the Piedmontese General, rapidly advanced upon his right flank, which he turned, while General Laharpe executed the same manœuvre on his left. The advantage remained on all points with the French, who, however, purchased it dearly. In the official report, they made the loss of the Allies amount to 3500 men, of whom 2500 were prisoners.

After this victory, the French advanced in the mountains, took possession of Carcare, and went to establish themselves on the heights which surround Cairo, which the Austrians had abandoned. Mr. de Beaulieu, perceiving that the French had carried their principal forces against the centre and right of his line, fell back obliquely by his right, in order to effect his junction with General d'Argenteau, and to draw nearer to the Piedmontese.

The French, who did not wish to give the Allies time to recruit their forces, vigorously pushed their advantages. Their left advanced rapidly by the Tanaro, constantly placed itself between the Piedmontese and the Austrians, and outflanked the right of the latter. The centre and the right, at the same time, continued to push forward on the 13th, and, on the 14th, forced the Austrians to risk a general engagement at Montelesino. Bonaparte followed the same plan, and executed the same manœuvre, which had succeeded so well at Montepotte. He directed the greater part of his forces against the right wing of the Austrians, so as to separate it from the Piedmontese, with whom it had a feeble communication. This disposition met

with the greatest success. The left of the Piedmontese, and the right of the Austrians, still commanded by Mr. d'Argenteau, were forced and put to flight. The centre of the Austrians had then to sustain the attack of almost the whole French army. It defended itself with the greatest bravery, attempted even several times to pierce through the centre of the French line, and for a long time kept the victory undecided. Bonaparte, fearing that it might escape him, made new dispositions to secure it; he reinforced the right of his army, and ordered it to advance in three strong columns against the left wing of the Austrians, which was sustained by some entrenchments thrown up near Dego.

This left wing opposed a vigorous resistance to the French; and the fire from the batteries made a considerable carnage amongst them. One of their columns, however, led by General Massena, succeeded in outflanking the left wing of the Austrians; the latter, pressed on all sides by more than double their number, were at length overpowered and routed.

In the mean time, and after the night had already come on, Colonel Wuckassowich, who, as has been explained, arrived a day too late, met

the body of the army of M. d'Argenteau, which was flying in confusion, and which was vigorously pursued by the French, whom the fighting, the heat, and the difficulties of the country, had also thrown into disorder. The Austrian Colonel, defiling, in good order, by a lateral valley, charged them with vigour, put them to the rout, pursued them, in his turn, for several hours, and retook Dego. This fortunate incident might have changed the event of the action in favour of the Imperialists, if M. d'Argenteau had, in his turn, come in support of this division. But, so far was he from joining this, that he did not rally a single battalion, but continued his retreat. The brave and able Colonel Wuckassowich, attacked, in his turn, by superior forces, was, notwithstanding an obstinate resistance, which cost the enemy a great number of men, and, among others, the three Generals Causse, Dupuis, and Rondeau, obliged to yield to numbers, and could not make his retreat, till after sustaining considerable loss. He went to rejoin, at Acqui, the remainder of the Austrian troops, which M. de Beaulieu there reunited under his command. If credit can be given to the returns

made by Bonaparte, the Allies must have lost in this battle, 2500 men killed, 8000 made prisoners, 22 pieces of cannon, and 15 stands of colours. Among the prisoners, was Lieutenant-General Provera.

M. d'Argenteau, of whom it may be said, that, on this occasion, he had lost all his judgment, if ever he possessed any, by retreating, on the 12th, totally forgot the detached corps, under this Lieutenant-General, and the latter did not learn the defeat of the Allies, till he saw the French arrive from all quarters against him. The sudden irruption of Bonaparte having separated him from General Colli, he attempted, in the night of the 13th and 14th, to effect his retreat towards the Austrian army, from which he was separated by the Bormida; but this river having suddenly swelled, it became impossible for him to pass it, and no other resource was left him, but that of retiring to the summit of the mountain, which was commanded by an old castle, where he entrenched himself, and where he defended himself for two days, though without either water or provisions. Surrounded on all sides, he was summoned to surrender at discretion; but he refused to do it. The French

then assaulted him; thrice were they repulsed with dreadful carnage. The three French Generals, Panel, Quenin, and Joubert, who conducted the attacks, were, the two first killed, and the third severely wounded. It was only on the 14th, in the evening, that the brave Provera and his gallant troops, exhausted by fatigue, hunger, and thirst, and having no longer any hopes of being succoured, surrendered themselves prisoners of war.

Bonaparte, in obedience to the orders given to the French Generals, never to publish the number of their killed, wounded, and prisoners, did not mention, in his relation of the victory of Montelesino, the number of men that it had cost him. It is certain, however, that it was very considerable. Three Generals having been killed or wounded in the actions of the 13th and 14th, there can be no doubt but that a proportionable number of officers and soldiers must have shared the same fate. The silence of Bonaparte as to the loss of his own army, sufficiently warrants us to believe, that he very much exaggerated that of the Allies, which, from impartial report, appears to have been by no means so great.

Though the battle of Montelesino had still farther weakened the points of communication between the Austrian and Piedmontese armies, they nevertheless made no combined movement to approach towards one another, and to contract their line. They thus afforded to Bonaparte the opportunity of placing himself between them, and of forcing the Piedmontese to act separately; which was the principal object of the plan of campaign that had been formed by the French.

Bonaparte leaving a considerable part of his army to observe that of the Austrians, to prevent their assisting the Piedmontese, or making a diversion in their favour, marched against the latter with the remainder of his forces. He ordered an attack to be made on their entrenched camp, on the 16th, and although he did not succeed in forcing it, the fear of being turned, induced the Piedmontese to abandon it during the night, between the 16th and 17th, after having left a garrison in the town of Ceva.

The Piedmontese army took an excellent position at the conflux of the rivers Tanaro and Cursaglia, entrenched themselves very

strongly, and for four days resisted all the efforts made by the enemy to dislodge them; but the French having, on the 21st, crossed the Tanaro in two places, General Colli, not daring to hazard a battle in the position which he then held, quitted it during the night following, retiring towards Mondovi, to which place he feared his retreat might be cut off. The French pursuing him closely, attacked him at break of day, near the village of Vico. The Piedmontese were defeated, but not without having made a great resistance. They continued to retreat, and the French entered Mondovi the same evening. The reports of the latter, stated the loss sustained by the Piedmontese at 1800 men killed, among whom was one General, 8 pieces of cannon, 15 ammunition waggons, 11 stands of colours, and 1300 men taken, among whom were three Generals. The Republican General Stengel, known by his defeat at the passage of the Roer, in 1793, was mortally wounded in this action.

The Piedmontese army, from that time entirely separated from the Austrians, and obliged to rely altogether upon itself, took a good defensive position behind the Stura. Its front was

covered by that river; its right extended to the fortress of Còni, and kept up a communication with the corps which defended the pass of the Col de Tende; its left was supported by the town of Cherasco, situated at the conflux of the Stura and the Tanaro. This position was the best that M. de Colli could have taken, under the circumstances in which he found himself. It covered the strongest places of Piedmont, and defended the only routes by which the French could penetrate into it, as they were not then masters of the Milanese. The safety of Piedmont and of Turin, depended on this line of defence being perfectly preserved. If the French succeeded in breaking through it, they would be enabled to penetrate into the flat country, and, leaving the strong places behind them, might march to the very gates of Turin, from whence they were not more than ten leagues distant. The superiority of their numbers would have enabled them to mask those fortresses which might have given them any inquietude, and to spread themselves over the plains of Piedmont, which the weak remains of M. de Colli's army would not have dared to dispute with them.

The reverses which the Allies had experienced at Montenotte, Montelesino, and Vico, and the rapid progress of the French, filled the Court of Turin with just and serious alarms. The King of Sardinia, strack with the imminent danger which threatened him, could hardly flatter himself that M. de Colli would be able to resist the efforts of an enemy so often victorious ; and not having reason to rely on General Beaulieu for any powerful succour, did not think it right to expose to the chance of a battle, his possessions and his crown. He saw no means of preserving them, but by an immediate peace, and lost no time in demanding one. He sent Plenipotentiaries to Genoa, charged to propose it to the French Commissaries ; and at the same time dispatched an order to General Colli, to solicit a suspension of arms from General Bonaparte. After some difficulties, the latter agreed to it. The principal conditions were, that the French should be put in possession of the strong places of Coni, Ceva, and Tortona ; that till the latter could be surrendered, the town of Alexandria should be given up to them ; that they should remain masters of all the country

on the right bank of the Tanaro, from the source of that river, to its embouchure into the Po; that they should be permitted to cross the latter river below the town of Valenza, and that the French troops should be allowed to have a free passage through all the territories of the King of Sardinia.

This armistice was soon afterwards followed by a treaty of peace, between this Prince and the French Republic. The detail on the nature, the conditions, and the political consequences of this treaty, shall not be entered into. It would be a deviation from the subject: this transaction shall only be considered with a view to the effects it produced on the rest of this campaign.

Before the narrative of it is resumed, some reflections on the events, which have just been recounted, may be hazarded. They have, indeed, been too remarkable, and their consequences too important, to admit indifference as to the true causes which led to them. Some have attributed the disasters which the Allies experienced in this campaign to the political errors of the ministers of the respective courts, as well as to the military misconduct of the

Generals; others have seen nothing in the triumphs of the French, but the natural effect of the superiority of their forces, of the bravery of their soldiers, and the talents of their Commander. The opinions of the best informed people, as well as the reports of the most impartial, concur in attributing the misfortunes of the Allies, to a complication of these different causes.

The court of Vienna had formally promised to raise its Italian army to 60,000 men, which, however, had never amounted to more than 30,000, including the Neapolitans. From the difficulty in providing soldiers, and money to pay them, the Piedmontese army was never so numerous as it ought to have been, according to the mutual engagements that had been entered into between the courts of Vienna and Turin.

On the one side and on the other, intrigues, mistrust, and other secret causes still more unfortunate, conspired to prevent the Austrian and Piedmontese armies from being so strong in point of number, and from acting with that union and identity of views, that were necessary to give them a chance of success

against an enemy, marching towards its object with a perfect unity of action and of interest.

The court of Vienna appointed to the command of the Italian army M. de Beaulieu, a General remarkable for his courage, as well as for his good fortune in war. It placed great reliance, and with good reason, on his zeal and his fidelity. But this General had never yet commanded in Italy, and, of course, could not have a perfect knowledge of the country in which he was about to wage war; a knowledge which the insufficiency of his forces rendered the more necessary. In doing justice to the military talents which distinguished M. de Beaulieu, it ought to be observed, that he did not possess all those qualities which ought to be found in a Commander in Chief. He was particularly deficient in that address, and those conciliating manners, so necessary in a General, who unites under his command, troops of different nations, or who is obliged to act in concert with them. It appeared that there did not exist between him and the Piedmontese Generals, that harmony and mutual confidence, which alone could make amends for the inferiority of their forces, and give a concordance to their operations.

Messrs. de Beaulieu and Colli were, besides, independent of each other, and were only instructed to act in concert, which they did not adhere to, so strictly as might be wished. The Austrians threw the blame of the defeats at Montenotte and Montelesino on the Piedmontese Generals, whom they accused of not having supported General d'Argenteau as they might have done. The Piedmontese, on the other hand, reproached the Austrians with having afforded them no assistance in the battles of the 16th, the 21st, and 22d, pretending that had they received any, they might have maintained themselves before Ceva and Mondovi. Both accused General d'Argenteau of having omitted or neglected to communicate the orders which he had received, to the Generals under his command; and of having occasioned both these defeats by the bad dispositions which he made, and by the slight resistance which he opposed to the attacks of the French. One cannot but suspect that these imputations were well founded, as this General was soon afterwards removed from his command, and even put under arrest.

It is impossible not to applaud the readiness with which M. de Beaulieu marched to cover

Genoa in the beginning of April, and the courage with which he attacked the French corps which threatened that city. But he may be censured for having uselessly remained many days at Voltri, and for not having suspected that the design of the French was to compel him to quit the heights, on which he had advantageously posted himself. In flying to the assistance of Genoa, M. de Beaulieu separated himself from the right of his army. After having accomplished his object, he ought instantly, as it seems, to have joined M. d'Argenteau. The city of Genoa had had time to secure itself from a *coup de main*. The best way of defending it, would have been, besides, not to suffer himself to be beat by the French, and to prevent them from penetrating into Piedmont.

The inaction of M. de Beaulieu gave time to Bonaparte to prepare his movement against M. d'Argenteau, to defeat this General twice, and to obtain those first successes which decided the rest of the campaign. If M. de Beaulieu had contracted his line, and collected his army, by drawing nearer to M. d'Argenteau; if, instead of occupying a very extensive front, the Generals Beaulieu and Colli had formed a junction, or

at least had taken such positions as would have admitted of their affording each other mutual support; they might have defended all the defiles of the Appenines, have rendered Piedmont impenetrable, and have thus completely disconcerted Bonaparte's plans. If the latter had marched to Genoa, to induce the Allies to divide their forces, or against Lombardy, in the hope that the Austrians would fly to its defence, he could not have executed either the one or the other of these movements, and particularly the latter, without endangering his flank, and exposing himself to be continually attacked in a very perilous situation. He would have been under the necessity of marching through the flat country; while the Allies, who were masters of all the heights, might have fallen upon him at such time, and in such places as would have been most advantageous to them. If Bonaparte, under these circumstances, had experienced any reverses, the Allies might had been enabled to drive him to the sea coast, and even to cut off his communication with the country of Nice, and with France.

It is impossible to deny, but that the plan followed by General Bonaparte was as wisely con-

ceived as it was ably executed. He shewed great ability and promptitude in taking advantage of the superiority of his forces, and of the errors of those who were opposed to him. He had but one object, towards which he directed all his movements, and applied all his means; this was to break the line of the Allies. He succeeded in it, by bringing almost the whole of his force to bear on the weakest part of their line, a simple manœuvre, and which can scarcely fail of being successful, if executed with foresight, celerity, and vigour.

CHAPTER II.

*Retreat of the Austrians behind the Po—
 Passage of that river by the French—Ar-
 mistice concluded between them and the Duke
 of Parma—Battle at Lodi—The French
 enter Milan—Insurrection of the Inhabi-
 tants of Lombardy—Passage of the French
 over the Mincio—Retreat of General Beau-
 lieu into the Tyrol—Armistice concluded
 between the French, the King of Naples,
 and the Pope—The French enter Leghorn
 —Insurrection of the inhabitants of Ro-
 magna—Siege and description of Mantua.*

THE armistice concluded between the Pied-
 montese and French armies, was productive of
 the greatest advantages to the latter. It de-
 livered the Republicans from one half of their
 enemies, provided them, abundantly, with mili-
 tary stores and provisions, and secured their
 position in Italy. It afforded them means of
 acquiring new successes, at the same time that
 it furnished certain points of retreat in case of

a reverse of fortune. Elated by so many victories, obtained in so short a time, and strengthened by all the new resources which he had procured, Bonaparte did not delay a moment to take advantage of them. The possession of Tortona, with the liberty of passing the Po, near Valenza, opened a way for him into the Milanese, which was become an easy conquest to an army already victorious, and double in number to that opposed to it.

The Republican army began its march on the 30th of April, and advanced against the Austrians. As soon as M. de Beaulieu had heard of the suspension of arms, agreed upon between the Piedmontese and the French, he had retired to Alexandria, and from thence to Valenza, where he crossed the Po. He then took a position behind that river, between those of Ticino and Terdoppio, in order to protect the Milanese. Abandoned by the Piedmontese, and deprived of the support of their fortified places, he could no longer think of acting on the offensive. Nothing now remained for him but to exert all his efforts to keep the French, as long as possible, on the other side of the Po, and then to make an obstinate defence of the Milanese, in order

to give the court of Vienna time to send reinforcements, which the defection of the King of Sardinia rendered indispensably necessary. Thinking that the French would take advantage of the liberty of the passage, stipulated in the armistice, and that they would endeavour to cross the Po, near Valenza or Tortona, of which they were masters, M. de Beaulieu posted himself with the greatest part of his army within the reach of these two towns, so as to protect the course of the river Ticino. He lined only the left bank of the Po with a few troops, as far as Pavia, and the mouth of the Ticino.

Bonaparte, foreseeing all the difficulties which must attend the passage of so rapid a river as the Po, in the presence of the enemy, and knowing that M. de Beaulieu had not a sufficient number of troops to guard the banks of the river along the whole of its course, judged, that by marching much lower down, he should find some point favourable to his passage, and weakly defended. By this movement, he compelled M. de Beaulieu to abandon, on a sudden, almost the whole of the Milanese, in order to

prevent the loss of his communication with the town of Mantua, and the Tyrol. If, on the contrary, Bonaparte had attacked him on the Ticino, M. de Beaulieu would have been able to defend, successively, the passage of each river, to save his magazines, and, perhaps, to gain sufficient time for the arrival of some reinforcements, which might enable him to stand his ground in the Milanese. By directing himself towards the Lower Po, Bonaparte gained, besides, the advantage of being farther advanced into Italy, of alarming all the petty States, of levying contributions in the Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Modena; and of procuring money, provisions, and horses, with which his army was not, as yet, abundantly supplied. In consequence of this, after having made a feint of attempting a passage at Valenza, he proceeded, on the 8th of May, by a forced march, to the neighbourhood of Placentia; and perceiving but a small number of the enemy on the other side of the Po, he hastened to transport his vanguard to the opposite bank, on the rafts and flying bridges. Some light troops, which he had sent forward during his

march, took possession of some boats, loaded with sick and provisions.

As soon as M. de Beaulieu received information of the march of the French towards Placentia and the Lower Po, he sent between 6000 and 7000 men, from Pavia, to defend the points threatened; but they arrived too late to oppose the passage of the French, whom they found drawn up on the left bank of the river.

A smart skirmish ensued, near Fombio, in which the Neapolitan cavalry lost many men, but gained much honour. This action was disadvantageous to the Allies, who were compelled to retire upon the Adda. In the night of the 7th, M. de Beaulieu ordered another body of 4000 men, from Casale, to succour that which was attacked at Fombio. This corps arrived about two o'clock in the morning, at Codogno, on the road from Placentia to Cremona, which road it found occupied by the French. The encounter between the two parties, produced a fire of musquetry, the noise of which having drawn the Republican General Laharpe to that quarter, he received a

ball, which killed him on the spot. His death was much regretted by the whole army. Although the body of Austrians, just mentioned, had forced the vedettes, and driven in the advanced posts of the French, it found them too powerful to think of attacking them, or remaining long before them. This corps then marched towards Lodi, where General Beaulieu had retired during the same night with the rest of his army.

The victories of the French, and the peace unexpectedly made by the King of Sardinia, had excited the utmost alarm throughout all Italy. The retreat of the Austrians beyond the Po, left at the mercy of the French all the countries situated on the right bank of that river.

The Duke of Parma, whose territories they had already entered, saw that he had not a moment to lose, in securing them from the revolutionary principles and rapacity of the French. He therefore solicited a suspension of arms, under the mediation of Spain, which was granted him at the price of 2,000,000 of French livres, 1700 horses, 2000 oxen, of an immense quantity of provisions, and of 20 paintings, to

be chosen by the French. Every step which they advanced into Italy augmented their military resources: each success furnished the means of acquiring new ones. Bonaparte was certain of being able henceforward to pay, equip, and subsist his army, at the expense of his enemies, as well as at that of the neutral powers. In passing the Po, he had overcome the greatest impediment to the conquest of the Milanese, the main object in his plan of the campaign.

He left the banks of the Po on the 9th of May, and found himself, on the 10th, with his advanced guard, in presence of General Beau-lieu's rear guard, which was posted in front of Lodi and the river Adda. A brisk cannonade was commenced on both sides, in consequence of which the Austrians evacuated the town of Lodi, and retired to the other side of the river. Major Malcamp (son-in-law of General Beau-lieu) who commanded this Austrian corps, caused several pieces of cannon to be placed at the end of the bridge which enfiladed it, while some other pieces, placed on the right and left, took it by a cross fire. He would not allow the bridge to be broken down, not imagining that

the French would, under such circumstances, venture to attack it. Bonaparte had not attempted to force it, because the whole of his army was not yet arrived; but as soon as the major part of it had joined him, he assembled his general officers, and communicated to them the resolution he had formed of storming the bridge. The plan was unanimously disapproved of by his Generals. Bonaparte obstinately persisting in this rash design, assembled a council of grenadiers, to whom he made an animating speech, which determined them to undertake the attack.* 4000 grenadiers and carabineers formed themselves into a solid column, and marched towards the bridge. As soon as they arrived at its extremity, they were received by a terrible discharge of grape-shot,

* Bonaparte having assembled this council of grenadiers, made them an energetic harangue, in which he did not dissemble the dangers that attended this *coup de main*. The answer of the grenadiers was, "Give us some brandy, and we will see what is to be done." It was given them in abundance, and produced a greater effect than the speech of Bonaparte. An officer of the Austrian staff related to the author this fact, which was imparted to him by a French officer, who was present at the battle of Lodi, and was made prisoner some time afterwards.

which it was impossible to withstand. They fell back with great loss, returned twice to the charge, and were again forced back by the fire of the Austrian cannons, which, enfilading the bridge, were discharged all at once close upon them, as soon as they had set foot on it. The French had already suffered enormously, and it might have been expected that they would have abandoned this desperate undertaking. But Bonaparte persevering in his resolution, ordered fresh troops to reinforce the column engaged in the attack. Six Generals, putting themselves at its head, animated them by their example, inflamed them by their words, and led them back to the charge. Taking advantage of a moment, when the thickness of the smoke, produced by the incessant fire, prevented the Austrians from perceiving and making a general discharge upon the French; the latter rushed upon the bridge, crossed it with rapidity, and falling impetuously upon the troops and cannon which defended its extremity, overthrew the one, and made themselves masters of the other. The bridge being forced, all the other columns instantly passed it, to support the former. This action, equally brilliant and unexpected, discon-

certed the Austrians, who abandoned their ground, finding themselves too weak to defend it, and began their retreat. It was protected by the Neapolitan cavalry, which gained infinite honour on this day. They charged the French infantry several times, always with courage, and sometimes with success. They shewed themselves, by the good countenance which they preserved, and the judiciousness of their movements, equal to the best veteran troops.

Bonaparte wrote to the Directory, that the Allies had lost in this action 2500 men, of which 1000 were made prisoners, and that he had taken 400 horses and 20 pieces of cannon. He had the effrontery to pretend that this battle cost him only 400 men; and certainly never did he give a more glaring proof of the falseness of his accounts. The loss suffered by his army on that occasion was universally estimated at 4000 men; and by some even greater. The very nature of the engagement rendered it more bloody than any of the preceding actions, and the French themselves considered it as the warmest contest during the campaign. It was absolutely impossible that they should be other-

wise than great sufferers on the bridge of Lodi, where they were thundered upon without intermission by artillery and musquetry; and if they were three times compelled to fall back, it was undoubtedly in consequence of the terrible fire to which they were exposed, and of the great havock which it occasioned in their ranks.

One cannot however help acknowledging the intrepidity with which the French accomplished this perilous undertaking. It was a striking proof, with how much indifference the French Generals throw away their soldiers' lives. By making other dispositions, and by the delay of a few days, Bonaparte might have crossed the Adda with as little loss as he sustained at the passage of the Po. He would not indeed have had such brilliant things to relate, but he would have preserved some thousands of his soldiers: He would have acquired less glory, but he would have shewed more patriotism. He forgot that the leading principle of the greatest Generals, was, to spare the blood of their soldiers; and that they only considered those as true victories in which they had but a small loss to lament.—The void created in

the French army by the battle of Lodi, was quickly filled up by reinforcements drawn from the army of Kellerman, whose presence in Savoy was rendered unnecessary by the peace concluded with the King of Sardinia.

As soon as M. de Beaulieu had found himself obliged to retire upon the Adda, he felt the necessity of quickly recalling those troops which he had on the Ticino, and at Milan. After having left 1800 men in the citadel, the Austrians evacuated that town on the 10th of May, and the French, to the number of 4000 men, commanded by General Massena, entered it on the 11th. On the day following, Bonaparte made a triumphal entry into the town, in the midst of the acclamations of the populace, and escorted by a numerous cavalcade of troops, and carriages filled with the principal inhabitants of Milan. He passed several days in that place, indulging himself in feasts, balls, and all sorts of pleasures. He received there greater honours than the Austrian Princes, Governors of the Milanese, had ever exacted: he lodged in the palace of the Archduke, who had left it a few days before. After having enjoyed his triumph, and shared with the Commissaries of the Exe-

cutive Directory, the incense offered up by the inhabitants of Milan, they employed themselves in attending to the interest of the Republic. They imposed a contribution of 20,000,000 livres (£800,000) on Lombardy, as the price of that liberty which they came to give it; and granted a suspension of arms to the Duke of Modena, for the sum of 10,000,000 livres (£400,000) to be paid either in specie or in military stores, without forgetting to stipulate the gift of twenty valuable paintings.

On the 20th of May, Bonaparte addressed a proclamation to his army, in which, after having extolled its late exploits, he announced those which he still expected from it. He called for its vengeance against the Neapolitans, the destroyers of Toulon; and, on the inhabitants of Rome, the assassins of Basseville.* He made it fear to find a Capua in Lombardy; and, in imitation of Hannibal, to whom Italian flattery did not cease to com-

* This Basseville, secretary to the French embassy, was massacred, three or four years since, by the populace of Rome, whom he had irritated by his conduct, and his revolutionary discourses.

pare him, he promised to his soldiers the conquest of Rome, and the spoils of Italy.

Anxious to see this last promise realized, scarcely had his troops entered Lombardy, than they gave themselves up to pillage, violence, and every species of disorder. Their rapacity, their contempt of religious ceremonies, and above all, their licentious conduct towards the women, exasperated the inhabitants to the highest pitch. They could not support such accumulated outrages, and they revenged themselves like Italians. On the 22d of May, a general insurrection broke out against the French. The towns and villages armed themselves at the sound of the tocsin. The national cockade was trampled under foot ; the trees of liberty were cut down, and all the Republicans found in small parties were massacred. It was at Milan, Lodi, Varese, and Pavia, that the greatest fury was shewn, and that the fiery and vindictive character of the Italians displayed itself in all its violence. The inhabitants of Pavia, assisted by 5000 or 6000 peasants, surrounded the French garrison, disarmed, and took it prisoner. The people of Milan were not so fortunate in a similar attempt. The French,

more numerous than at Pavia, dispersed the insurgents, after having killed a vast number of them. Bonaparte had already begun his march against the Austrians, when he heard of this unexpected insurrection. He returned immediately, and ordered troops to march against those places where the insurgents chiefly assembled. He caused the village of Binasca to be burned, put a hundred of its inhabitants to the sword, and marched himself with a powerful corps against the town of Pavia. He found the gates of it shut; and having in vain summoned the inhabitants to open them, he caused them to be beaten down with cannon. The French then spread themselves through the streets, killed every one they met, delivered the garrison which was prisoner, and pillaged the town. These rigorous punishments soon quelled the insurrection. The Commissaries and Generals of the French arrested, in all the towns, the most considerable persons, caused a great number of them to be shot, disarmed the inhabitants of Lombardy, and treated it more and more as a conquered country.

After the battle of Lodi, General Beaulieu, too weak to dispute any longer the possession

of the Milanese, and to support the insurrection of its inhabitants, thought of nothing more but of covering Mantua, and of keeping up his communication with Germany. For this purpose he took a good position on the Mincio, his right extending to the Lake of Garda and Peschiera, and his left to Mantua.

Bonaparte made different movements with his troops, to induce M. de Beaulieu to believe that he wished to go round the Lake of Garda, by Salò and Riva, in order to make himself master of the road to Tyrol. But while he was making these feints, he attacked the Austrian posts on the Mincio, on the 30th of May, and effected the passage of that river, near Borghetto. In the mean time, one column of his army directed its march towards Peschiera and Castelnuovo, with the intention of cutting off M. de Beaulieu from the road to Verona and Trente. As the latter movement might have deprived this General of every future means of retreat, he was no longer at liberty to defer it. He was compelled to give up all communication with Mantua, and to leave that place to rely on itself. Happily, he had had time to supply it with provisions, and

to render it capable of making a good defence. He garrisoned the town with 12,000 men, and marched towards the Adige with the remainder of his army. He passed that river, routed a corps of the enemy which was pursuing him, traversed the States of Venice, and retired into the narrow passes of the Tyrol. There he took post with about 14,000 men, which was all that remained of his army.

The conduct of M. de Beaulieu, after the French had passed the Po, deserves praise. Constantly attacked and pursued by a victorious army, double in numbers to his own, he sustained several battles with credit, if not with success, and effected his retreat with order and with but little loss. He rendered Mantua, in a short time, capable of making a long defence, and by those means he preserved a possibility to the Austrians of returning with advantage into Italy, of which Mantua, in a military point of view, is the capital. In spite of all the manoeuvres made on his right and left by the French, with a view to surround, and cut him off from the road to Germany, M. de Beaulieu gained the defiles of the Tyrol with his little army, and made excellent dispositions for defence.

The retreat of the Austrians into the Trentino, having left Bonaparte master of his movements in Italy, he took advantage of it to spread his troops in it, and to raise contributions. Knowing that much time would elapse before the Imperialists could assemble a new army, he wished in this interval to take advantage of his victories, and to find the means of making fresh conquests in those countries which he had already subdued. He was desirous, above all, to detach the King of Naples from the coalition, and even the Pope, whose states were, by the retreat of the Austrians, at the mercy of the French. His wishes were quickly satisfied, and even anticipated. The King of Naples proposed a suspension of arms, to which Bonaparte the more readily agreed, as the distance of that Prince's states protected them from the menaces of the French, at least by land; and because, by drawing off his troops from the Austrian army, the latter would become still weaker. The King of Naples might injure the French, but had nothing to fear from them. The conditions of the armistice, therefore, which was concluded on the 4th of June, were not grievous to that Prince. They were

reduced to a stipulation, that his troops should separate from those of the Emperor, which happened soon after.

The Pope was, with respect to the French, in a much more unfavourable position, both as to the situation of his dominions, his means of resistance, and in every other respect. Bonaparte entered the dominions of his Holiness on the 29th of June, and took possession of the towns of Bologna and Ferrara, as well as of fort Urbino. He threatened to make farther advances into the territories of the Church, and there was nothing that could prevent him from doing so. The Pope, who had not a doubt of the extreme rigour with which the French would exercise the rights of conquest upon his dominions, and knew how much they desired to annihilate both his spiritual and temporal power, hastened to avert the impending storm, by offering to consent to any conditions which might be imposed upon him. Whatever might have been the inclination of Bonaparte to invade the territories of the Church, and whatever was the facility with which he might have done so; yet he felt that it would be dangerous to engage

himself farther on, while he left behind him Mantua, the castle of Milan, and Lombardy, the inhabitants of which might rise again in his absence. He esteemed it, therefore, more prudent, as well as more convenient, to enjoy, without danger, all the sacrifices, by which the Pope offered to purchase his neutrality. This was granted him, on condition that he should pay to France, 21,000,000 of French livres, (£900,000) and that he should deliver up to the Commissioners of the Republic, 100 paintings, as well as 200 precious manuscripts; that the French troops should remain in possession of the towns of Ferrara and Bologna,* and of fort Urbino; that the citadel of Ancona should be delivered up to them, and that the Pope should recall, or set at liberty, those of his subjects, who had been proscribed or imprisoned, as guilty of sedition and revolutionary practices.†

* Bologna is, next to Rome, the richest, and most important city of the dominions of the Church. It has nearly 100,000 inhabitants.

† The reader is, without doubt, struck with the hardship of this last condition, which had likewise been imposed on the King of Sardinia. The Directory had the effrontery to deprive two Sovereigns of their most precious right, and most sacred duty, that

The French found in the towns of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, and Urbino, 200 pieces of heavy artillery, and all the military stores of which they were in want, to be able to besiege Mantua. Several artists were sent from Paris, who chose, in the above-mentioned towns, and in those of Milan, Pavia, Parma, and Placentia,

of maintaining the public tranquillity, and of punishing those who disturb it. It dared to protect criminals from the power of justice, and to constitute itself arbiter between Princes and their subjects; and this, while it punished with death every Frenchman who did not acknowledge its authority; while it accused the Coalesced Powers with wishing to interfere in the government of France, and professed to make war against them, only to prevent their realizing that project, and to punish them for having conceived it. By reducing two Sovereigns to this degree of humiliation, one knows not whether the Directory did not, in truth, surpass in despotism, those who, at the beginning of the century, wished to force Louis XIV. to dethrone his own grandson.

All the world certainly knew that the chiefs of the French Republic had never ceased, from its first establishment, to support and recompense all strangers, who partake of their principles, and endeavour to put them in practice. But it was not expected that they would make this protection one basis of their diplomatic system, and that they would force Sovereigns themselves to sanction the rebellion of their subjects.

all the most precious monuments of the arts, which were to be found, and sent them to Paris. Thus did the French plunder Italy, as the Romans had formerly plundered Greece.

The inhabitants of the Imperial Fiefs, irritated by the vexations and insolence of the French soldiers, took up arms against them, killed some, and besieged those who formed the garrison of Arquata. Bonaparte sent a body of troops against these insurgents, caused a great number of them to be shot, and several villages to be burnt. He loaded this small country with heavy impositions, and subjected it to all the rigours of military despotism.

The Directory wished to take advantage of the moment when its army was without a rival in Italy, to destroy, in every respect, the power of its enemies. Indifferent as to the choice of means, and caring little whether they were just, provided they were advantageous, it gave a glaring proof how little dependence was to be placed on the treaties which it contracted. Regardless of that which had just been concluded with the grand Duke of Tuscany, and regretting sincerely, that it could no longer treat that Prince as an enemy, the Directory ordered Bo-

naparte to take possession of the town of Leghorn. That General consequently marched his troops into the territory of the Grand Duke, and, with a view to conceal their real destination, spread a report that these troops were intended to penetrate into the southern parts of the Ecclesiastical States. But they suddenly turned to the right, and entered Leghorn on the 27th of June.* They drove the Governor, whom they did not find sufficiently obedient, out of the place, and substituted themselves instead of the forces of the Grand Duke. That Prince in vain made representations upon the violation of his territory and neutrality. The powerful argument of the strongest, and that supreme law, the interests of the French Republic, were opposed to him. It did not, however, reap all the advantages from that expedition, which its chiefs had promised themselves. The English had been warned of what was preparing against them, and their ships had time to leave the port,

* When sending an account to the Directory of this expedition, Bonaparte added, that on his going to Florence, the Grand Duke of Tuscany *had requested him, as well as the Commissary Salicetti, to do him the honour to come and dine with him, which they had thought proper to accept.*

carrying off the greatest part of the magazines and effects belonging to the Government, and to the merchants of that country. Greatly disappointed at seeing their intended prey escape, the French, to make themselves amends, imposed a heavy contribution on every thing in that town, which was suspected to be English property, and summoned the inhabitants, under the most severe penalties, to denounce whatever they knew to belong to the English. By this means they did not fail to draw pretty considerable profit from the taking of Leghorn; and they gained, besides, their chief object, which was to shut the port of that town against the fleets, both military and mercantile, of the English.

About the same time, the French experienced afresh the just consequences of the rapine and vexations which they exercised upon the conquered countries. The inhabitants of a part of Romagna, driven to despair by all which they were condemned to give and to suffer, armed themselves to the number of several thousands, fell upon, and massacred the French detachments employed in laying waste their country. Bonaparte, who did not choose to let this insurrection go unpunished, sent an additional number of

troops, who killed several hundreds of the unfortunate Peasants, and burnt the town of Lugo, as well as several villages.* These sanguinary and barbarous executions, although in part justified by the rights of war, raised a hatred and a desire of vengeance in all those parts of Italy occupied by the French, to the highest pitch. A great number of them fell victims in consequence, and the Italian stiletto, seconded by the climate, and the intemperance of the French, concurred as powerfully as the Austrian sword, to the great consumption of men in the French army in Italy.

While Bonaparte was thus exercising his empire in that country, possessing himself of its spoils, and rendering himself an object of fear and hatred, his troops were carrying on the sieges of Mantua, and of the castle of Milan. The latter place surrendered on the 29th of June, twelve days after the trenches were opened. The garrison, commanded by General Lami, were made prisoners of war. The details of this siege have not been entered into, because

* It was under the walls of Lugo, that the Romans were defeated by the Gauls, with the loss of 25,000 men : Belisarius built a fortress there.

it exhibited nothing remarkable, brought on no considerable action, and was attended with little bloodshed on either side.*

Bonaparte being in want of the artillery necessary for carrying on a siege, and of the requisite stores, had been compelled to content himself, after the retreat of M. de Beaulieu into the Tyrol, with investing the town of Mantua; and he even had not been able to form the blockade but at a great distance, on account of the peculiar situation of the place.

Mantua has so much occupied the attention of Europe, has been the aim of so many efforts, has caused such an effusion of blood, and has so long held in suspense the fate of Italy, that those who are not well acquainted with the topographical and military situation of that town, may not be displeased to find here a description of it.

This town, which boasts of having been founded by the Etrurians before the Trojan war, is situated upon a lake formed by the Mincio, twenty Italian miles in circumference, and two

* The Castle of Milan was besieged, in 1707, by Prince Eugene, and made an excellent defence. The Marquis de la Floride commanded there.

miles broad. It is large, well built, and contains a great number of churches, of which some are very richly decorated. At the time when it still belonged to the Dukes of Mantua,* who resided there, it reckoned upwards of 50,000 inhabitants; it does not now possess half that number. It has always been fortified, and its situation has made it considered in all Italian wars as the most important fortress in that country. It has sustained several sieges, and whenever it has surrendered, it has been more in consequence of a blockade, and want of provisions, than of open force, or the regular operations of art. Its chief means of defence consist less in its fortifications, than the difficulties opposed to the approach and attacks of an enemy. The town being entirely surrounded by water and marshes, is only to be arrived at by three bridges or principal causeways, which are covered by

* The last Duke of Mantua was put under the ban of the Empire in 1703, as a punishment for having taken part with the French. The Imperial troops, commanded by Prince Eugene, made themselves masters of the whole Duchy of Mantua in 1707. Since that period, the House of Austria has remained in possession of it. It is annexed to the Milanese.

fortifications, raised at each of their extremities, which must be carried by an enemy, before he can approach the town. There is, besides, a fourth communication, defended by the entrenched suburb *Il Thé*. If once the besiegers make themselves masters of the exterior works, they may easily form and maintain the blockade of Mantua, but they are scarcely more advanced towards the formation of a regular siege, as they can only open the trenches upon the narrow front of the causeways, which lead into the town. The waters of the lake stagnating in summer, the place then becomes very unwholesome, and those of the inhabitants who are in easy circumstances, generally leave it at that time. This unwholesomeness is not the least of its means of defence: for it is impossible to besiege it, without risking the total destruction of an army by sickness. In almost every siege, this place has sustained, pestilential fevers have made great ravages, both amongst the assailants and defenders of it.

These considerations did not deter General Bonaparte, who had been taught, by past successes, to be confident of future ones. After having

carried some out-posts of the town, he opened the trenches before it on the 18th of July. But the difficulties attending the siege, the fevers which broke out in his army, and the successful sorties of the garrison, rendered the progress of the French extremely slow, and enabled Count Canto d'Irles, who commanded in the town, to defend it until relieved.

CHAPTER III.

A new army assembled by the Austrians in Italy, under the command of Field Marshal Wurmser—Operations and first successes of that General—The Siege of Mantua raised by Bonaparte—Complete defeat of the corps of General Quosdanovich—Defeat of M. de Wurmser at Castiglione—Second defeat—Repassing of the Mincio and the Adige, and re-entrance of the defiles of Tyrol—New insurrection against the French—Plan formed by the French to unite all their armies in Germany—Battle of Roveredo—Action at Bassano—Arrival of Marshal Wurmser at Mantua—Peace made by the King of Naples with the French Republic—Refusal by the Pope of the conditions of Peace prescribed by them—Revolt of the inhabitants of the Duchies of Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara—Origin of the Cispadan Republic.

THE defection of the King of Sardinia, and the loss of the Milanese, which resulted from it,

made known to the court of Vienna, when too late, the insufficiency of the troops which it had sent into Italy. As it could not possibly acquiesce in leaving so valuable a part of its dominions, as Lombardy, in the hands of the French, it resolved to make the greatest efforts for the recovery of that country. All the troops stationed in Carinthia and Styria were sent, by forced marches, into the Tyrol. The inhabitants of the latter country having shewn a disposition to arm themselves for the defence of it, some thousands of them were equipped and formed into corps of chasseurs, a sort of service to which the Tyrolians are extremely well adapted. As all these different reinforcements would not, however, have made M. de Beaulieu's army sufficiently strong, to enable him to renew offensive operations, the cabinet of Vienna, attending to the most pressing concern, sacrificed its plan of a campaign beyond the Rhine, to its personal and immediate interest in Italy. Field Marshal Wurmser, who commanded the Imperial army of the Upper Rhine, received an order to set off with more than 30,000 effective men for Italy, and there to replace General Beaulieu. The months of June and

July passed away before these different corps of troops could form a junction, or be sufficiently recovered from the fatigues of so long a march, and put in a state to act. Ten thousand men, out of the 30,000, who had come from the army of the Rhine, were left in the Bishopric of Inspruck, to observe a French corps, which menaced it; and on the 29th of July, Marshal Wurmser began his march against the French, at the head of an army of 47,000 men. He divided it into three principal bodies. That of the right, consisting of 17 battalions and 14 squadrons, directed its march along the Lake of Garda, to Salò and Brescia: that of the left, commanded by General Mezaros, consisting of 5 battalions and 7 squadrons, marched by Legnago, towards the Po; while Marshal Wurmser, with 29 battalions, and 14 squadrons, commanded by Generals Melas and Davidovich, advanced to the Mincio with the centre, to attack, in front, the enemy's army between Mantua and Peschiera.

This disposition met at first with the greatest success. The column on the right, under the orders of General Quosdanovich, being divided into several small columns, surprised

and forced the important posts of Salò and Brescia, where it made prisoners 2000 men, three Generals, as well as a great number of officers. The next morning, this corps advanced on the roads from Brescia to Mantua and Verona, to take the French on their rear, and to favour the attack made by the centre column.

This latter had not been less successful in what it had undertaken. On the 29th and 30th, it forced all the enemy's posts along the Adige, took 1500 men, as well as 10 pieces of cannon, and drove back the French as far as the Mincio.

Bonaparte being victoriously attacked at all points, and threatened with being surrounded by the Austrian columns, in the night of the 31st, precipitately raised the siege of Mantua, which was so far advanced that the approaches were within 100 paces of the covered way. The garrison, attentive to all the movements of the besiegers, made a vigorous sortie while they were retiring; fell upon their rear guard, took 600 men, and made themselves masters of all their artillery, and all the ammunition of the siege, consisting of 134 cannons and mortars, and 140,000 shells or balls. It employed itself im-

mediately in destroying the works, which had been raised, either for the purposes of the siege, or for those of the blockade. Placed between the two columns of Generals Wurmser and Quosdanovich, Bonaparte saw the whole danger of his situation, and was sensible that if he gave these two Generals time to form a junction, and to combine their attacks, it would be almost impossible for him to make head against both of them at once. He then took the only course which could save his army, and preserve the Milanese. He judged that by concentrating his forces, and advancing rapidly against the corps of M. de Quosdanovich, he might defeat him before he could be succoured by M. de Wurmser.

In consequence of this plan, Bonaparte marched, on the 30th, at night, with the greatest part of his forces, against M. de Quosdanovich, whose corps was divided, and stationed at several different points, by which he was endeavouring to rejoin M. de Wurmser. Bonaparte caused all these detachments to be attacked successively at Lonado, Montechiaro, Dezenzano, Brescia, and Salo, on the 31st of July, the 1st, 2d, and 3d of August. Some of these actions were to the advantage of the Austrians, but the greater

number to that of the French. The most obstinate and most bloody of all was that which took place on the 3d, before Dezenzano. 4000 Austrians being attacked by 10,000 French, defeated them, and made prisoner a General, and some hundreds of men. But the French corps having rallied, and having been reinforced by fresh troops, re-attacked the Austrians. The latter made a long and courageous resistance; but being at last overpowered by numbers, by heat, and the fatigue occasioned by a continued march of four days and four nights, were almost all killed or made prisoners. The Austrian regiment of Klebeck lost on this occasion more than 1000 men, who were deprived of all bodily strength, either to defend themselves, or even to fly. After a series of actions for four days, the different corps of M. de Quosdanovich's columns were entirely defeated, dispersed, and obliged to make their escape as they could, into the mountains of the Tyrol. Near one half was killed, or fell into the hands of the French, who purchased, however, these advantages by the loss of a great number of men, and of several Generals. Delivered from one part of his enemies, and

having no longer any thing to fear for his rear, immediately after the first successes obtained against M. de Quosdanovich, Bonaparte, leaving only a small body of troops completely to drive this General back into the Tyrol, hastened his return, with about 28,000 men, to go against Marshal Wurmser. The latter, after having passed the Mincio, was advancing, with 18,000 men, to endeavour to effect a junction with M. de Quosdanovich. On the 8d of August, Bonaparte met, near Castiglione, the advanced guard of M. de Wurmser, which had gained a slight advantage on that day, and had taken 200 or 300 men, and some pieces of cannon. He instantly attacked, with his whole force, this advanced guard, composed of 3000 men, commanded by General Lyptay. This brave General opposed the firmest resistance, disputing the ground inch by inch, to give time to M. de Wurmser to come to his assistance. The latter, however, not arriving, and the French assailing General Lyptay on all sides, he found it impossible to hold out any longer, and came forward with his officers to surrender themselves to the French. But at this moment, the latter perceiving at a distance the Austrian cavalry coming up on a gallop, re-

treated precipitately, to take a fresh position against the new troops who were coming to attack them, and fell back before General Lyptay, who was advancing towards them to lay down his arms. The main body of M. de Wurmser's army arrived in the interval; but before it could form in order of battle, Bonaparte attacked it with impetuosity. The Austrians did not give way; but, fatigued by a long march, made during extreme heat, not being formed, and engaging in an unconnected manner, and without any determinate object, against an enemy which had the advantage of ground, and whose dispositions were before made, all that they could do was to maintain themselves in the disadvantageous position which they occupied. They had been even on the point of being driven from it, but having fortunately planted 12 pieces of cannon on an eminence which supported their left, their fire stopped the French, and prevented them from penetrating into the plain which separated the right and the left of the Austrians. Bonaparte wrote word that they lost on this day 20 pieces of cannon and 7000 men, of whom 4000 were made prisoners. It may be affirmed, that

their whole loss did not exceed 2600, and that of the French was at least as great.

The two armies passed the night within musket shot of each other. They were so overcome with fatigue, that they made no movement whatever. That which could have had the greatest physical strength to attack the other, would have been sure of destroying it. They passed the 4th without coming to blows. The French employed it in putting themselves in order, and posting themselves advantageously. The Austrians, on the other hand, made no new disposition, and remained in the bad situation in which they had engaged the day before. They contented themselves with forming the plan of a general attack for the 7th. But Bonaparte did not wait for it, and hastened to take advantage of the superiority of his force, and the faults of his enemies. On the 5th, in the morning, he attacked with vigour the whole line of the Austrians, whose left he had turned, and whose rear was threatened by General Serrurier who was coming from the Po with one division. The Austrians fought with their usual valour, but every advantage was so entirely on the side of the French, that victory could not escape

them. If they had succeeded in piercing into the plain, all had been over with the Austrian army. All the officers who were about M. de Wurmser pressed him for a long time, in vain, to give orders for a retreat, which was become indispensable. This brave, but too old commander, could not bring himself to decide on it. The English Colonel Graham had at length the good fortune to determine him to it, and thus to save the Austrian army from total destruction. But the French had already gained so many advantages, and the ground was so favourable for them, that the retreat could not be made without great disorder and loss. It cost them near 3000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 30 pieces of cannon, and a great number of ammunition waggons. The Austrians repassed the Mincio on the same day at Valeggio, and encamped near that town. On the next and the following days they continued their retreat, during which they had to sustain many actions, which cost them some hundreds of men more, as well as some pieces of cannon. They did not stop till they reached the entrance into the Tyrol, to which M. de Wurmser brought back not much more than half of his army.

However, notwithstanding the disasters which this General experienced, he attained his principal object, which was to relieve Mantua. During the five or six days that he was in full communication with this city, he had thrown into it considerable supplies of provisions and ammunition, recruited the garrison, and again enabled this place to resist a long blockade.

Thus terminated this expedition, the preparations for, and first events of which, seemed to promise to the Austrians the recovery of the Milanese. The first dispositions made by Marshal Wurmser were excellent and perfectly executed. The reverses which followed may be ascribed principally to two causes: 1st. To the useless diversion which M. de Wurmser caused General Mezaros to make, whose corps never fired a shot. 2d. To his imprudence in advancing with too small a force beyond the Mincio, though he had every reason to believe that M. de Quosdanovich had been defeated. If the Marshal, satisfied with having in great part accomplished his object, by the deliverance of Mantua, had, resting his left against this place, continued behind the Mincio, he might have defended the passage of this river,

have received all the reinforcements which he expected, collected the remains of Quosdanovich's corps, and in a short time have formed a powerful army, and superior in number to that of the French. Then he might have passed the Mincio in force, and have advanced beyond that river with advantage, and a probability of success.

Bonaparte, with no less expedition than judgment, took advantage of the faults and of the separation of the Generals Wurmser and Quosdanovich, gained two marches on the former, and fell unexpectedly on the corps of the latter, which being too much extended, was easily defeated and dissipated. The French General executed on this occasion the same manœuvre, to which he had before owed, and has owed since so much success. He was also particularly assisted by the preservation of the fort of Peschiera, which defends the point of the Lake of Garda, at the spot from whence the Mincio issues, a fort which the Austrians could not get possession of, and which a good deal embarrassed their movements. The accounts from Bonaparte made the loss of the Austrians amount, in this short,

but memorable expedition, to 70 pieces of cannon, a still greater number of ammunition waggons, 6000 men killed or wounded, and 15,000 made prisoners. This statement was exaggerated, but not so much as many others that have been transmitted by this General. From a particular account, furnished by each regiment to General Wurmser, and sent by him to the Aulic council of war, but which has been known to few, it appears that the Austrians lost, in these eight days of victories and disasters, 17,000 men, of whom 391 were officers. The loss of the French, however, was not a great deal less; it certainly amounted to 10,000 men, of whom 4000 were made prisoners. Their army suffered also cruelly from the heat and the forced marches which it made, and was in little less disorder than that of their enemies.

Bonaparte was in the course of this expedition twice in danger of being taken. The officer who commanded the Austrian flotilla on the Lake of Garda, having, on the 31st of July, defeated that of the French, disembarked his troops in the Peninsula of Cermione, and placed them in ambuscade on the road from

Brescia to Peschiera. His soldiers had orders not to fire, and to stop none but such as might seem to be of consequence. In the evening the Generals Bonaparte and Berthier, with their staff, returning from Brescia, passed along that road, preceded by three Hussars. The Croats who were in ambuscade, hearing some cavalry arrive at a quick rate, sprung on the high road and fired on the three Hussars. Two of them they killed, but the third having been missed, he turned his horse and galloped off, crying out, *General, save yourself*: the whole party turned about, fled with precipitation, and had the good fortune to escape all the shots that were fired at them. They returned to Brescia and took another road, which obliged them to make a tour of several leagues.—On another occasion, Bonaparte was within two minutes of being taken by the Austrian Hussars, at Goito.—It does not appear necessary to enter into any detail to prove the falsity of the marvellous account sent at this time by the French General to the Directory. He wrote word, that being at Lonado with 1200 men, at the moment when 4000 Austrians were surrounding this town, he sent

them an order to lay down their arms, which they instantly obeyed. The improbability of this event makes it unnecessary to enter into any discussion about it. It was never heard of in the Austrian army.

The remainder of the month of August passed away without any event of importance. It was spent by the respective armies in recovering from their fatigues and their losses. Marshal Wurmser was entirely occupied in recruiting the great diminution sustained by his army, which by the end of August amounted to nearly 50,000 men. Bonaparte also received new reinforcements from the army of Kellerman. He re-constructed the works necessary for the blockade of Mantua, and employed himself in providing the means to secure the accomplishment of new designs.

Emboldened by the continual triumphs of their armies, and determined by the necessity of maintaining them at the expense of Europe, the Chiefs of the French Republic conceived at once the project and the hope to unite on the banks of the Danube, the three armies of Moreau, Jourdan, and Bonaparte, to invade the dominions of the House

of Austria, to annihilate its supremacy over Germany, and to dispose of the destiny and riches of that vast country, To realize this project, as rash as it was gigantic, it was necessary that Bonaparte should destroy the remainder of Wurmser's army, should force the passes of the Tyrol, and march into Bavaria to form a junction with Moreau. More confident, more able, and above all, more fortunate than any of the Republican Generals, he hastened to concur in the execution of this plan.*

On the 4th of September, he attacked the whole line of the Austrians, and was fortunate enough to force it, after a resistance which was pretty vigorous at some points, but weak at others. He wrote word that he had taken on this occasion, 25 pieces of cannon, 50 ammunition waggons, 7 pair of colours, and

* The French formed the same plan in 1703, and the Duke de Vendome, who commanded their army in Italy, received orders to penetrate through the Trentino into Germany, in order to form a junction with the Elector of Bavaria. But although M. de Vendome was very superior in number to the Imperialists, he was unable to force the defiles of the Tyrol, and advanced no farther than the city of Trent.

6500 men. He made himself master of the city of Trent, and of a great part of the Duchy of that name.

At the same time that Bonaparte was intent on penetrating into Germany, Marshal Wurmser, being made acquainted with his design, had formed that of disconcerting it by a diversion, and a new attempt for the delivery of Mantua. He had calculated that by advancing with a part of his army along the Brenta, and turning the right flank of the French, the latter would not dare to advance into the Tyrol, for fear of seeing themselves separated from the troops, who were besieging Mantua. M. de Wurmser had flattered himself that by this manœuvre, he should perhaps accomplish the raising the blockade of that place, and that, at least, he should retain Bonaparte in Italy. This expedition depending for success on the promptitude and precision with which it should be executed, and being likely to be attended with great fatigues and dangers, the Austrian General took with him the choicest men of his infantry and cavalry.

It happened that these two Generals com-

menced their operations on the same day, and the departure of M. de Wurmser facilitated greatly, the gaining the battle of Roveredo by Bonaparte. The latter learnt, with astonishment, the march of the Field Marshal; and it, in fact, prevented him from pushing farther into the Tyrol, but, in place of falling back along the Adige, towards Verona, as the Austrian General had no doubt flattered himself that he would do, he marched by his right towards the valley of the Brenta, and set himself in pursuit of the Field Marshal, upon the road from Trent to Bessano. In this manner, he separated him entirely from the rest of his troops, which remained in the Tyrol, and no longer left him any other alternative than that of retreating upon the Upper Piave, and into the mountains, or of attempting to make his way across the Vicentino and the Veronese to Mantua. As the revictualment and relief of that place was the principal object which Marshal Wurmser had, or could have in view, however great the difficulties which presented themselves, in the execution of this second alternative, he adopted it; probably flattering himself that his junction

with the garrison of the fortress would form a body strong enough to enable him to keep the field before that place; and that before it was reduced to surrender, a new army, adequate to its deliverance, would be formed in the Tyrol.

Bonaparte came up with his rear guard, at Primolano, on the 7th of September, and defeated it. He wrote that he had taken 10 pieces of cannon, and 4000 men, which was far from being true. He continued his pursuit the next day, and arrived at Bassano at the moment that Marshal Wurmser quitted it. The latter continued his march with the greatest rapidity, gained the advance upon Bonaparte, traversed the country of Vicenza, passed the Adige, defeated, on the 11th, at Cerna, the enemy's division, which guarded that river, took 800 men, and arrived, at last, with about 10,000 men, under the walls of Mantua. The French attacked him on the 13th; but he again defeated them, killed a great number of men, and took 1500 prisoners, with 10 pieces of cannon.

The junction of M. de Wurmser, with the garrison of Mantua, augmented its means of

resistance, in case of a siege, but diminished, in the same proportion, those which it could oppose to a blockade, since the number of mouths to feed was considerably increased. Accordingly, M. de Wurmser thought less of attacking the enemy, than of procuring the greatest possible quantity of provisions and forage. With this view, he made, during the month of October, several excursions in the environs of Mantua. This occasioned several engagements, with various success, of which the only effect was to straiten the Austrians, more or less, in their position, without the works of the place; they were of no importance in any other light.

The unexpected operation, executed by M. de Wurmser, and the disasters which the French, at the same time, experienced in Germany, obliged Bonaparte to renounce the design of penetrating thither. He then led back the greater part of his army round Mantua, after leaving two corps, one in the Trentino, and the other in Friuli, to observe, and keep in check, the Austrians in these two countries.

The month of October furnished no great military events, but it presented political oc-

currences of great consequence to the States of Italy, and to the farther progress of the war in that country. Of two armistices, concluded in the month of June preceding, between the French Republic on one side, and the Pope and the King of Naples on the other, the former was broken, and the second was changed into a treaty of peace. However, it made no alteration in the relative situation of the Republic and the King of Naples, and was, properly speaking, only a continuation of the armistice. The King of Naples had been induced to conclude it by the solicitation of the court of Spain, and by the fear that if the English left the Mediterranean, the city of Naples would be exposed to the insults of the French fleet. The treaty of peace secured him from this ; and this was the only advantage which the King of the Two Sicilies reaped from that treaty. To the French it was more profitable. They detached from the coalition the most powerful Prince in Italy, next to the Emperor, and had no longer reason to apprehend that the King of Naples, who had, for three months, been organizing a numerous army, would send a large body of troops

across the Pope's dominions, to make a powerful diversion in favour of the Austrians, in the Duchies of Ferrara and Modena.*

The Pope had taken advantage of the armistice, which he had concluded with the French, to commence negotiations for peace. To effect this, he made many advances to the French Government; but the latter was little disposed to make peace with a Prince, from whom it had nothing to fear, and of whom it had resolved to make a prey. Unwilling, however, to incur the odium of peremptorily refusing the propositions for peace, made by the Pope, the Directory chose rather to elude them, and caused proposals for peace to be presented to him, at once so burdensome and so humiliating, that, notwithstanding the invasion of his dominions, the dangers he incurred, and the weakness of his means of defence, he could not resolve to accept them. One is at a loss which most to wonder at, the despotism, the

* The King of Naples had made very considerable military preparations, and had raised his army to near 80,000 men. It consists in time of peace of only 40,000, of which a great part are Swiss.

ignorance, or the folly, which dictated the thirty three articles proposed by the French to a Prince, who had never declared war against them; articles on which he was left no option but that of absolute assent or refusal. Never did any conqueror reduce his enemies to such extremities. It appears, however, that his Holiness was only determined to a refusal, by those articles which concerned his ecclesiastical jurisdiction; the acceptance of which would have destroyed the doctrine of his infallibility, and the basis of his Spiritual Empire.

The French about the same time began to realize their project, which had been long known, of forming republics in Italy.

They had delayed the execution of this plan, merely to gain sufficient time to reap the fruits of their victories. They had begun by levying exorbitant contributions in the conquered countries, and by completing the supply of necessities requisite for the maintenance of their army. When they had exhausted all the countries occupied by their troops, and had drawn from them, partly by contributions, and partly by the sale of armistices, every thing which they were capable of furnishing, they

proceeded to mature those seeds of insurrection and democracy which they had sown in Italy. They excited the people to abjure the laws of their country, and to adopt the revolutionary forms of government. They took care at first not to call to independence the inhabitants of Lombardy, over whom they still wished to preserve the most absolute authority. They began by causing a revolt amongst the subjects of the Duke of Modena, whom they did not find sufficiently dependent on themselves, notwithstanding the rigour of the armistice which they had granted him. The inhabitants of the town of Reggio were the first to set an example of insurrection; this was quickly imitated by several towns throughout the Duchy of Modena. The troops of the Duke were driven out, his agents were deprived of their offices, and his government was replaced by a democratic administration. Its Chiefs hastened to solicit the support of the protectors of the liberties of the people, which was immediately granted them; and, notwithstanding the neutrality agreed upon with the Duke, that Prince was declared, in a short

time after, to have lost the confidence of the French Republic.

The example set by the inhabitants of the Duchy of Modena, and the certainty of being protected by the French, encouraged the towns of Bologna and Ferrara to overturn their governments, and to put themselves in a state of revolution. No time was lost by the French in rendering the revolt general, and in drawing from it all the advantages which they had promised themselves. They convinced the insurgents of the necessity of taking up arms, if they wished to preserve their liberty, and pointed out to them how much it was their interest to defend those who had ensured it to them. Thus they armed several thousands of the inhabitants of the revolted countries, trained them to the military profession, and joined them to their troops. The aim of the French was, partly to compensate, by this reinforcement, for the excessive diminution which their army had sustained in battle and through sickness; and to acquire an augmentation of forces to resist the new attack prepared by the Austrians. The French calculated that the fear of again falling into the power of their

sovereign, would urge these auxiliaries to make the greatest efforts ; who, though not yet inured to war, had the great advantage of being proof against the climate. The example of the French National Guards, who were become good troops in a short time, led them to suppose, that the habits of a camp, and a few engagements, would have the same effect upon those of Italy, and would render them capable of defending in future their own independence.

CHAPTER IV.

The Austrians assemble a fourth army in Friuli and Tyrol, under the orders of Lieutenant-Generals Alvinzy and Davidovich—Position and strength of the French army—March of M. d'Alvinzy—Engagement at Fonteniva—Success of M. Davidovich on the Upper Adige—Battle of Arcole, and retreat of M. d'Alvinzy—New successes of M. Davidovich—He is compelled to retire to Alla—Causes of the misfortunes of the Austrians—Faults committed by Generals Davidovich and Alvinzy—Able conduct of Bonaparte.

WHILE the French were thus spreading confusion throughout the northern parts of Italy, and were raising up new enemies against the Austrians, the latter were collecting the means of making a third attempt to rescue Mantua, and to re-conquer the Milanese. All the regiments which had suffered in the months of

August and September, were reinforced; and 25,000 fresh troops were sent into the Friuli and the Tyrol. These different corps found themselves capable of acting by the end of October, and began to be in motion on the 31st of the same month, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Alvinzy. This General set out from Friuli with 30,000 men, traversed the Trevisano, and directed his course towards the town of Bassano, situated upon the river Brenta; at the same time that another corps of about 20,000 men, commanded by Lieutenant-General Davidovich, left the environs of Bozen, marched along the Adige, and bore upon the town of Trent. The French army was then distributed in the following manner: 15,000 men occupied the banks of the Brenta; 10,000 defended the approach to the town of Trent; 25,000 formed or covered the blockade of Mantua, where Marshal Wurmser was shut up with more than 20,000 men; and 10,000 others, either French or Italians, were distributed as garrisons in the towns of Milan, Bologna, Ferrara, and Leghorn.

In recapitulating the numbers of the respective forces, it appears that the Austrians had

nearly 70,000 men, and that the French had 60,000, of which only 50,000 could be brought into action.*

On the 3d of November, General Alvinzy arrived on the banks of the Brenta, forced the passage of that river, and posted himself, with 12,000 men, at Bassano. He placed a like number at Fonteniva, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Provera, and the rest of his army was employed either in covering his left, or in forming his communication with M. Davidovich.

In the night of the 5th, Bonaparte left Vicenza, where he had reunited the divisions of his army which occupied Ferrara, Legnago, Verona, and Montebello, and attacked the corps of General Provera on the morning of the 6th. Both sides

* The accuracy of this statement may be relied upon, both with respect to the numbers of the French and Austrians, and with respect to their position. It was sent to the author, such as he has given it, by an Austrian general officer who commanded a corps in that expedition. If on this occasion particular stress is laid by the author on his authority, it is because the Austrians were then, for the first time, superior in numbers to the French, and because some readers might perhaps be induced to doubt this from the issue of the expedition.

fought with the greatest animosity, which rendered the combat for a long time doubtful, and at the same time excessively bloody. 4000 Austrians, and an equal number of French, were either killed or wounded : one of the French Generals, called Lanus, was wounded and made prisoner. The Republicans succeeded at length in driving back the Austrians beyond the Brenta, and in breaking down the bridge at Fonteniva.

Generals Alvinzy and Provera had drawn nearer to one another, and were preparing to renew the engagement on the 7th, when they perceived that the French had abandoned the field of battle. Bonaparte had been induced to it, on hearing of the reverses which his troops had sustained in the Trentino. They had been defeated on the 2d and 3d by General Davidovich, who had taken 1000 prisoners, and had made himself master of the town of Trent. That General attacked the French again on the 6th and 7th, routed them after a very smart action, killed and wounded 2000, took 1000 more prisoners, and pursued the rest as far as Rivoli and la Corona.*

* These two posts are very strong, and have been

General Alvinzy, wishing to take advantage of the retreat of the French, and of their defeat in the Trentino, set out, on the 7th, from the banks of the Brenta, continued his march the 8th, and took possession of the town of Vicenza, which the French had abandoned. On the 9th and 10th, he still gained ground, and dislodged the enemy from Montebello, who retired between that town and Verona. On the 11th, an action of no consequence took place with the advanced guards. On the 12th, the two armies found themselves in presence of each other, and came to action. The French met with some success at first, but they did not maintain it, and the action terminated in favour of the Austrians, who compelled their enemies to fall back into the town of Verona. The Republican General Launay was killed in this affair, and two others were wounded. On the 13th, General Alvinzy made some movements, in order to draw nearer to Mr. Davidovich, and to enable himself to combine his operations with those of that

considered as highly important in all the wars of Italy. They have always been occupied by the armies which had to defend the entry of the Veronese and the Duchy of Mantua.

General. In the night of the 13th, Bonaparte filed a large column of troops along the Adige, constructed a bridge of boats over that river, at Ronco, and marched towards Villanova. His project was to surprize the rear of the Austrian army, and to carry off the baggage and their train of artillery; but he could not succeed in this attempt, having been stopped during his march by a corps of the enemy, entrenched in the village of Arcole, which is surrounded with morasses and canals. This advantageous position was well defended by the Austrian troops who occupied it, and maintained by them the whole day, against the attacks of almost the whole French army. In vain did their Generals put themselves at the head of their columns, animate them by their words, and draw them on by their example—In vain did General Bonaparte harangue his soldiers, remind them of their victory at Lodi, call for the same exertions, and promise them the same success—In vain did he lead them several times, himself, to the attack of the bridge of Arcole—Overpowered by a dreadful fire of grape and musquet shot, they were compelled to give up all hopes of carrying the bridge and village of Arcole

by storm. They were great sufferers in these imprudent attacks, in which five of their Generals were killed or wounded.—While Bonaparte obstinately persisted in re-acting the affair of the bridge of Lodi, and sacrificing, without advantage to himself, the blood of his Generals and soldiers; a division of his army, which he had detached, had crossed the Adige much lower down. After having made an extensive circuit, in order to turn the village of Arcole, it attacked that place on a weak point, and made itself master of the village in the night, where it took 5 pieces of cannon and 400 men. General Massena, at the same time, obtained a slight advantage over a small body of Austrians.

General Alvinzy having advanced with all his forces upon the points menaced, promoted the views of Bonaparte, who wished to draw him towards the Lower Adige, in order to prevent his junction with General Davidovich. The approach of the Austrians obliged the French to evacuate the village of Arcole, in the night of the 14th. In the morning of the 15th, an action was commenced, which lasted the whole day, without having any decisive or even important result. It was, however, of some advantage

to the French. On the following day, the 16th, the Austrians attacked the whole line of the French army. They, at first, compelled the centre and right wing of the enemy to give ground, but the French having rallied, and the Austrians being unexpectedly taken in flank, by a corps of troops concealed in a wood, and in the rear by another column which had turned their left, they were put to the rout, driven from the village of Arcole, and compelled to retire, in disorder, to Bonifacio.

In the account, given by Bonaparte to the Directory, of these three engagements, he stated, that he had made between 4000 and 5000 prisoners, killed and wounded 8000 men, and had taken 18 pieces of cannon. He concluded his letter with assurances that he should be master of Mantua within fifteen days. No doubt this estimate of the loss of the Austrians was exaggerated;* their Generals, how-

* It was impossible to entertain a doubt of this in reading the dispatches of General Berthier, chief of the staff, which bore the same date as those of Bonaparte. The first estimated the loss of the Austrians at 5000 men made prisoners, and 3000 killed and wounded; while the second made the latter amount to 8000. The accounts of these two Generals had already been

ever, acknowledged it to have been very considerable on these three days, and above all, on the last. But, at the same time, they asserted, that that of the French was not inferior, which it is easy to believe, when we read, even in the very letter of General Bonaparte, that it was, in reality, *un combat à mort*: that 15 of his Generals were killed or wounded, and that there were none who had not their clothes pierced with bullets. All accounts agree in representing these three actions as the most bloody in the whole campaign.

The day after the battle of Arcole, the Austrians retired towards Vicenza. They were feebly pursued by the French, who did not follow their victory, either because it had too

contradictory, with regard to the defeat of M. de Wurmser, in the month of August. Bonaparte wrote that he had taken from 12,000 to 15,000 men, and 70 pieces of cannon. Berthier, in a letter equally official, written a few days afterwards, fixed the number of prisoners at 9000, and that of the cannon taken at 45. The last-mentioned General, being chief of the staff, must necessarily have been as well informed on these points, as Bonaparte himself, and cannot be suspected of wishing to lessen the enemy's loss. Other examples of the difference in the reports of these two Generals could be given. These contradictions shew the just measure of Bonaparte's veracity.

much weakened them, or on account of the reverses which they had sustained on their left. With a view partly to deprive them of the fruits of the victory of Arcole, General Davidovich attacked, on the 17th, the French troops left on the Upper Adige, under the orders of General Vaubois. He defeated them completely, drove them from the entrenched heights of Rivoli, and siezed the important post of La Chiusa. He pursued the Republicans as far as the heights of Campara, and took from them 11 pieces of cannon and 2000 men, amongst whom were the Generals La Valette, and Fiorella. M. Davidovich, on the day following, (the 18th) again attacked the French, with equal success, and although they had been reinforced during the night, repulsed them as far as Peschiera, and advanced to Castelnovo.

These two advantages, obtained one after the other, by M. Davidovich, were so much the more important as they placed that General on the rear of Bonaparte's army, as well as on that of the troops who blockaded Mantua. M. Davidovich was now within a few leagues of that place, and to enable him to arrive there, he had neither any river to pass, nor any considerable defile to force.

The Austrians had not yet been so near raising the blockade of Mantua, and they had reason to hope that they should accomplish it.

Alarmed at the successes of General Davidovich, and foreseeing the whole extent of those consequences which might arise from them, Bonaparte had no hesitation in renouncing the advantages which might have been derived from the victory of Arcole. He marched immediately on his left with two divisions of his army, joined them to that of General Vaubois, and attacked, on the 21st, General Davidovich, on the heights of Campara. The latter, finding himself very inferior in number, did not attempt to make any great resistance, and retreated towards Rivoli, and from thence towards Dolce, Peri, and Alla. A corps of 4000 men, commanded by General Augereau, had marched from Verona, with the intention of advancing directly against Borghetto and Alla, with a view of cutting off the retreat of Davidovich's corps; but it was stopped, the whole of the 21st, and the night following, by a small corps of 800 men, commanded by Colonel Lpsignan, who kept it in check till M. Davidovich had arrived at Alla with the whole artillery and baggage. Bonaparte, nevertheless, wrote

word that he had taken in this affair 1500 men, with two trains of pontoons, besides baggage. From the most authentic information, it may be asserted, that he did not take near so great a number of men, and affirmed, with equal confidence, what Bonaparte took care not to publish, which is, that between the 4th and 21st of November, the corps of M. Davidovich alone took 22 pieces of cannon, and more than 4000 men, and that he did not lose, in the same space of time, more than 1800 men, and 3 pieces of cannon.

In looking for the causes which produced the failure of this expedition, we perceive that we must again attribute the disasters of the Austrians to the division of their forces, and to the too great extent of their front of attack. It is probable, that if, after the battle of Bassano, M. d'Alvinzy had drawn nearer to M. Davidovich, these two Generals, united, and superior in numbers to the French, would have been enabled to repulse them beyond the Adige, and afterwards beyond the Mincio. This fault is, after all, not the only cause of the issue of this enterprize. The best informed officers of the Austrian army in

Italy attribute it principally to two things: first, to the inaction in which General Davidovich remained from the 9th to the 17th of November; an inaction which cannot be justified, and which permitted Bonaparte to direct almost his whole force against M. d'Alvinzy. Secondly, to the refusal of the latter General to form a junction, by a forced march in the night, with M. Davidovich, who was already on the other side of the Adige, near Rivoli; a junction, which would, without doubt, have overthrown the few obstacles which existed from thence to Mantua. The conduct of Generals Davidovich and Alvinzy, on this occasion, which seems to have arisen rather from want of inclination, than of capacity, was so much the more unskilful, if it was not culpable, as the first successes had removed the principal difficulties; and as, being superior in force, they no longer wanted any thing but some degree of mutual understanding, and some activity to deliver Mantua, an object for which the Emperor had entrusted them with near 50,000 men, and employed all his military resources.

Bonaparte, during the fifteen days which this expedition lasted, acted as he had invariably done from the commencement of the campaign. He

exerted himself, constantly, to prevent the two corps of his enemy from forming a junction; advanced, like lightning, sometimes against the one, sometimes against the other, always attacking their weakest point, and pushing his successes as far, and with as much vivacity as possible. In this manner, although he had, upon the whole, fewer men than the Austrian generals, he found himself, when opposed to either of them separately, equal, and sometimes even superior in number. The frequency of his attacks, and the bravery of his troops, secured the success of this manœuvre, and gave him the victory. It must likewise be added, that the Austrians were, as it appears, as ill-informed of Bonaparte's movements, as he was well-informed of their's; or that, if they were not ignorant of them, they neglected to take advantage of those moments, in which, for the purpose of advancing in mass at one single point, he left others unprotected.

CHAPTER V.

Position of Peri re-taken and again lost by M. Davidovich—Sorties of the garrison of Mantua—Inaction and position of the respective armies—Mission of General Clarke—Exhausted state of Lombardy—New burthens imposed by the French—Discontent excited in consequence—Cispadan Convention—Preparations for war made by the Pope—New sorties of Marshal Wurmser—The French take possession of the Venetian citadel of Bergamo.

GENERAL d'Alvinzy having made some movements to draw nearer to the city of Verona, the French, who had reason to apprehend being taken in flank by that General, did not dare to run the risque of maintaining themselves in the position of Peri. They quitted it on the 22d of November, and on the same day M. Davidovich took possession of it a second time with his advanced guard; he did not, however, keep it long, and was forced to abandon it three days afterwards, M. d'Alvinzy not having continued to

advance, and the French having taken measures to secure themselves from that General.

While Generals Davidovich and d'Alvinzy yielded to the talents and fortune of Bonaparte, Marshal Wurmser made several sorties from Mantua, to make a diversion in their favour, as well as to procure subsistence and forage. He made an attack, with almost his whole force, on the 19th and 23d of November, on *St. Antoine* and *la Favorite*, drove in the enemy's picquets, and had the good fortune to introduce into Mantua a considerable quantity of provisions. These enabled him to prolong still farther his defence.

The successes of M. Davidovich between the 4th and 17th of November, having in some degree made amends for the disasters which M. d'Alvinzy had experienced during the same interval; and their army being still, in spite of its losses, more numerous than that of the French, it was supposed that these Generals would quickly recommence offensive operations. But whether they proposed waiting for new reinforcements, whether they knew that the last sorties of Marshal Wurmser secured for a long time, still to come, the subsistence of Mantua, or whether they were restrained by superior

orders, they undertook nothing during the month of November. The bad season came on, and obliged them to pass likewise the month of December in complete inaction, and in the same position which they occupied at the end of the preceding month. Their armies formed a semicircle from the Lake of Garda, as far as Monceleze, beyond the Piavego, occupying Arco, Alla, Bassano, Vicenza, and Padua. The head quarters of M. d'Alvinzy were at Bassano, and those of M. Davidovich at Alla.

The French army was as completely inactive, and remained so for as long a time, as the Austrians, and for the same reasons. The line which it occupied, extended from the Lake of Garda, to Legnago, passing through Rivoli, Verona, and Montebello. The space comprised between the Austrian and French armies was occupied by their advanced guards.

General d'Alvinzy, after having fixed the position, and the cantonments of his army, went, at the end of November, to Alla, to concert measures there with M. Davidovich, and to make arrangements relative to the future subsistence and disposition of his army. At the same time, Bonaparte set off for Milan, with a

view of meeting in that place General Clarke, whom the Executive Directory were sending to Vienna, with proposals of a separate peace. The stay which the latter made at Milan, and the reciprocal inactivity in which the two armies remained during this interval, occasioned it to be pretty generally believed, that General Clarke had made known the object of his mission to Generals Bonaparte and d'Alvinzy, and had engaged them to suspend, provisionally, all hostilities, till the issue of his negotiation. The tranquillity which the armies enjoyed, was more owing in reality to the rigour of the season, the impossibility of acting in the mountains of Tyrol, and to the expectation of reinforcements on both sides. With respect to General Clarke's mission, it proved, in the sequel, as short as it was ineffectual; the court of Vienna having rejected the proposals, and even refused to admit the presence of that Irish negotiator.

Bonaparte was detained at Milan, till the middle of December, as well by a sore in his leg as by affairs relative to the subsistence of his army. It was in want of many articles of clothing and equipment. The administrators of provisions likewise knew not in what manner

to supply the consumption of the army. The contributions were found to be dissipated, and Lombardy was exhausted by two successive requisitions. The particular extortions of the Generals and the Commissioners, had completed the ruin of that fertile and not long before flourishing country. The Commissioners of the executive power, Salicetti, and his nephew Bonaparte, had acquired immense riches, and had set the example of pillage. They had been too well imitated by the other Generals, who had shared amongst them the spoils of Italy.

The plunder of that country was the only point on which Bonaparte was in agreement with the Generals under his orders. These last, incited and headed by Berthier,* whose talents and advice had not a little contributed to the triumphs of Bonaparte, displayed, during this interval of military stagnation, the greatest discontent against that General. Their complaints were principally directed against the imperious

* This General is the son of the late first clerk of the war office, and of the repository of plans at Versailles. He owes his military fortune to Marshal de Broglie, to whom he was Aide-de-Camp in 1789, when the Marshal commanded the army assembled round Paris.

character of that young man, and against the indifference with which he had lavished, during the whole campaign, the blood of his Generals and his soldiers. The rumour of these dissensions having reached France, the Directory, dreading the consequences which might result from them, took measures for suppressing them. It obliged Bonaparte and Berthier to write two letters, in which they disavowed all motives of division, which were said to exist between them. The injunction of the Directors, the supreme authority of Bonaparte, and the military events which followed, kept within bounds the spirit of jealousy and hatred, which animated the Chiefs of the French army.

Its wants were so pressing, and the French Government was so little in a condition to supply them of itself, that, however exhausted Lombardy might be, Bonaparte was obliged to demand from it new sacrifices. He convoked at Milan, in the beginning of December, a general assembly of the nobility and clergy of the Duchy, and imposed on the inhabitants a new contribution of 5,000,000 of French livres, and a levy of 25,000 men. These two demands, which the presence of their conquerors pre-

vented the Milanese from refusing peremptorily, excited an universal discontent, and there was every prospect that the execution of them would be attended with the greatest difficulty. Bonaparte did not find more good-will in the inhabitants of Ferrara, Bologna, and Lodi, on which he likewise laid proportionate contributions, and the inhabitants of which it was his intention to subject to military service. The city of Lodi distinguished itself a second time, by a vigorous opposition to the conquerors of the Milanese. It was accordingly placed in a state of siege, that is to say, it was delivered up to the discretion of the Republican Generals.

At the same time that Bonaparte took these rigorous measures to maintain and augment his army, he employed himself also in extending and consolidating the revolt of the inhabitants of the Duchies of Modena, Ferrara, and Bologna. He assembled, in the town of Modena, a kind of federal convention, composed of nearly one hundred deputies, charged with the office of constituting the Cispadan Republic, and, above all, of arming the greatest number of men they could for the purpose of reinforcing the French army.

All the inhabitants of the cities and counties of Modena, Reggio, Ferrara, and Bologna, from eighteen to fifty years of age, received orders to arm, under pain, in case of disobedience, of being considered as enemies of their country and the public good. This confederation adopted the forms, as well as the principles, of the National Convention of France. It formed also *committees of public safety, and of general security*, and employed all the revolutionary means of its model.

The Pope, in refusing to accede to the conditions which the French government wished to impose on him, had not been blind to the dangers to which he exposed himself. He was not ignorant that the French had resolved, if not to annihilate, at least greatly to circumscribe his spiritual and temporal power, and that they would make the utmost efforts to penetrate farther into his dominions, to plunder and to revolutionize them. Being conscious that he had done every thing to allay the storm, which depended upon him, either in the character of a Prince, or of Head of the Church, he now thought only of employing all the means in his power to defend his existence in these two respects. Being no longer able to reckon,

at least ostensibly, on the succour of the King of Naples, and having reason to doubt the sincerity of the intercession of the court of Spain in his favour, he connected himself more closely with that of Vienna, and united his destiny with that of the latter power. He augmented his army, and placed it on a war establishment,* and sought for extraordinary means of defence in the affection of his subjects towards him, and in their hatred to the French. He exhorted all the inhabitants of the territories of the Church to arm: and to induce them to do so, neglected neither promises, nor privileges, nor rewards.

He was well seconded by the zeal and patriotism of the higher ranks, and the opulent people. They readily employed their money and their influence in raising several corps of volunteers. The Princes of Colonna and Borghese, each raised a regiment at their own ex-

* The troops of the Pope, whatever ridicule be attached to their name, would not be contemptible if they had good officers. They are well kept, and have good pay. They were engaged with the French in an affair very honourable for them, though unfortunate, since they had never seen fire, and had to do with the most experienced troops in Europe.

pense. The States of the Church assumed all at once a military aspect, and their head, after having shewn himself worthy of his spiritual elevation, by his wisdom and his attachment to principles, did himself no less credit as a Sovereign, by his courage and his resolution. On the 20th of December, he ordered a body of troops to march to Faenza,* and took measures that it should amount in a short time to 20,000 men. He gave the command of it to General Colli, formerly the commander of the King of Sardinia's troops.

The inaction of Generals d'Alvinzy and Davidovich, not allowing Marshal Wurmser to hope for a speedy deliverance, he was again obliged to rely on himself for providing means for the subsistence of the garrison, and the inhabitants of Mantua. He made several sorties during the month of December. Those

* It was near this town, situated on the Flaminian way, that historians pretend the famous triumph was formed. It was likewise in this town, called by some *Fayenza*, that the earthen-ware, known by the name of *Fayence*, was invented. Raphael, Julio Romane, and Titian, did not disdain to employ their pencils in painting some of these earthen vessels.

of the 11th and 14th were the most successful. His troops got possession of some boats loaded with provision and ammunition destined for the French army. This resource, joined to some thousands of horses which were in the place, delayed for some time the necessity of a surrender.

Bonaparte quitted Milan on the 16th, and proceeded to Verona. His army had been considerably reinforced, partly by old troops from France, and partly by some thousands raised in the insurgent countries. He had, besides, received from Piedmont a train of battering artillery, and it was supposed, that, weary of waiting till famine might subdue Mantua, he had determined again to besiege it in form; but the certainty of having shortly to sustain another attack on the part of the Austrians, prevented him from thinking of this enterprize, and he felt that the real mode of reducing Mantua, was to be again victorious. He neglected no means to become so; he visited the principal posts of his army, and made dispositions to be prepared for every event. He gave at the same time a fresh proof of the little respect he paid to neutral

powers, by ordering a body of troops suddenly to enter the Venetian citadel of Bergamo, which commands the city of that name. To colour this violation of neutrality, he wrote to the Directory, that he had been determined to this measure by the unfriendly disposition of the inhabitants of this province towards the French; and to prevent the enemy's parties from disturbing the communication between the Adige and the Adda. Many of his soldiers, he said, had been assassinated by the people of the country, who favoured as much as possible the escape of the Austrian prisoners.

On the 19th of December, General Loudon, (nephew of the famous Field Marshal of that name) who commanded the right wing of Davidovich's army, reconnoitred beyond the Lake of Garda, and pushed forward as far as the town of Brescia. He met only some of the enemy's vedettes, whom he took. At the same time, General d'Alvinzy detached a body of troops from the left wing of his army, which passed the Adige, at Boara, and directed its march towards the Duchies of Ferrara and Bologna, where the French were reinforcing themselves.

The object of the Austrians, in making these

movements on their right and left, was to draw the attention of the enemy to them, and to induce them to weaken their centre. The march of General Loudon towards Brescia and Bergamo, was calculated to persuade the French that the Austrians intended to carry the war to the country between the Adige and the Oglio, as Prince Eugene had done in 1705. The object of sending a body of troops into the countries of Rovigo and Bologna, was to cover the territories of the Pope, to facilitate the junction of his troops with the Austrians, and to oblige the French to place a large part of their force at this point. These preparatory dispositions for the attack, meditated by the Austrian Generals, had in part the effect which they promised themselves from them. Bonaparte reinforced his posts, as well in the Brescian as on the Lower Adige. He was not, however, deceived as to the real intentions of the Austrians. It was easy for him to judge that they had no other object in view, but the deliverance of Mantua; he therefore took his measures, so as to be enabled, when necessary, to reunite against them the greater part of his forces.

CHAPTER VI.

The Austrians form a fifth army—Distress of Mantua—Sortie of Marshal Wurmser; and escape of the English Colonel Graham—March and success of General Provera—Battle of St. Michael, before Verona—March and success of M. d' Alvinzy—Complete defeat of the Austrians at Rivoli and Corona—Bonaparte returns with reinforcements to the blockade of Mantua—M. de Provera arrives before this place—His rear guard are taken prisoners—His failure before the suburb of St. George—He is taken with his whole corps—Observations on the causes of these events—Loss of the Austrians and the French.

THE Austrians had employed the end of November and the month of December in forming a fifth army. All the regiments had been completed; and General Frolich had joined M. Davidovich with about 6000 men.

By the end of December, the Austrian army was as strong as it had been before the expedition in the month of November; and no exertions or expense had been spared to enable it to renew the campaign with advantage. The Generals were informed of the distress the city of Mantua experienced: they knew that the garrison was altogether in want of many necessary articles of subsistence, and was diminished by sickness and by service. In order to give himself time to wait the effect of the expedition which was preparing, Marshal Wurmaer had made, on the 29th of December, a very vigorous sortie. He had killed and taken prisoners a great many men: but this had been more brilliant than useful, the environs of Mantua being so exhausted of provisions, that the garrison could bring but a small quantity into the place. Its critical situation did not allow General d'Alvinzy to remain any longer in a state of inaction; and he kept himself in readiness to renew the campaign as soon as the season would admit of it. The necessity of hastening appeared more pressing on the arrival of the English Colonel Graham at head-quarters.

This officer, who exercised with the army of Italy, the same functions which Colonel Craufurd did with that of Germany, had followed Marshal Wurmser in all his expeditions, and had shut himself up with him in Mantua. The great importance of the Austrian Generals' being exactly informed of the state of the garrison, determined Colonel Graham to take on himself the charge of carrying this information to them. He acquitted himself with address and good fortune, in this hazardous commission. He left the city, in disguise, on the night of the 29th of December, and after having escaped the vigilance of the French patrols, arrived on the 4th of January, at the head quarters of the Austrians. M. d'Alvinzy received from him precise information of all that related to the city of Mantua and its garrison. He learned, that whatever might be the œconomy in the consumption of the subsistence, it would be entirely exhausted by the end of January. These accounts did not admit of his losing a moment; and it was resolved to execute instantly the projected operations.

The Austrian army at that time amounted to near 50,000 men. About 10,000 were before Padua, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Provera; nearly 10,000 were at Bassano, about half way between M. de Provera and M. d'Alvinzy, who was in the Tyrol with more than 25,000 men. It was resolved that General Provera should begin the attack on the Lower Adige, while the centre corps should advance in force against Verona, and that the grand army should put itself in motion in the Tyrol. The French army, notwithstanding all the reinforcements which it had received, did not exceed 40,000 men. Every probability was in favour of the Austrians.

On the 7th of January, the corps of M. de Provera left the neighbourhood of Padua, directing itself against Porto Legnago. On the 8th, he met the French, attacked and defeated them, though they made a vigorous resistance. He took from them the posts of Casella, Meclara, and San Salvaro; and forced them to retire to Bevilaqua. The enemy, having been reinforced, endeavoured to recover the ground which they had lost, but failed, and were again driven back to Bevilaqua;

nor could they sustain themselves there, but fell back on Porto Legnago, where General Augereau was, who defended the Lower Adige with 10,000 men. Of the two French Generals Stever and Comus, the first was killed, and the second wounded and made prisoner, on this occasion, in which the Vienna Volunteers, who had lately joined the army, particularly distinguished themselves. On the day following, the 9th, the Austrians pursued their advantages, again attacked the French, and with the same success as the day before. They forced them from the villages of St. Zenon, Menerba, and Bosto, and drove them as far as Bonavigo, and Porto Legnago, after having taken 300 prisoners and 3 pieces of cannon. These successes brought M. de Provera to the banks of the Adige, the passage of which he must necessarily force to be enabled to get to Mantua.

Bonaparte was at Bologna, when he was informed (on the evening of the 10th of January) of the march and success of M. de Provera. Not doubting but that all the rest of the Austrian army was at the same time in motion, he renounced for the moment

the affairs which had called him to Bologna.* After having caused 2000 men, who were with him in that city, to march immediately towards the Adige, he proceeded, himself, first to the blockade of Mantua, and then to Verona. He reached this city in the morning of the 12th, at the moment when the division of General Massena, who commanded there, was engaged with a part of the Austrian column that had come from Bassano. This corps, whose destination was to alarm the enemy on his centre, and to keep in check there a part of his forces, had overthrown the advanced guard of Massena, and had driven it under Verona. That General then marched out of the town, with all the troops that he had with him, and met the Austrians at the village of St. Michael. A very brisk

* He had marched into that town to intimidate the Pope, and to induce him to sue for peace. He had also in view to engage, or rather to force the Grand Duke of Tuscany to pay 2,000,000 of livres to the Republic, to indemnify it for the trouble and expense it had incurred by *defending the port of Leghorn against the English*. Bonaparte renewed his demand after the defeat of the Austrians, and the Grand Duke thought it not prudent to refuse it.

action ensued, which was not decisively favourable to either party. The Austrians attained their double object, which was to occupy General Massena at this point, and then to favour the march of a part of the corps from Bassano, which was going to reinforce M. d'Alvinzy, in the valley of the Adige. The French claimed the honour of victory in this action, and said, that they had taken 600 men and 3 pieces of cannon. They did not add, that they had lost an equal number of men and 4 pieces of cannon. After this affair, the Austrians marched back towards the mountains, and the French resumed their position before Verona.

While the Austrians were thus engaging the right and centre of the French, to draw their attention and their force to those points, General d'Alvinzy commanded the principal attack on the Upper Adige. He marched on the 11th to Montebaldo; and on the 12th made an attack on the head of the French line. The Austrians drove them from some entrenchments, but could not make themselves masters of the redoubts of Corona, which could not be attacked in front. They turned them on

the 13th, and succeeded in driving the enemy out of them, taking near 1000 prisoners. General Joubert, who commanded the French in these parts, fell back from Corona on Rivoli, which was by nature, as well as by the works which the French had raised, the strongest point of their position on the Upper Adige.

Bonaparte was as yet ignorant what were the real projects of the Austrians. They had attacked at the same time the right, the centre, and the left of his line; and had shewn on these three points forces nearly equal. Their movements had been till then well combined and executed. Bonaparte, uncertain against which point the Austrians would direct their greatest force, had not yet ventured to weaken any part of his line, and had remained in the centre, at Verona, that he might be ready to march with reinforcements, either to the right, or to the left, as circumstances might require. On the 13th, at night, he learned at the same time, that General Provera had forced the passage of the Adige, and that General Joubert had been driven from Corona. These two checks, experienced at once by both wings, were calcu-

lated to increase Bonaparte's embarrassments, and to double his uncertainty with respect to the direction of the disposable troops which he had with him; but the report of the spies, and the considerable force which the Austrians had filed off towards Corona, left him no doubt of their designs, and convinced him, that it was on the Upper Adige that they intended to make their principal efforts.

In consequence, he instantly ordered the division of General Massena to set out from Verona for Rivoli; sent directions to a corps which was at Desenzano to proceed to the same point; and after having given instructions for the measures to be taken on his centre and his right, went post himself, with his whole staff, to Rivoli, where he arrived in the middle of the night. He immediately considered how he should recover the important post of St. Marco, which is the key of the valley of the Adige; a post of which the Austrians had a few hours before obtained possession.

General d'Alvinzy, who had concerted every thing to make a general attack on the day following, passed this same night in making

preparatory dispositions for it. He had not supposed that Bonaparte could have had time to reach Rivoli with reinforcements; and believing that he should have to do only with the division of General Joubert, he had conceived the project of turning it, and the hope of cutting it off. The French occupied the semicircle of mountains which surround the village and the valley of Rivoli, at the foot of which runs the Adige. M. d'Alvinzy's plan was to turn this position, by placing a column behind it, which should cut off the road from Rivoli to Peschiera and Castelnovo, and should at the same time prevent General Joubert from receiving reinforcements, and from effecting his retreat. This General was to be attacked at the same time vigorously in front; and M. d'Alvinzy flattered himself that he should thus enclose him between superior forces, and break down, in one day, the principal barrier between him and Mantua. According to this plan, he had detached a corps of 4000 infantry, which was to take a position on the 14th, in the rear of General Joubert.

As soon as the French attacked, at four in the morning, the advanced posts of the Aus-

trians, and retook that of St. Marco, M. d'Alvinzy perceived that he had been anticipated, and that, contrary to his expectations, the French had been reinforced. All his dispositions, however, having been made, and in part executed, he was obliged to make up his mind to engage in the position in which he had placed his army, although it ceased to be so advantageous, since the enemy had received such reinforcements. The battle began warmly at about five o'clock in the morning. The Austrians vigorously attacked the left of the French, made it give way, and drove it from height to height. After having forced it entirely out of the line, they proceeded against the centre, which they likewise made fall back, which movement the right also followed. Bonaparte, seeing himself on the point of being completely defeated, ordered a brigade of reserve to march to the centre, the defence of which he entrusted to General Berthier, and went himself to the left, which was losing ground every minute. At this moment, so critical for the French, General Massena appeared with the division which was coming from Verona. Bonaparte instantly

ordered it to his left, which, being reinforced and rallying, renewed the attack against the Austrians, and after an obstinate engagement, retook a part of the posts which it had lost. While matters were in this situation on the right of the Austrians, their centre and left gained fresh advantages over the enemy, and, after having carried several entrenchments, reached Rivoli, the principal position where the enemy had reunited almost all their forces and their artillery. At the moment when they gained possession of the strongest posts of this position, the column which had been detached to turn it, appeared at a distance, on the heights behind the French. This moment seemed likely to be decisive in favour of the Austrians, and would undoubtedly have been so, if, while that column took the enemy in the rear, the rest of the Austrian army had reunited, and had made a vigorous attack in front; but the main army remained divided into three columns, which endeavoured separately to make themselves masters of all the heights, in order to surround the French. This enabled the latter to place themselves in force between these columns, and to take them in flank.

Till that time, the battle was entirely in favour of the Austrians, and every thing seemed to promise them a complete triumph. However distressing Bonaparte's situation might be, he did not despair of victory. He judged that it was possible to turn the dispositions made by the Austrians against themselves, and that what seemed likely to effect his ruin, might, on the contrary, produce that of his enemy. He saw, that if he could succeed in retaking Rivoli, the column which had turned him, being thus insulated, would itself be cut off and lost. In consequence, sending a brigade to keep this column in check, he rallied, reanimated, and led his troops again to attack the corps which had taken Rivoli, and recovered that precious post. As the possession of it must decide the day, the Austrians returned to the charge, and made such vast efforts that they again took this position. Bonaparte, knowing that it could not be left in their hands without his being exposed to complete ruin, united his whole forces, and made new dispositions. He sent General Berthier, with all the cavalry, to charge the enemy in the plain, and marched himself against the heights so long disputed. These two attacks;

made with concert and fury, had the greatest success. General Joubert retook Rivoli; and at the same moment General Massena, who had gained the right of the Austrians, taking them briskly in flank, threw them into disorder, and decided their defeat. They retreated in great confusion towards Corona.

Bonaparte, victorious in front, was then enabled to dispatch a considerable force against the 4000 men who had turned Rivoli. He caused them to be attacked by several columns, which almost encircled them, and left them no resource but to surrender themselves, or to cut their way through with sword in hand. This corps preferred the latter, and made the greatest efforts to pierce through the troops which surrounded them; but having neither cannon nor cavalry, they could not resist an enemy who had both these advantages as well as those of position and number. The greater part of these 4000 men were either killed or made prisoners.*

* The reader will perhaps not be displeased to read an extract from the private account which the author has received from the officer who commanded this column.

“ I had the command of the first column, consisting of 4000 men: without a single horse or cannon,

Such was the issue of the battle of Rivoli, which ruined the measures taken by the Austrians for the purpose of penetrating into the Duchy of Mantua, and of delivering its capital.

“ each soldier and officer on foot, provided with iron
 “ cramps, preceded by pioneers to break the ice. I
 “ marched thus during two days and two nights without
 “ halting, over rocks covered with snow, and without
 “ finding a single bush to make fire with. The third
 “ day, after a march equally severe, but through a
 “ country less dismal, I succeeded, according to the
 “ general plan, in turning the position of the enemy,
 “ who were entrenched at Rivoli, on the banks of the
 “ Adige. While I made this movement with my corps,
 “ three columns attacked the entrenchments of Rivoli in front, and carried them. The enemy retook
 “ them, and we again succeeded in driving them out;
 “ but by one of those inexplicable fatalities, peculiar
 “ to the Austrian army in Italy, the three columns
 “ which had attacked in front, having once more lost
 “ the entrenchments, my column found itself cut off,
 “ and abandoned by the rest of the army. I had now
 “ nothing left, but to cut my way through the enemy,
 “ for I could not bring myself to capitulate. Without
 “ cannon or cavalry, I had to make my way through
 “ a victorious army, which attacked me with all the
 “ advantage arising from numbers, from the ground,
 “ and from the nature of their arms. Accordingly, the
 “ greatest part of my troops were either killed or taken.
 “ Almost all the staff officers of my corps were wounded
 “ and made prisoners.

“ Seeing no longer any means of rejoining our army,
 “ which had retired into the mountains, I turned with

It cannot absolutely be affirmed that the plan of their Generals was ill-combined, but in the execution of it they committed several faults, of which it was impossible to be guilty with impunity, when opposed to a General so able and so active as Bonaparte. It was, no doubt, to the rapidity with which he advanced, and with which he made Massena's division march from Verona to Rivoli, that he owed this victory. If he had deferred that movement for only one day, General Joubert would undoubtedly have been driven from his position, and perhaps cut off. Bonaparte decided the business by outstripping M. d'Alvinzy; and it was no doubt as much owing to the good intelligence of spies, as to his own ability.

However important might be the victory of Rivoli, it delivered Bonaparte from only a part of his enemies. Previous to his departure from

" 10 officers towards the Lake of Garda, upon the borders of which I remained shut up in a country house, for two days and two nights, in order to escape the French patrols in search of us. On the third night I threw myself into a boat with my officers, and in spite of the vigilance of the French feluccas, we succeeded in passing through them by dint of rowing, and happily arrived at Torbole, where there was an Austrian garrison."

Verona to Rivoli, he had been informed of M. de Provera's success on the Lower Adige ; and while he was defeating M. d'Alvinzy, he had good reason to apprehend that the former General would overcome every obstacle, and succeed in breaking through the blockade of Mantua. This would have accomplished the principal object of the Austrians, and would have counterbalanced the effect of the battle of Rivoli. Bonaparte, desirous to neglect nothing which might hinder M. de Provera from accomplishing his object, without taking any repose, or allowing any to his troops, set out in the night of the 14th for the blockade of Mantua, accompanied by part of the troops who had fought at Rivoli. He left at that place General Joubert, with orders to attack the Austrians the next morning, at la Corona. To ensure the success of this enterprize, General Joubert sent, during the night, a column which marched round Montebaldo, and arrived at day-break on the heights which commanded la Corona. It was posted there before the whole of the Austrian army was arrived ; it then attacked them with advantage during its march, and took them in flank,

while General Joubert advanced directly against them.

The Austrians, overpowered by fatigue, weakened by their losses, and discouraged by their disasters, opposed no very vigorous resistance. They were defeated, and lost a great number of men made prisoners. The rest continued their retreat, and proceeded to secure themselves in the defiles of Tyrol.

Bonaparte arrived on the 15th, at night, at Roverbella, with the reinforcements which he brought from the Upper Adige. He there learned that M. de Provera had arrived before the lines of the blockade of Mantua. It has been seen before, that that General had reached, on the 9th, the banks of the Adige, between Porto Legnago and Ronco. Not being strong enough to think of making himself master of those two posts, which would, besides, have diverted him from his object, he resolved to force, as soon as possible, the passage of the Adige at some point or other, and to march straight to Mantua, without attending to the enemies whom he might leave behind. He employed the 11th, 12th, and 13th, in making his arrangements, and in attempting to deceive

General Augereau, who was opposed to him. For this purpose, he made part of his troops march towards Roncò and Legnago, and sent some pontoons to Nicesola; to induce a belief that he intended to pass the Adige at that place. But while he was making these feints; he prepared to pass the river opposite Anguiary, the most favourable point for this operation. On the evening of the 13th, he raised a battery of some pieces of cannon on the banks of the river, and under cover of their fire succeeded, in spite of the French, in constructing his bridge. His advanced guard, composed of volunteers, drove them from Anguiary; and the Austrians passed the Adige in defiance of all the efforts which the enemy made to hinder them. This being accomplished, M. de Provera recalled the troops which he had sent towards Bonavigo and Legnago; and having left two battalions on the banks of the Adige, began his march towards Mantua, thinking only of being beforehand with the enemy. He passed through Cerea, Saugui-netto, and Nogara, where he arrived on the 14th, in the evening, and where his troops passed the night. The next day, he marched as

rapidly as possible, passed through Castellara, and arrived, at noon, before St. George, a suburb of Mantua, which was one of the principal posts of the blockade, and which the French had fortified in a very strong manner.

As soon as M. de Provera had left the Adige, Generals Guieux and Augereau lost no time in pursuing him, with whatever troops they could assemble. The rapidity of M. de Provera's march did not allow them to overtake him, but they came up with his rear guard, which having to do with very superior force, and being wholly unsupported, was defeated and made prisoners. The same thing happened to the troops which M. de Provera had left on the Adige. The consequence was, that that General had not more than 5000 men when he arrived before St. George. He found that suburb so strongly entrénched, that, however urgent the necessity was for forcing the lines of the blockade, M. de Provera did not dare to hazard an immediate assault on the suburb, with troops fatigued, and small in number. He deferred his attack till the next morning, and found means, in the course of the day, to concert measures with General Wurmser. They agreed, that on the

next day, the 16th, they should attack, each on their own side, *la Favorite* and *Montado*, which they hoped to be able to carry more easily than *St. George*. But while they were preparing for this enterprize, Generals Bonaparte and Massena hastened their march, and that of the 6000 men, whom they brought with them. They arrived before Mantua in the night of the 15th, and proceeded to reinforce the posts of *St. Antony*, *la Favorite*, and *St. George*. By this junction, the French found themselves, at day-break, about 17,000 men strong, with the expectation of being still more numerous in a short time, General Augereau being on his march with his whole division. This superiority of force greatly embarrassed *M. de Provera*. That General seeing himself hemmed in by so great a number of enemies, receiving no news of General d'Alvinzy, and having every reason to suppose he had been defeated, had no part left him but to endeavour to break through the blockade of Mantua, and to shut himself up with *M. de Wurmsers*, in that place. The latter, as he promised, marched out of the citadel before day-break, with almost all the troops under his command. He attacked and carried the post of

St. Antony, then proceeded to la Favorite, and exerted all his efforts to force the entrenchments, and the corps of the enemy opposed to him. But this body, reinforced by the troops just arrived, shut up within its lines, and protected by the fire of its works, put a stop to the progress of Marshal Wurmser, and, in spite of the vigour of his attack, prevented him from advancing farther. At the same instant, M. de Provera likewise attacked la Favorite on his side: but he met with insurmountable obstacles, as did M. de Wurmser, and was incessantly repulsed by the fire from the enemy's entrenchments. While he was thus making useless efforts to storm the lines of the blockade, several French corps were ranging themselves behind, and were hemming him in. General Miollis, who commanded at St. George, then sallied out of his entrenchments, and advanced, in front, against M. de Provera. The latter, attacked on several points, and threatened on all, had it no longer in his power to resist such a force. Nevertheless, after having bravely defended himself for a long time, and killed a vast number of the enemy, his troops being overcome by numbers and fatigue, he offered to capitulate, which was agreed to.

The whole of his corps were made prisoners of war; but the officers were at liberty to return to the Austrian army on their parole. Marshal Wurmser, seeing his hopes once more disappointed, put an end to an useless contest, and retired within the walls of Mantua.

Thus ended this expedition, which, like all those undertaken by the Austrians in this campaign, commenced with the most brilliant success, and concluded with the greatest disasters. The failure was the result of the same causes, which had brought on the misfortunes of the months of August and November. The Austrians persisted in dividing their forces, and in making partial attacks. Bonaparte also persevered, and certainly with more reason, in uniting his troops, and to engage in a mass on one single point. He was not, however, indebted for his success to his tactics alone. He acknowledged himself, in his dispatches, and the dispositions which he made clearly evinced, that he had been thoroughly instructed as to the projects of M. d'Alvinzy. It would be imprudent, indeed, to publish conjectures on the manner in which he received this most precious intelligence. What may be depended upon, is, that he did not procure

it through the means of a common spy, but from some one whose situation afforded opportunities of being well acquainted with the plans formed by the Austrians. If Bonaparte had not been so exactly informed, it is reasonable to believe, that, instead of being so completely victorious, he would have been severely beaten at some point or other, and that the Austrians would at least have been enabled to break up the blockade of Mantua. That General admitted that he never incurred so great a danger, and *that his position hung as it were by a thread*. In effect, if he had remained a day longer at Verona, the corps of General Joubert would undoubtedly have been routed, and perhaps cut off. If, after the victory of Rivoli, he had staid four-and-twenty hours more on the Upper Adige, it is probable that M. de Provera would have penetrated the lines of the blockade of Mantua, and formed a junction with M. de Wurmser. In either case, Mantua would have been delivered, and the French, placed between two powerful divisions of the army, would have been compelled to abandon the Adige, and to repass the Mincio. Far from being guilty of the least delay, Bonaparte, as

if he had possessed the power of divination, hastened from Verona to the Upper Adige, and from thence to the blockade of Mantua, on the very day, and at the very hour it was necessary for him to be there, in order to frustrate the operations of the Austrians.

He arrived at Rivoli some hours before General d'Alvinzy commenced the grand attack which he had projected. Bonaparte then opposing to him a very large force, and at the same time making use of it with the utmost dexterity, disconcerted M. d'Alvinzy, and made him experience a defeat in the very place where he had a right to expect a victory. From thence, without either losing an instant, or granting any repose to his troops, he led them under the walls of Mantua, and arrived likewise some hours before Generals Wurmser and Provera carried their combined attack into execution. He opposed to these two generals, soldiers, who, thirty-six hours before, were fighting at Rivoli, and who brought victory with them from the banks of the Adige to those of the Mincio. This excessive exertion, the constant cause of Bonaparte's triumphs, might, on this occasion, have drawn him on to utter ruin, had he not

been informed, with precision, of the numbers, position, and designs of his enemies. Without this immense advantage, he would not have dared to move his troops with almost magical celerity, and to expose those points which he had left without sufficient means of defence, to be forced in his absence. However brave, able, and fortunate, he never would have ventured to play so hazardous a game. He was besides much assisted by the quality of the troops, with which he had to contend, the Austrian army being chiefly composed of recruits. He was not less so by the errors of the generals opposed to him. They committed several, both on the Upper and Lower Adige: but the greatest, undoubtedly, was the ordering M. de Provera to commence his campaign before he could be joined by the troops assembled at Faenza, by the Pope, or before they could have time to march towards the Po, with a view of causing a diversion there. If either had happened, Bonaparte would probably have left a greater number of troops on the Lower Adige, which would have set M. d'Alvinzy more at his ease; or, if he had not done so, M. de Provera, and the Papal troops, would undoubtedly

have broken up the blockade of Mantua, and formed a powerful army, by their junction with M. de Wurmser. The hurry of M. de Provera's march cannot be excused by the pressing necessity of relieving Mantua; a delay of a few days would not have put that place in the hands of the French, since it held out sixteen days after his defeat.

The result of this expedition, which resembled, in its short duration and fatal consequences, those of the months of August and November preceding, had a decisive effect in favour of the French. It secured to them the possession of their conquests in Italy, by throwing Mantua into their hands. These advantages are incontestible, but what is by no means so, is the account sent by Generals Bonaparte and Berthier, of the number of Austrians killed, wounded, and prisoners.

They estimated that of the killed and wounded at 6000, which is not very far from the truth; but they calculated that of the prisoners, in one letter to be 23,000, in a second 25,000, and in a third 20,000.* In like manner, they reckoned

* Amongst these prisoners were the three Generals Provera, Klobos, and Hohenzollern, 5 Colonels,

the number of cannon taken at one time to be 44, and at another 60. This variation in an article so easily ascertained as men and cannon, alone makes it doubtful what degree of credit should be given to these reports. Other considerations contribute to prove their exaggeration. Even allowing that the list of officers taken prisoners, as sent by Bonaparte, was exact (which it is not) whoever knows the formation of the Austrian battalions and squadrons, may judge how erroneously the French Generals have stated the account. In fact, calculating from the rank, the most favourable to their reports, the number of officers is not sufficient for 12,000 men, even deducting all those who might be absent, as attached to the equipage and to the commissariat. The accuracy of this method of calculating the number of prisoners, has been confirmed by several former occasions. It might be objected, that some of the officers had been killed ; but an equal proportion of soldiers

5 Majors, 62 Captains, 78 Lieutenants, 48 Sub-Lieutenants, and 24 Ensigns. Several officers, comprehended in this list, were improperly included, and, amongst others, Colonel Lusignan, who was one of the five Colonels said to be made prisoners, although he was not taken.

having without doubt fallen, the officers and soldiers taken prisoners must continue in the same proportion, both in the battalions and squadrons. Following, therefore, neither the French accounts, nor those published at Vienna, after the most exact information which could be obtained on this subject, the loss of the Austrians, under both the Generals d'Alvinzy and Provera, may be estimated at 17,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The French said nothing of that which they sustained during these six days; it undoubtedly fell far short of that of their enemies, though it amounted to upwards of 7000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

CHAPTER VII.

Retreat of the Austrians in Tyrol and Friuli—Actions at Carpedenolo and Avio—Defensive position taken by the Austrians—Surrender of Mantua—March of the French to the Papal territories—Proclamation of Bonaparte—Action of Senio—Conquest of Romagna, of the Duchy of Urbino, and of the March of Ancona—Taking of Loreto—Letters between the Pope and Bonaparte—Treaty of Peace between his Holiness and the French.

AFTER the fatal days of the 14th, 15th, and 16th of January, the Austrians, wholly incapable of undertaking any thing, or of even preserving the places they held, thought only of saving the wrecks of their army. M. d'Alvinzy secured himself in the defiles of the Tyrol, and all the troops which were between the Adige and the Brenta, fell back on this last river, and marched towards the Trevisano: they were not immediately followed by the French, who also required some time to recover from

the losses and fatigues they had sustained. In two days, however, they began to pursue the Austrians, whose rear guard they overtook on the 26th of January. They attacked it at Carpedenolo, and after a very smart engagement, they killed, by their own account, 200 men, and took 900. At the same time General Joubert, marching up the two banks of the Adige, followed the Austrians into Tyrol. He attacked their advanced posts at Avio, and made some prisoners, amounting, as he reported, to 400. He continued to advance for some days, and successively took possession of the towns of Torbole, Roveredo, and Trent, as fast as they were evacuated by the Austrians. If we may believe that General, they left in this last town 2000 sick or wounded, and lost in their retreat 1800 men taken prisoners. Generals Massena and Augereau marched, the first towards Feltre, and the other towards Treviso, and continued, as well as Joubert, to advance, till they had arrived before the new defensive position which the Austrians took behind the rivers Adige, Lavis, and Piave. Their line extended from Botzen or Bolzano, (the point where the de-

defiles of Tyrol become impenetrable, or at least cannot be turned) to the mouth of the Piave, which falls into the Adriatic Sea, above and near to Venice. They divided their army into three principal bodies, one of which defended Tyrol, and another Friuli, where they placed the greatest number of their forces. The third body, stationed between the two first, covered the space enclosed between the sources of the Lavis and the Piave. It was in this position, defended by three rivers, and a chain of almost inaccessible mountains, that the Austrians, obliged to abandon Mantua and Italy to the French, and having no other view than that of covering the hereditary dominions, concentrated their remaining forces, and waited for new ones. Their army was still under the command of Lieutenant-General d'Alvinzy, whom His Royal Highness the Archduke Charles replaced soon after.

The disasters and retreat of the Austrians deprived them of all hope of preserving Mantua. This place, for which the House of Austria had made such great exertions, and had suffered such considerable losses, was at length obliged to capitulate: its garri-

son much diminished by the sword, but still more by disease, had been long deprived of common necessities, and reduced to eat horse-flesh. Overwhelmed with fatigue, misery, and want, it had borne them all in the hope of preserving to the Emperor, a place on which depended his power in Italy. It was reduced to the last extremity, when Generals d'Alvinzy and Provera made a last effort for its relief. The event of this expedition reduced Marshal Wurmser to the hard necessity of surrendering a fortress, which he had defended, during four months, with a perseverance and activity worthy of the highest applause. The honourable conduct of this veteran officer secured to him the respect even of his enemies, and the capitulation which they granted him, bore testimony to the high estimation with which he had inspired them. It was signed on the 2d of February; the principal articles were—that the garrison, consisting of 18,000 men, should become prisoners of war, but be conducted into the territories of the Emperor, to be there exchanged in preference to all

others*—that Marshal Wurmser, all the Generals, the officers of the staff, 200 cavalry, and 500 individuals, at the choice of M. de Wurmser, should return into the Austrian dominions, with 6 pieces of cannon and their artillery men—that all the Generals and officers should keep their swords and baggage, and the privates of the infantry retain their knapsacks, and those of the cavalry their cloak bags. Besides these conditions, M. de Wurmser obtained advantageous terms for the inhabitants of Mantua, and secured to them the exercise of their religion, and the enjoyment of their property and privileges. The just regard thus paid to the rank, the age, and the conduct of Marshal Wurmser, reflected so much the more honour on Bonaparte, as he had not hitherto given an opportunity of praising his moderation.

The French General, having no longer any opponents in Italy, resumed the execution of those plans of plunder and dismemberment,

* It had consisted, at the time of the junction with Marshal Wurmser, of 24,000 men; 6000 had perished, either by the sword or contagious fevers; and a like number was in the hospitals.

which had been concerted either by himself or by the leaders of the French Republic. After the defeat of Generals d'Alvinzy and Provera, he had hastened to reinforce the troops which he had stationed in the Duchies of Bologna and Ferrara, and had dispatched General Victor thither, with orders to penetrate into Romagna. Shortly after, he went himself to take the command of this detachment, in order to give more dispatch and greater success to the expedition. He was preceded by two proclamations, in the first of which, after having enumerated the injuries which the French pretended to have received from the Pope, he declared, that the armistice concluded between his Holiness and the French Republic, in the month of June preceding, was at an end.*

* These means were not the only ones employed by Bonaparte to facilitate his march through the Papal territory, and for preventing the resistance which he might have experienced from a numerous and armed people. Before he made use of threats, he had endeavoured to tranquillize and lull the Papal Government into security. He had written Cardinal Mathei a letter, on the 20th of January,

On the 1st of February, Bonaparte made himself master of Imola; and marched the next day to attack Faenza, in front of which the Papal troops were entrenched, behind the river Senio. These troops, which had never before been in action, ventured nevertheless

which contained the following expressions. "*We are on the point of unravelling the plot of this ridiculous comedy.* You are witness of the value which I attach to peace, and of the ardent desire to spare you the horrors of war. Whatever may happen, I entreat you to assure his Holiness, that he may remain at Rome without inquietude. As first minister of religion, he shall meet with protection, both for himself and the church. You may likewise assure the people of Rome, that they shall find in the French army, friends, who will only rejoice at victory, as it may ameliorate the fate of the people, and deliver Italy from the dominion of strangers. My particular care shall be, not to suffer any alteration to be made in the religion of their fathers."

Bonaparte joined to this letter, those of Cardinal Busca to Cardinal Albani, the Pope's envoy at Vienna, which he had intercepted. They contained the detail of the measures taken by the Pope for his defence, and a view of the steps to be taken with the court of Vienna. A few days after having written this letter to Cardinal Mathei, Bonaparte had sent orders to citizen Cacault, agent of the Republic at Rome, to leave that town immediately, and to repair to him at Bologna.

to wait for the conquerors of the Austrians, and were desirous of shewing that report had not done justice to them. As soon as the French appeared on the left bank of the Senio, they were cannonaded from the batteries which the troops of the Pope had erected on the opposite bank. Bonaparte brought against them a legion of Italians, which he had raised in Lombardy: this body of troops, which, like its opponents, had never been before engaged, but which was supported by the French, attacked, in concert with them, this little army, which was quickly broken and put to flight. It lost 14 pieces of cannon, 1000 prisoners, and 400 killed or wounded. The French lost only 40 men; such, at least, was the account of Bonaparte, who also asserted, that several priests had been killed in the field of battle.

After this easy victory, the French arrived under the walls of Faenza, the inhabitants of which assembled at the sound of the tocsin, and flew to arms. Bonaparte forced the gates of the city with cannon; he had not the barbarity to put in execution the threats contained in his proclamation, and did not give

up the town to pillage. He contented himself with assembling all the priests and monks, whom he harangued, and brought back, as he said, to the *principles of the Gospel*. He thought himself so sure of the effect which his speech had produced upon them, that he dispatched two superiors of religious orders, one to Ravenna, and the other to Cesenna, (the country of the present Pope) to prepare the inhabitants for his reception. It was a circumstance not a little extraordinary, that one of the most strenuous supporters of the faction most adverse to the catholic religion, should make choice of two monks for his ambassadors.

After the capture of Faenza, the French advanced into Romagna, and possessed themselves of the towns of Forli and Cesenna, near which runs the famous Rubicon. They pursued their march the following days without meeting with any opposition from the Papal troops, which, being divided into several separate small bodies, were not able to make any effectual resistance. Most of these corps retreated at the approach of the French, and those whom the latter came up with,

were either taken or dispersed. After having traversed Romagna, Bonaparte entered into the Duchy of Urbino; he met with no farther opposition, advanced into the March of Ancona, and made himself master of the town of that name, where he took 1200 of the Papal troops, and a great quantity of cannon and arms of all sorts; that place being one of the principal arsenals in the Pope's territories. On the 11th, Bonaparte sent a detachment to take possession of Loretto, in the hope of finding there the boasted treasure of the Holy Virgin; but care had been taken, a few days before, to remove the greatest part of it. The French found nothing there but the statue, in wood, of the Madonna, some relics, and some valuable articles, worth nearly 100,000 livres (£4000 sterling), which General Berthier estimated, nevertheless, at a million (£40,000 sterling.)

Bonaparte, at this period, issued a proclamation, which there was little reason to expect from him, and which concurred with the capitulation granted to Marshal Wurmser, to shew that he was not inaccessible to the sentiments of moderation, justice, and hu-

manity. Satisfied, he said, with the conduct of the French priests who had taken refuge in Italy, he forbade, under the severest penalties, all the inhabitants of the country, as well as all the individuals of his army, to molest them, under any pretence whatever; ordered that they should be lodged, maintained, and fed, at the expense of the convents, in the dominions of the Church: and ended his proclamation, with saying, that he should see, with pleasure, whatever the bishops and other charitable ecclesiastics should do to ameliorate the destiny of the banished priests.

After the taking of Ancona and Loretto, the French continued to advance into the territories of the Church, directing their march to Macerata and Foligno. Their progress, which nothing could stop, there being no probability that the Pope's troops would dispute the passage of the Appenine, filled Rome with the greatest alarms. In the person of Bonaparte, they saw Brennus and Attila. They represented him to themselves arriving in the capital of the christian world, and of the arts, making himself master of its riches, de-

stroying its monuments, and overturning the pontifical throne. All the rich and considerable persons of Rome prepared to quit that city; and his Holiness himself made dispositions for placing his person in a state of safety. All the riches of Rome and Loretto were packed up, and sent to Terracina. At the same time that the Pope took measures to escape the tempest, he neglected nothing to avert it. Foreseeing all the consequences which might result from the arrival of the French at Rome, he thought it right to prevent it, by making all the sacrifices which they exacted from him.

Bonaparte, on his side, was not less disposed to terminate his expedition by a treaty. His object was less to advance to Rome, than to excite apprehensions in the Pope of his doing so, and to determine him to agree to the conditions which the French Republic chose to prescribe. Bonaparte felt that he could not, without imprudence, penetrate farther into the Papal territories. Whatever victories he had gained over the Austrians, and however weakened they were, it was possible they might attempt to take advantage of his absence, and the distance of a part of his army. In addition

to this, he would have been obliged, for the purpose of securing the obedience of a vast country, and a city so populous as Rome, to maintain a considerable body of troops in that place, and would in that case have weakened his army, and have afforded the Austrians the opportunity of attacking it with advantage. If he had left in the dominions of the Church, only a small body of men, he would have had reason to apprehend that, their weakness being known, the Pope's troops might assemble, and being supported by a people who were numerous, and ill-disposed to the French, might cut off the return of the latter, engaged as they would be in a difficult country, and where every thing was against them. Being unable at any rate to employ more than one month in this expedition, Bonaparte, instead of undertaking an uncertain and dangerous conquest, was right in preferring a treaty which gave him, without risk, all the advantages that he could expect from the war. He had, besides, received from Paris, instructions conformable to these views, the Courts of Madrid and Naples having made advances to the Executive Directory in favour of the Pope.

These considerations induced Bonaparte to take advantage of the first pacific overtures made by his Holiness. Having received from Cardinal Mathei, a letter, as affecting as it was dexterous, he returned an answer on the 13th of February, and announced to him, that he granted his Holiness five days for the purpose of sending him a negociator, provided with full powers to treat for peace. Two days afterwards, Bonaparte received the following letter :

“ Dear Sir, health and apostolical Benediction.

“ Being desirous to terminate in an amicable
 “ manner our existing differences with the
 “ French Republic, by the retreat of the troops
 “ which you command, we send and depute to
 “ you, as our Plenipotentiaries, two ecclesiastics,
 “ Cardinal Mathei, who is perfectly known
 “ to you, and Monsignor Galeppi, and two
 “ secular persons, the Duke Don Louis Braschi,
 “ our nephew, and the Marquis Camillo
 “ Massimi, who are invested by us with full
 “ power to concert with you, to promise and to
 “ subscribe such conditions as we hope will be
 “ just and reasonable, binding ourselves by our
 “ faith and word, to approve and ratify them

“in special form, that they may be valid and
 “inviolable at all times. Being assured of the
 “sentiments of good-will which you have
 “manifested, we have abstained from any
 “removal from Rome, and by that you will
 “be persuaded how great is our confidence
 “in you. We finish by assuring you of our
 “greatest esteem, and by giving you the paternal
 “apostolical benediction.

“PIUS VI.

“Given at St. Peter of Rome, the 12th February.”

This letter, and the arrival of the negociators, was quickly followed by the conclusion of peace; and Bonaparte returned to the Pope the following answer:

“*Most Holy Father,*

“I ought to thank your Holiness for the
 “obliging things contained in the letter which
 “you have given yourself the trouble to write to
 “me. The peace between the French Republic
 “and your Holiness has been just signed. I
 “congratulate myself on having been able
 “to contribute to your particular repose. I
 “conjure your Holiness to distrust those

persons, who, at Rome, are sold to the courts
 " which are enemies to France, or who allow
 " themselves to be exclusively guided by those
 " malicious passions which always bring on the
 " ruin of states. All Europe knows the pacific
 " and conciliating virtues of your Holiness.
 " *The French Republic will, I hope, be always*
 " *one of the truest friends of Rome.* I send
 " my Aide-de-Camp, chief of brigade, to express
 " to your Holiness the esteem and perfect
 " veneration which I have for your person ; and I
 " beseech you to believe the desire which I have
 " to give, on every occasion, proofs of that respect
 " and veneration, with which I have the honour
 " to be your very obedient servant,

" BONAPARTE, General in Chief.

" From the Head Quarters at Tolentino,

" February 19th."

The articles of peace were nearly the same
 with those of the armistice concluded in the
 month of June preceding, of which this treaty
 might be said to be only a ratification. The
 principal conditions were, that the Pope should
 give up irrevocably to France, Avignon, the
 Comtat Venaissin, the Duchies of Bologna

and Ferrara, and the legation of Romagna ; that he should pay, in two months, 15,000,000 of French livres, over and above the 21,000,000 stipulated in the armistice concluded in the month of June, of which 5,000,000 only had been paid ; that the French should remain in possession of the citadel of Ancona, till peace should be established on the continent, and of the provinces of Macerata, Umbria, Perugia, and Camerino, till the 36,000,000 due from the Pope should be entirely paid. They likewise confirmed the articles which stipulated the gift of the statues, pictures, and precious manuscripts. The French made besides, as Bonaparte wrote word, a good harvest of these, in Romagna, the Duchy of Urbino, and the March of Ancona.

Such was the price at which the Pope, who had never declared war against the French, and who had only made it for the purpose of self defence, was obliged to purchase the preservation of the throne of St. Peter. It cost nearly the third part of the dominions of the Church, and more than one year of his revenues, to satisfy the ambitious views and the rapacity of the French Government.

After having acquired by this treaty new pecuniary means for the subsistence of his army, from the chests of which a treasurer named Flachat had just stolen 6,000,000 (£250,000 sterling) Bonaparte employed himself in laying also under contribution the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the Republic of Venice. In this manner did the French accomplish their purpose of making this campaign at the expense of the neutral powers; and thus did the latter, for the sake of a neutrality which was constantly violated, make greater sacrifices than it would have cost them to defend the entrance of Italy against the French, or to drive them from thence after they had invaded it.

There remains only to present the reader with some general observations on the whole of the campaign taken together, and on its result.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Conclusion.

IT would be useless to enlarge on the astonishing succession of events, which have been described. The facts speak for themselves, and are too striking to require being detailed. Piedmont invaded, and the King of Sardinia forced to an ignominious peace—Lombardy conquered—both banks of the Po republicanized—the King of Naples detached from the Coalition—the Pope deprived of nearly one-third of his dominions—all the north of Italy a prey to the miseries of war, and to political convulsions—that country, but lately so rich and flourishing, robbed of its wealth and splendour—Such is the picture presented to us by this memorable campaign, which will be to posterity a subject of admiration and regret, and which the annals of war will place on a level with, if not above, that of 1706.*

* The French were at that time masters of almost all Lombardy, and of the City and Duchy of Mantua.

No person has so much contributed to the issue of the campaign of 1796, and by it to the peace which will follow this war, than the commander of the French army, Bonaparte.* None

One of their armies occupied these territories, whilst another besieged Turin. After the battle of Cagliano, gained by the Duc de Vendôme, over General Reventlaw, Prince Eugene was obliged to retreat as far as Roveredo and Gavardo: but he speedily resumed the offensive, and advanced, early in May, as far as Verona. Two months after, deceiving the Duke of Orleans, who had succeeded M. de Vendôme, he passed the Adige, the Tartaro, the Secchia, and the Tanaro, notwithstanding all the efforts of the Duke of Orleans, upon whom he had stolen several marches. He entered Piedmont, and raised the siege of Turin, after having gained a great victory over the French army: returning back again, he re-entered the Milanese, successively drove the French from all the posts occupied by them, and obliged them to evacuate Lombardy.

* Pascal Bonaparte, a godson of General Paoli, was born at Ajaccio, in Corsica, in the year 1768. His father, who died young, had the rank of Major in the service of France. At the age of ten years, Bonaparte was placed at the royal school at Brienne, from whence he was removed to the military school at Paris. While there, he discovered application and an inclination for the sciences. In 1785, being then no more than fifteen, he was appointed Lieutenant en Second of the regiment *de la Fere* artillery, which he joined at Valence.—His person is middle-sized, and his complexion dark and swarthy; his countenance bespeaks

of the Generals of the Republic have performed services so important and so difficult. He is the

nothing remarkable, except his black eyes, which are lively, and habitually fixed on the ground. He brought with him from Corsica, and preserved both in the royal houses, where he was brought up, and the regiment into which he entered, republican and elevated ideas, a spirit of independence, a great deal of pride, an extravagant opinion of his own nation, and a great contempt for the rest of the world. This character, as little adapted to military discipline as to society, pleased neither his commanders nor his companions: the latter did not fail to bestow on him those little corrections which, when given by equals, generally prove useful lessons; they had, however, no good effect on the haughty and savage disposition of this young man. Disassembling, silent, vain, and misanthropic, he read much, seldom went abroad, and almost always alone: he studied history and politics, disdaining the details of his profession, which he hardly attended to. Though naturally silent, when the subject under discussion was to his taste, whenever he deemed the auditory worthy of him, and more especially when Corsica was the topic of discourse, then he became animated, and spoke with great energy and warmth, though not with elegance. On these occasions, he discovered a good memory, a great degree of penetration and wit, a knowledge very uncommon for his age, and, above all, an extreme tenacity of opinion. Such was Bonaparte before the Revolution; till that period, he had shewn neither the inclinations, the virtues, the vices, nor the manners of his age.—His opinions, the violence of his character, and his ambition, would naturally induce him to take part in this revolution;

only one amongst them, who has not owed all his success to the superiority of his forces, or to political causes. Active, enterprising, able, and, above all, fortunate, he has committed few he was supposed to have had a considerable share in the disturbances which agitated Corsica in 1769. The year following, he rejoined his regiment, which was at Auxonne, taking with him a brother, of the age of twelve. One of his companions inquiring why he took so young a man as his brother with him, he replied, *I wish him to enjoy a great spectacle, that of a nation which will speedily be either regenerated or destroyed.*

Bonaparte attached himself more and more to the republican party, and obtained a rapid advancement. He was for a short time employed in the war of La Vendée; and also at the siege of Toulon. Being at Paris on the 13th of Vendemiaire, he shewed himself on that occasion one of the warmest partisans of the Convention, and very actively seconded Barras. This last being made Director, offered Bonaparte the command of the army in Italy, on condition that he should marry the widow of the Vicomte de Beauharnois, who had been guillotined. The young Italian accepted the terms, and departed for the Italian army, which he found in the greatest want of arms, clothes, and ammunition. He found the means to procure, at Genoa, a part of what was wanting; and the victories which he obtained from the beginning of the campaign, very soon placed his army above all want.

This biographical note was furnished by an officer who served several years in the same regiment as Bonaparte, and who was perfectly capable of appreciating him.

military faults, has not suffered his adversaries to commit any with impunity, and has not, in person, experienced one defeat. The war of Italy, which, till 1796, had been, if the expression may be used, only an episode of the general war, he made his principal and leading object; and there, where the Emperor seemed to have the least to apprehend, he made him experience the most sensible losses, and caused the most serious alarms.

If Bonaparte has been so great as a General, he has been far from shewing himself so as a conqueror, or as a man. The cruel manner in which he treated the towns of Milan, Pavia, Lugo, and Arquata; the burning of Binasco and several other villages; the massacre of a great number of their inhabitants; the outrages and pillages which he sanctioned by impunity, as well as by his own example, have tarnished the splendour of his victories, and left him no other claims to the admiration of posterity. The despotism which he exercised over the countries conquered by his arms, the excessive contributions which he imposed on the inhabitants, and the extreme rigour with which he enforced the measures ordered by the French

Government, have fortunately weakened the great effect of opinion, which his victories might have produced in Italy. Notwithstanding the formation of the Cispadan and Transpadan Republics, and although they furnished many thousands of auxiliaries to the army of Bonaparte, one cannot doubt the aversion which the majority of the inhabitants of this country has for the French, and for their political principles. The violent insurrections which broke out, whenever the latter had experienced any check, afford an unequivocal proof of the sentiments of hatred and vengeance with which they had inspired them, as well as of all the evils which they had occasioned.* If Bonaparte has, by his political

* It would have been very surprising if the French could have made themselves beloved in Italy, by making it submit to the most despotic yoke, by despoiling it of its most precious effects, and drawing from it more than 100,000,000 of livres, by contributions. It is thought right to present, in this place, the particulars: Lombardy was obliged to contribute 25,000,000 of livres; Mantua 800,000; the Imperial Fiefs 200,000; the Duchy of Modena 10,000,000; Massa and Carrara 600,000; Parma and Placentia 20,000,000; the Pope 36,000,000; Bologna and Ferrara 3,700,000; Leghorn, as the depôt of English magazines, 8,000,000. If we add to these contributions, of which two-thirds have been paid, the seizure of all the money which was found

conduct, placed himself below the height to which his military triumphs had raised him, neither has he kept up to it by his personal qualities. The bombast, the boasting, and the marvellous, which mark all his letters to the Directory, the constant exaggeration of the losses of the enemy, the ridiculously diminished estimate of his own, the perpetual representation of the destruction of the Austrian armies, when they had only been beaten, the capture of Mantua, so often announced as very near, many months before it took place, the circumstance of 4000 men laying down their arms, at Lonado, at his command, have given to his narrative the appearance of a military romance; and still leave just doubts, not of the reality of his victories, but of the extent of their consequences.

in the public coffers; 51 chests of silver plate taken, at Milan, Lodi, and Bologna; if we add the immense value of the requisitions in kind, made by the French, the pillage, the extortions, and the robberies, committed by the French army; we may have an idea of the fate of Italy, and of the sentiments which the inhabitants must feel for their conquerors. Bonaparte had no hesitation to say, in the proclamation which he made to his soldiers, in entering into Carylthia, that all the expenses of the army of Italy, during eleven months, had been paid by the conquered countries, and that he had besides sent 30,000,000 of livres to France.

In fact, if one takes the trouble to cast up the number of Austrians whom Bonaparte has successively declared to be killed, wounded, and made prisoners, from the opening of the campaign, to the capture of Mantua inclusively, we shall find, that the killed or wounded amount to nearly 50,000, and the prisoners to more than 100,000 men. In order to enable the reader to judge of the degree of credit which should be given to this enumeration, an account of the number of Austrian troops sent into Italy, from the month of March 1796, to the month of January 1797, which there is every reason to believe to be a pretty correct statement, shall be here presented.

The army of M. de Beaulieu, at the opening of the campaign	- - - - -	30,000
Troops which came from the Upper Rhine, with M. de Wurmser	- - - - -	30,000
Reinforcements sent to M. d'Alvinzy during September, October, and November	-	25,000
Troops detached from the corps of M. de Frolich, and the armed Tyrolese	- -	11,000
Fresh reinforcements sent to M. d'Alvinzy, in December and January	- - -	9000
Total	-	<u>105,000</u>

From this statement, rather exaggerated than under-rated, we find, that according to the ac-

counts sent by Bonaparte, he must have taken, killed, or wounded, 45,000 men more than the Austrians employed in Italy during this campaign; not to mention that at least 10,000 died in the hospitals, and that after the capture of M. de Provera, and the defeat of M. d'Alvinzy at Rivoli, there still remained to the latter about 30,000 men, either in the Tyrol, or on the Brenta.

Perhaps it may be acceptable to compare the statement just given, with that of the forces sent also by the French into Italy, and with that of the loss which they sustained.

The army of Bonaparte (or of the Lower Alps)	
before the opening of the campaign	- 30,000
Troops drawn from the two armies which had	
made war in Spain, and which were sent	
into Italy, in March, April, and May	- 35,000
Army of Kellermann (or of the Upper Alps)	
which, after the peace with the King of	
Sardinia, was successively incorporated	
with that of Bonaparte	- - - 25,000
Reinforcements which arrived from the interior,	
till January 15, 1797	- - - 18,000
Troops raised in Italy	- - - 12,000
Total	- 120,000

Bonaparte found himself, at the end of January, at the head of about 60,000 men. He had therefore lost at that period, an equal number,

in killed, prisoners, rendered unfit for service, or dead in the hospitals: that is to say, only 15,000 less than the Austrians. If one is surprised that the difference between the loss of the one army, almost always victorious, and that of the vanquished army, was not greater, a reason for it will be found in the indifference with which Bonaparte always lavished the blood of his soldiers; an indifference to which he owed almost all his success, in the sacrifices of men which he made at Lodi, at Fonteniva and Arcole, and, more than all, in the diseases occasioned by the climate, the blockade of Mantua, and the intemperance of the French soldiery.*

* It is assuredly not intended to induce a belief, that this estimate of the forces which the French and Austrians had in Italy, and of the losses which they sustained there, is arithmetically exact. Every judicious reader will perceive, that to determine this point with precision, one must have at the same time the statements made in the respective war departments of Vienna and Paris. No more than a near and probable estimate has been pretended to be given. There is every reason to believe it to be so, from the numerous researches made on this subject, from the assertions of persons applied to, and from the information which they have given on the force, and the periods of arrival, of the different corps which have been respectively sent into Italy, during this campaign.

It has been seen, in the course of this work, from what causes, and owing to what faults, the Generals Beaulieu, Wurmser, and d'Alvinzy, were successively driven out of the Milanese, from the Duchy of Mantua, and finally from all Italy. After having sustained, for four years, so many losses and expenses, the cabinet of Vienna, nevertheless, formed, during this campaign, six powerful armies in Italy, made greater efforts, and displayed greater resources towards the end of the war, than it had done in the beginning of it. Though it might probably have done better, had it begun as it ended, it deserves applause, however, for the wisdom with which it reserved its means in a war, the long duration of which it was easy to foresee, and for the energy with which it employed them in this last campaign. This would, without doubt, have been a successful one, if the means which were provided with vigour, had been directed with ability. But the Austrian Generals, persisting in Italy in their old ideas of tactics, while the Archduke was advantageously following new ones in Germany, constantly practised in the former country their system of *ubiquity*, notwithstanding the success with which Bonaparte

opposed to them a contrary line of conduct. Their mode of carrying on the war was methodical and slow, while his was enterprising and violent: They were making combinations, while he was preparing battles: They were shewing themselves on all points, while he made a point of appearing strong but on one: They were extending themselves, and endeavouring to circumvent him by their manœuvres, while he contracted himself, and advancing rapidly *en masse* against the point which it was of importance to him to force, broke in a moment the line and the combinations which they had formed against him. It was to this system, invariably followed by Bonaparte, that he owed the victories of Millesimo, Montechiaro, Castiglione, Roveredo, and Rivoli: it was by the rapid transposition and violent employment of his troops, that he gained such brilliant successes, in the months of August, November, and January; and that at each of these periods, in less than six days, he disconcerted plans, and dispersed armies, which had been two months in forming.

Some secondary causes also contributed very much to the issue of this campaign. The council of war, at Vienna, chose, as it had done in the

preceding ones, not only to take the charge of forming the general plan of the campaign, but also to direct the execution and local application of it. The Austrian Generals, bound by positive instructions, not daring to undertake any thing contrary to them, and being less responsible for events, than for their obedience to the orders which they had received, were often obliged to sacrifice to them opportunities of probable success, even sought for them less anxiously, and considered less how to deserve applause, than how to escape censure. The first dispositions of the Austrians being made with a great deal of care, exactness, and often with ability, and the General executing them with scrupulous fidelity, they were almost always crowned with success.* But when the talents of the enemy, or the chance of war, produced any unforeseen event, which reduced the Austrian Generals to the impossibility of executing

* It may be recollected, that in the three expeditions undertaken for the relief of Mantua, in the months of August, November, and January, the Austrians were victorious during the three or four first days; they were almost always so in the course of this war, whenever they began the execution of an offensive plan; and this from the causes just shewn.

the plan which had been dictated to them; then, obliged to rely on their own discretion, not being in the habit of taking it for their guide, and fearing to commit themselves, they neither dared, nor were capable of acting independently, and did not hazard any of those decisive strokes, which, in certain circumstances, can alone give victory.

Bonaparte was much more advantageously circumstanced. The necessity in which the Executive Directory found itself of paying, maintaining, and subsisting the armies of the Republic, at the expense of the countries which they occupied, did not admit of its limiting the power of its Generals; and as those had every thing to do, it was requisite that they should have the power to do every thing. To these considerations was added, the confidence which Bonaparte's first victories inspired. They taught the Directory that it might rely on the talents and good fortune of this young man. They left it altogether to him to direct, at his will, the force which was entrusted to him. Exempt from all responsibility, and neither mistrusting himself or his fortune, he could take advantage of all favourable circumstances, and could even

seek for victory in hazard. All the confidence which the Directory had in Bonaparte, he extended to the Generals who were under him, and left them the liberty of regulating their conduct according to circumstances and their own judgment. He had seldom occasion to repent of the latitude which he gave them; and when they made a bad use of it, he employed them no more; he changed his Generals, but not his system. He owed to it great part of his successes; as those of the Archduke, in Germany, resulted principally from the full powers which he had received, and from the independence in which he was placed, of the direction, as well as censure, of the aulic council of war.

Bonaparte appears also to have very ably employed another powerful means of success, that of treachery and secret intelligence. Imitating, in that respect, Prince Eugene, he spared no pains nor expense, to procure faithful spies, and to gain over people, who were in a situation to admit of their being well informed. Taking, with one hand, money from the countries which he had conquered, he lavished it with the other, to purchase, or to discover, the secrets of his enemies. The Austrian Generals, having little money to

dispose of for the same object, and not being able to procure it in the same manner that Bonaparte did, had it not in their power to be equally prodigal.* In this they laboured under a very great disadvantage; and it is not one of the least real causes of their reverses. Those which they experienced in the latter months of this campaign, resulted also, in great part, from the quality of the troops which they commanded. The armies, which were formed in the months of November and January, had a considerable proportion of recruits. The flower of the army of Italy had been destroyed or taken, in the fatal expedition of the month of August; and what then escaped, was afterwards shut up in Mantua, with M. de Wurmser. The sixth army, formed since the month of January, and of which the Archduke Charles has taken the command, is also, in great part, composed of young soldiers.

* The day after the first battle of Castiglione (the 4th of August), he gave £900 to an Italian spy, who gave him, in the course of the day, an exact account of the position of the Austrians, and of the number of their troops. In consequence of this information, the French General made, in the night of the 4th, the dispositions which might be most advantageous, and which procured him the victory which he gained the next day.

That of the French, on the contrary, with the exception of some thousands of men raised in Italy, is composed of the best troops of the Republic. In proportion as the latter disengaged itself, by peace, from part of its enemies, it diminished the number of its armies, and sent to those which it retained, the choice part of those which it suppressed. Thus, the troops which had been employed against Spain, La Vendée, and the King of Sardinia, went to repair the losses of the armies in Germany and Italy. The latter consists at present of none but formed and veteran soldiers; while the Emperor has been only enabled to supply with recruits, the void which has taken place in his armies. The French Republic has at this time the same advantage over the Emperor, with respect to the quality of troops, which that Prince had over it at the commencement of the war.*

* These are not the only causes which have given the French such a great superiority over the Austrians in this campaign. There are others, which arose from the nature of the country in which the war was carried on, and from the difference between the soldiers respectively employed. The theatre of war has been very disadvantageous to the Austrians. The mountains of Piedmont and Tyrol, are

almost all extremely difficult of access. The valleys which separate them are covered with mulberry-trees and vines, planted in hedge-rows, or in arbours, forming narrow covered ways, which must be forced one after the other by the soldier. The roads are defiles lined with walls, and are nevertheless the only places where the cavalry can act. The ground in Lombardy is not more favourable for war. It is not mountainous, but it is equally divided by vine and mulberry hedges, and the culture of rice requires a vast number of ditches full of water, which are no less embarrassing. A General must not hope to direct the movements of his troops on the ground: he can only manœuvre on maps, and according to the whole of his position taken together. In the Italian Tyrol, a battalion can never march or attack in front. As soon as it advances to the enemy, it must be scattered about as *tirailleurs*; then each man must act for himself, and consider himself alone, as a small army. He must advance with rapidity when he is supported; retire in the same manner when he is not; he must fire *à-propos*, then put himself under cover; he must call his companions when he has found a good pass. What disadvantage does not the Austrian soldier labour under in such a country! He is obliged to fight with a musket weighing eighteen pounds; to carry sixty cartridges, a very heavy knapsack, and a cloak around his breast which almost stifles him. In this condition he is to contend with the French soldier, whose musket weighs no more than a fowling-piece, who has nothing but a wretched coat upon his back, which undoubtedly does not embarrass him, and whose natural agility, as well as his species of courage, renders very fit for this kind of war.

All new methods have succeeded in war, from the Macedonian phalanx to the tactics of Frederick. The French owe a great part of their successes to the new mode of fighting which they have adopted. They pre-

precipitate themselves, like a swarm of wasps, on all the points which they desire to force. Fifty drums beat the charge, without ceasing; at this noise, which animates the assailants, and intimidates those who are to wait their attack, the bravest advance shouting, and mutually encouraging each other. Young Generals put themselves at their head, and share their dangers. The timid mass follows at some distance, and fills up the ground. Artillery has but little assisted the successes of the French in Italy; they almost always charged with the bayonet.—The Austrian army is brave, very brave; well managed, it would be the first in Europe. But nothing is done to excite and uphold the bravery and good-will of the soldier. He is left to all the horrors of his profession; the idea of killing or being killed is constantly presented to his mind, naked and unqualified. It is never disguised by the enthusiasm of honour, by the sound of military music, and the rolling of the drum. At the moment of action they send into the rear the music and the colours, those precious ensigns, which have, both in ancient and modern times, been so often the pledge of victory, and of the devotion of the soldiers. It is thus that an army, whose elements were almost perfect, has been so often beaten by one very inferior with respect to material composition. Positions and entrenchments have, besides, been constantly relied on, although it ought to have been observed that they were always carried. In this war, innominate nature has been of no use, living nature has done every thing.

THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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